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This study sought to identify correlation between the levels of 
commonly cited success factors in individual AMT project implementations 
that differentiated successful AMT implementation efforts from 
unsuccessful ones, by surveying "knowledge workers". In order to 
classify AMT projects as successes or failures, the survey instrument 
obtained information from each project regarding the initial expected 
outcome of the project, and its performance relative to the stated 
expected outcomes. Scoring schemes were developed, evaluated, and the 
best methodology was used to obtain the relative performance scores for 
each project. The scores obtained underwent cluster analysis to define 
projects as successes or failures. These groupings were used for 
testing nineteen hypotheses to find out which of the factors commonly 
listed as success factors in AMT project implementations were 
statistically significant for distinguishing between the successful and 
the unsuccessful groups of AMT implementation. 
A two tailed t-test for independent groups, indicated that seven 
out of the nineteen factors addressed in study were statistically 
significant in differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts across the spectrum of projects represented. The 
findings concluded that although all of the factors addressed in the 
hypotheses tended to contribute to success in individual project 
implementation, the degree to which they varied between successful and 
unsuccessful projects was significant for only seven factors. The 
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degree to which these seven factors are present would be indicative of 
more successful AMT implementations across projects and organizational 
boundaries. The seven significant factors were: alignment of the core 
organizational systems with the corporate strategy, strategy formulation 
process, educational program for employees, top-down planning and 
bottom-up implementation, pace of implementation, adequacy of technology 
implemented to its application, and the alignment of AMT strategy with 
corporate culture. 
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Problems of productivity growth and global competition are major 
concerns of business organizations. Among the ma~ proposed solutions 
to these problems is the upgrading of process technology in 
manufacturing sectors of the economy. However, most firms experience at 
least some problems in their efforts to implement process innovation. 
Most firms do not get the full productivity benefits of these 
technologies [24]. Even when firms do apparently achieve acceptable 
performance levels with the new systems, it often takes longer and uses 
more resources than most managers anticipated [34]. The challenge now 
is in the organizing, scheduling, and managing the total manufacturing 
enterprise, and determining why some companies are successful at 
introducing new process technologies while others have extreme 
difficulty, and why some companies that have a history of successful 
innovations suddenly experience problems with a new one [36]. 
It is easy to use limited data (one's experience, say, or one's 
casual observation of others) to construct theories about the secrets of 
success or failure in process innovation. Unfortunately, few theories 
have weathered the exposure to large amounts of data because so ma~ 
variables obscure the picture: industries differ, technologies differ 
(some are inherently more complicated than others or are at different 
stages of development), companies differ, their vendors and consultants 
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differ~ and the people involved differ [36]. This study attempted to 
identify some of these factors and based on the data collected across 
different industries, search for a generalizable patterns of successes. 
This was done in an attempt to provide some input to address these 
probing questions relating to the implementation of advanced 
manufacturing technology (AMT) projects. 
Successful implementation strategies address the method of 
implementing Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs) such that they 
produce the expected effects (the desirable outcomes of AMT) on the 
total organizational posture. Among the desirable outcomes of AMTS are 
the following: greater long-term profitability, improved 
competitiveness, improved quality, higher productivity, greater 
flexibility, shorter throughput time, improved schedule performance, 
reduced inventories, reduced prices for end products, less parts queue 
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time, and greater value added per square foot and so on [102]. This, of 
course, is by no means an exhaustive list of the desirable outcomes of 
AMTS, but a representative set of desirable outcomes, to give only a 
synopsis of the potential benefits that could be derived from 
successfully implemented Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs). 
This study reviewed the literature to determine the factors that 
were predominantly mentioned as success factors in individual project 
implementation experiences. These formed a basis for developing the 
hypotheses for the study. Based also on the information from 
literature, a questionnaire was developed and used to conduct a survey 
of projects that have implemented AMT. This was done in order to 
investigate if there were a general set of factors which distinguished 
successful AMT implementation from the unsuccessful ones. The results 
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of this study are expected to provide some direction and guidelines for 
successful implementation of AMTS. The development in the following 
sections will indicate the need for this study, through the statement of 
the problem, background of the study, and the goals and objectives of 
the study. 
The Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs) explored in this 
study fall under the realm of technologies that collectively, comprise 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM). 11 Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing (CIM) is an approach to the organization and management of 
a manufacturing firm, in which the functions of design, manufacturing 
and production management are mutually rationalized and completely 
coordinated, through the use of computer and information/communication 
technologies" [63, p. 173]. 
There are numerous discrete advanced manufacturing technologi es 
under the overall umbrella of technologies that make up CIM. 
Technologies that are included in this framework include: Computer Aided 
Manufacturing (CAM), NC/CNC/DNC, Robotics, Vision Systems, Automated 
Guided Vehicle Systems (AGVS), Automated Storage and Retrieval Systems 
(AS/RS), Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS), Manufacturing Cells, 
Automated Assembly Systems, Computer-Aided Testing and Computer-Aided 
Inspection (CAT/CAI). 
Other technologies included under the CIM umbrella are: 
Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Engineering (CAD/CAE), Group 
Technology (GT), Computer-Aided Process Planning (CAPP}, MRP and MRP II, 
Just-In-Time {JIT) manufacturing, Local Area Networks (LANS), 
Manufacturing Automation Protocols, and Technical and Office Protocols 
(MAP/TOP), Initial Graphics Exchange Specification (IGES), Database 
4 
Management Systems (DBMS), and so on. As is evident thus far, almost 
every 11 buzz word 11 in modern manufacturing systems can be under this 
general rubric that comprises CIM. The study investigated how these 
technologies combine with other systems within an organization to yield 
the respective levels of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
implementation success attained by the organization. Figure 1 gives a 
general picture of how these AMTS fit into the total organizational 
infrastructure. The model presented in Figure 1 indicates that the 
external focus of strategy must be balanced by assessment of the 
internal capabilities - the organization's structure, management 
process, cultural and political systems, and the technical system - in 
order to implement strategy effectively. A disciplined approach to 
implementing these AMT systems is the cornerstone for achieving the ful 1 
potential of such systems. The questionnaire that was used to conduct 
the survey for this study was designed to capture the relationships of 
these systems, and to subsequently test individual factors within each 
system to find out which of them were differentiating factors between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation. 
Need for the Study 
Manufacturing firms throughout the world have invested and are 
expected to continue to invest heavily in Advanced Manufacturing 
Technologies (AMTs). As global competition intensifies, American 
managers are adopting a new battle cry: 11 Beat 1 em with technology or 
move-over there 11 [44, p. 69]. Indeed, since 1975, the boom in 
information-intensive processing technologies has been explosive. 
According to Jaikumar [44], a close look at how U.S. managers are 
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actually using these technologies~ however~ silences their battle cry in 
a hurry. He indicated that they are buying the hardware of flexible 
automation, but in most cases, they are using it very poorly. 
Information, from Oataquest, Inc., a market research firm, shows that 
purchases of factory automation has doubled to 18.1 billion dollars over 
the past five years, and the market is expected to double again by 1990 
[67]. Each year, these new technologies, such as CAD, CAM, robotics, 
etc., are being applied to an ever-expanding list of industry fields 
with some impressive successes. 11 No 1 anger are these technologies only 
for giant corporations, for as they are proven, these technologies are 
becoming less expensive and within the budgets of smaller companies who 
must consider these new technologies to remain competitive within their 
market places" [76, p. 13]. The results of the efforts to implement AMT 
systems at this stage are mixed, with some alarming failures, but also 
some notable successes. 
To date, the strategy for implementing advanced manufacturing 
technologies (AMTS} have been developed via trial-and error by each firm 
as it pursues its first efforts. This approach to Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT} implementation may not result in the most 
efficient operation of the new technology installation. The process by 
which a strategy is formulated is extremely important to the strategy's 
success. The appropriate process involves not only developing the right 
economic answer, but also ensuring that it can be implemented within the 
particular company [97]. Determining what set of activities needs to be 
undertaken involves identifying what is needed by the company. There is 
however, no empirical data currently available, that delineates the 
factors accounting for success across a spectrum of AMT project 
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implementations. There is therefore a need for such a study in order to 
provide a general model that is not based on individual project 
implementation experiences. Such a model would be significant in 
directing future implementation efforts. Implementing modernization 
which will not aid a company in accomplishing its business objectives 
will be a failure. It is imperative that the real needs of the company 
be determined in order to identify the appropriate modernization 
activities, and delineation of the requirements for a successful AMT 
project implementation would assist in that process. 
In a number of cases, managers have successfully resolved the 
issues involved in implementing AMT systems, but their experiences and 
knowledge is not readily available to assist other managers going 
through similar experiences. Assessing and documenting the general 
requirements for successful implementation Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT), and evaluating their ·commonality across several 
implementation efforts will provide a set of generally accepted factors 
required for successfully implementing Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT). This would be valuable information and also serve as a guide for 
future efforts to implement AMT systems. 
Implementing advanced manufacturing technologies (AMTS) such that 
the system will achieve the anticipated effects on the total 
organizational posture is of prime concern to numerous organizations 
that are planning to implement AMT systems in the future. This study 
was designed to extract and synthesize the general factors affecting AMT 
implementation efforts across several different projects. This will 
provide valuable information for managers who are designing AMT 
implementation strategies for the future. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The information addressing Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) 
implementation success or failure that is available in the literature 
today is predominantly based on reports of individual project 
implementation experiences. This body of information, currently being 
used to theorize on the factors accountable for successes or failures of 
AMT projects are therefore, limited to reports by individuals involved 
in the implementation of the project being reported on without the 
benefits of cross comparisons with other implementation experiences. 
Empirical data indicating the commonality of any set of factors for 
successful implementation of AMT across several projects is currently 
lacking. Such information is required in order to give implementation 
planners and practitioners some direction in their implementation 
efforts. This research synthesized factors that were commonly cited in 
literature as being factors for individual AMT projects successes. 
Subsequently, a study was conducted, to survey AMT projects across the 
United States, to investigate if there were any discernible pattern in 
factors that accounted for successes across a spectrum of AMT projects. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to conduct a survey of companies 
across the United States that have implemented advanced manufacturing 
technologies, to investigate if there is any commonality in factors that 
significantly differentiated successful AMT projects from the 
unsuccessful ones. The study was aimed at determining if there are any 
generalizable patterns in success factors across the myriad of projects 
represented in the survey sample, or if the success factors addressed in 
literature are based strictly on individual projects. Assessing and 
documenting the factors affecting AMT implementation efforts will 
provide valuable information to managers who are designing 
implementation strategies for the future, and contribute to the general 
theory of AMT implementation. 
In the efforts to implement Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT}, identifying attract ive opportunities and setting the ri gh t 
strategic direction do not themselves guarantee success. An 
organization will move most effectively toward its declared objectives 
when, and only when, all of its complex elements are synchronized. This 
synchronization concept is frequently referred to as 11 fit 11 • Successful 
performance occurs when an appropriate strategy is implemented through 
the effective rationalization of the basic elements (The core 
organizational systems} that make-up and drive the organization. 
Success - the achievement of the declared strategic business objectives 
desired from the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project 
implementation - is brought about through a complex interaction of 
strategy and all these elements. The questions addressing each of the 
hypothesis for this study attempted to focus on the complex interaction 
required of the core organizational systems (organization's structure, 
management processes, cultural and political systems, and the technical 
system} in order to achieve the strategic business objectives specified 
for the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} in the organization's 
strategy formulation. 
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Theoretical and Practical Framework 
for the Study 
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All of the complex elements and actions required to move an 
organization towards its strategic objectives must be raised to the 
conscious level, clearly understood, and as much as possible, made to 
work in unison. A strategic diagnosis is one way to evaluate the fit 
among them all, and can help the organization move surely towards 
success [88]. There is no general theory of implementation that would 
specify how different organizational settings can balance their external 
focus on strategy formulation with their internal capabilities in order 
to implement the AMTs included in their strategy effectively. 
It seems reasonable that more sophisticated manufacturing systems 
would require integrated planning of the whole system, but even the 
largest companies rarely approach the problem this way. It is much more 
of a trial and error process [34]. There is a disturbing tendency in 
much of the literature on advanced manufacturing technologies that 
suggest that every installation is unique and there is no transfer of 
knowledge gained from experience from one case to the next [24]. The 
overall thrust of this research was to explore theoretical and practical 
answers to the question of why some firms that adapt advanced 
manufacturing technologies are more successful than others. In spite of 
the importance of this issue, there is no general theory of 
implementation in existence [24]. This research should eventually 
contribute to the general knowledge of implementation, as well as 
provide summary recommendations to practitioners faced with 
implementation planning in the future. 
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Scope and Limitations 
This study was limited to selected companies that have implemented 
AMT. The sampling of companies to be included in the study was 
conducted on a nationwide basis. Information was collected from project 
managers or team members that have been involved in the actual 
implementation of their respective AMT systems. This was possible 
because a purposive sample was used to direct the survey instrument to 
those who have either volunteered to be participants in the study, and 
have indicated their involvement in such projects, or have been selected 
by experts consulted, based an their knowledge of, and interaction with 
those chosen to be in the survey population. 
The responses to the questionnaire have several inherent 
limitations. One of the major limitations is that the return rate to 
mail questionnaires is usually very low because the participants are 
essentially volunteers. In order to increase the return rate, the depth 
in which questions are designed has to remain somewhat limited to avoid 
possible concern of respondents as regards revealing confidential 
company information. 
Another limitation of this study is that the questionnaire approach 
distances the researcher from the sample, somewhat limiting the 
researcher's knowledge of the respondents. 
Assumptions 
The study made the following assumptions: 
1. All participants had a good understanding of their 
organization 1 s Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT), and the 
implementation process in their particular organizations. This was 
accomplished by using a purposive sample in a deliberate effort to 
direct the questionnaire to people that are known, though publications 
or personal contacts, to be involved in their AMT efforts. 
2. All participants have played an active part in their 
organization ' s Advanced Manufacturi ng Technology {AMT) implementation, 
for example, by being members of the AMT project team. 
3. All participants understood the intent and purpose of each of 
the survey questions. 
4. All participants answered the questions honestly and 
accurately. 
Definition of Terms 
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Although most of the terms in the study may be classified as common 
knowledge in advanced manufacturing organizations. The following 
definitions are provided to avoid misinterpretation of their use within 
this study: 
ADVANCED MANUFACTURI NG TECHNOLOGY (AMT ) - Indivi dual technologies which, 
as a group comprise computer integrated manufacturing. Among the 
technologies included in thi s category are: robotics, computer-aided 
design and computer aided manufacturing {CAD/CAM ), material handling 
systems, vision systems, and so on. 
KNOWLEDGE WORKER - People who were involved in the planning and/or 
implementation of their AMT. 
CIM - COMPUTER INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING - An approach to the 
organization and management of a manufacturing firm, in which the 
functions of des i gn, manufacturing and production management are 
mutually rationalized and completely coordinated, through the use of 
computer and information/communication technologies. 
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION - Attainment of the stated expected outcomes 
for the AMT project. The level of success of a project is measured by 
the degree of attainment of the expected outcomes for the project. 
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FMS - FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM - FMS consist of a group of 
processing stations (usually Numerical Control machines) connected by an 
automated workpart handling system. 
JIT - JUST-IN-TIME - This is a Japanese production control philosophy in 
which there is so little inventory in the system that detailed 
monitoring of transactions is unnecessary. It is a l ogi sti cs approach 
designed to result in minimum inventory by having the necessary material 
arrive at the necessary place and time. 
LEAD TIME (MANUFACTURI NG) - The total time required to process a 
workpart through the plant. It includes not only the actual operation 
times but also the nonproductive dead time that must be allowed. 
~p II - MATERIAL REQU IREMENT PLANN ING II also referred to as 
MANUFACTURI NG RESOURCE PLANNING - Material requirement planning (MRP} is 
a computational technique that converts the master schedule for end 
products into a detailed schedul e for raw materials and components used 
in the end products. MRP II represents a significant improvement over 
MRP. It ties together, the various separate functions of production 
planning and control system by linking the MRP system and the financial 
systems in the company. 
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Null Hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this study were derived from an extensive review 
of literature. In the literature review which is presented in its 
entirety in Chapter II, a set of factors were identified predominantly 
by several different sources as being accountable for varying levels of 
successes attained in AMT project implementations in their firms. Those 
factors that were most frequently listed were synthesized, and formed a 
basis for the hypotheses that were tested for the study. Chapter II 
covers the review of literature which produced the factors addressed in 
these hypotheses. A summary of each hypothesis formulated, along with 
the literature supporting them is also provided at the end of the 
literature review in Chapter II. 
This study was designed to test the following hypotheses: 
1. The degree of effectiveness in aligning the core organizational 
systems with the corporate strategy will not be a significant factor in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful organizations in their 
efforts to implement AMT. 
2. The degree of effective alignment of employee attitudes with 
the corporate strategy wil l not be a significant factor in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
3. The strategy formulation process will not be significant in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
4. An organization's position along the organic - mechanistic 
dimension will not make a significant difference in the degree of 
success attained in their efforts to implement Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT). 
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5. The nature of the relationship between the technology supplier 
and the user firm will not be significant in differentiating successful 
and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
6. The existence of an AMT champion will not make a significant 
difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
efforts. 
7. The position of the AMT champion in the organization will not 
make a significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
projects. 
8. The existence of an employee educational program prior to AMT 
implementation will not be a significant factor in distinguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts 
9. The degree of availability of hands-on training program for 
employees after the installation of the AMT system will not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
10. The degree of top-down planning and bottom-up implementation 
in an organization will not be a significant factor for distinguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
11. The pace of implementation will not make a significant 
difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
efforts. 
12. The degree to which organizations obtained experience with a 
pilot project prior to implementing a full scale project will not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
13. The organization and composition of the AMT project team will 
not be a significant factor differentiating successful and unsuccessful 
AMT implementation efforts. 
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14. The degree of management commitment and support in an 
organization will not be a significant factor differentiating successful 
and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
15. The magnitude of product redesign or simultaneously designing 
a new product in parallel with implementing a dedicated AMT will not 
make a significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
16. The degree of adequacy of the particular technology to an 
application in the organization will not make a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
17. The degree of information integrity in an organization prior 
to AMT implementation will not be a significant factor in 
differentiating between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
efforts. 
18. The degree of availability of qualified systems integrators in 
an organization will not make a significant difference between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
19. The degree of alignment of an organization's AMT strategy to 
its culture will not be a significant factor in differentiating between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
The core organizational systems shown in Figure 1 are represented 
in the nineteen hypotheses stated for this study corresponding to the 
factors addressed in the literature, and selected as pertinent factors 
for investigation in this study. A summary of the core organizational 
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systems along with the hypotheses addressing them is presented in Table 
I. 
TABLE I 
COUNTERCHECK OF HYPOTHESES' AFFILIATION 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter focuses on the review of theoretical and empirical 
literature most pertinent to this investigation. It also inventoried 
data pertinent to the adequate assessment of the current knowledge of 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation strategies, and 
established the practical and theoretical reasoning underlying the AMT 
implementation process. This aided in identifying the general 
requirements for successful AMT implementation. These identified 
factors were then used in the survey design to attempt to establ ish the 
commonality of these factors in the companies surveyed. This chapter 
covers the literature supporting the different core organizational 
systems, as they relate to the implementation of Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT). The topics covered include: the need for 
understanding of implementation success factors, strategy formulation 
and implementation, cultural and political systems, technical systems, 
organizational management processes, organizational structure, 
implementation success factors, and expected outcomes of AMT. 
The Need for Understanding of Implementation 
Success Factors 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) is not just groups of 
equipment or systems such as Computer-Aided Design (CAD), Robotics, 
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Manufacturing Resource Planning (MRP I I} or other sophisticated 
equipment, but significant strategic systems, capable of determining an 
organization's survival or demise in the face of global competition. 
AMT represents an opportunity to revise the way companies do business in 
new and creative ways through more flexible and integrated approaches to 
manufacturing operations. Modernization includes the set of activities 
which will improve productivity, quality, and throughput time, among 
other benefits. Some of these activities will involve purchasing new 
equipment, but may involve improving how the product is currently being 
processed and utilizing existing resources to their maximum capabilities 
without spending money on new equipment [76]. Determining the right set 
of activities is the cornerstone to a successful modernization effort. 
Implementing new technologies which do not interface with all required 
activities will create an island of modernization with disappointing 
results. For this reason, it is important to identify the needs of the 
organization, and how the new technologies tie into the strategic 
direction of the organization. Delineation of factors for successful 
implementation would be a valuable resource in th i s needs analysis. 
This information would provide guidance not only for determining if a 
modernization activity should be undertaken, but also determine what 
areas should be considered for such modernization activities. 
Most market forecasts reveal a dramatic growth in factory 
automation. According to Dataquest, Inc., 11 ••• purchases of factory 
automation has doubled to 18.1 billion dollars over the past five 
years. The market is expected to double again by 1990 11 [67, p. 8]. 
The evolution of global markets and competition are some of the 
reasons that organizations are adopting AMTs. Because of international 
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competition; companies are being forced to introduce new and better 
products faster, and at a lower cost. Developments in manufacturing 
technology are offering new options - options for greater flexibility, 
better quality, and rapid response to changing market requirements - at 
lower costs. In addition to market pressures, the rate at which 
technology itself is being developed and transferred is forcing 
companies to recognize AMTs as the inevitable alternative in order to 
remain competitive. 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) implementation involves 
more than a technical challenge. It is also an organizational 
challenge. It requires that the organizations involved redefine 
traditional roles and responsibilities, organization structure, work 
content, reward systems, and its approach to education and training 
[67]. 
Because of the complexities of all the issues involved in 
implementing AMT, many companies are ending up with disappointing 
results, as their attempts to implement AMT fail to yield quick and 
dramatic benefits, and may even cause problems that are more complex and 
serious than those they were intended to solve [101]. The enormous 
amounts invested in AMTs justify the need for synthesizing factors that 
would indicate the trade-offs and constraints that project managers 
and/or teams are likely to face in the implementation process, in order 
to increase the success rate of their implementation efforts. The 
following sections will address the different components of the general 
AMT implementation model introduced in Chapter I. 
Hayes and Wheelright [36], in their discussion of Implementing 
Changes in Process Technology, indicate that from examining the data 
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contained in a number of surveys and case histories, one is likely to 
conclude that much of the advice on "how to succeed in implementing a 
process innovation" is quite superficial. They assert that the 
case/surveys indicate, for example, that "top management commitment" and 
the support of the workforce are essential, that "interfunctional 
committees" help deal with the pervasive effects of technological change 
throughout the enterprise, and that it is important to find someone to 
11 champi on" the new technology. They noted, however, that in many 
instances, top management commitment seems to hinder the innovation 
process (particularly when top mangers force an innovation on an 
unwilling organization). Similarly, interfunctional committees can 
complicate, frustrate, and bureaucratize the implementation process as 
easily as they abet it. They also pointed out that the wrong 
technological champion can do irreparable damage. They contend that 
these supposed answers are not really answers, they are more 1 i k.e 
questions. "How does one obtain the commitment of top management and 
the support of workers? Who should be on the interfunctional committee, 
and whom should it report to? Where does one find a technological 
champion, and how does one know - before it is too late- whether one has 
found the right person?" [36, p. 324]. 
Ettlie [23] explores the theoretical and practical answers to the 
general question of why some firms that adopt new production technology 
are more successful in utilizing these innovations than others. He 
notes that despite the importance of this issue, no general theory of 
implementation currently exists. He further indicated that such a 
generalized model should eventually contribute to the fund of knowledge 
on implementation as well as provide summary recormnendations to 
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practitioners faced with implementation planning and problems for 
discrete parts production technology in both the supplier and user 
organizations. He notes that most firms experience at least some 
problems in implementing process innovation. He further stressed that 
"in particular, we are not effectively utilizing discrete parts 
manufacturing innovation like CAD/CAM Systems, even when they are 
installed," [23, p. 38] and that most firms do not get the full 
productivity benefits of discrete parts manufacturing technology. He 
asserts that even when firms do apparently achieve acceptable levels of 
performance with new systems, it often takes longer and uses more 
resources than anticipated. Ettlie notes that "The challenge now is in 
the organizing, scheduling and managing the total manufacturing 
enterprise" [23, p. 39]. He further states that it seems reasonable 
that more sophisticated systems would require integrated planning of the 
whole system, but even the largest companies rarely approach the problem 
this way. It is much more of a trial and error process. 
Ettlie proposed that the factors which influences implementation 
success can be divided into three categories. First, the technology 
incorporated into the innovation can be characterized by attributes 
(e.g. cost, sophistication). The second broad category of variables is 
the nature of the organization attempting to install process change. 
Examples of variables in this category are implementation strategy and 
availability of slack resources. The third category of variables is the 
context of the organization. Examples of variables in this category are 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) behavior supporting implementation 
of customers, adoption listing and economic conditions [23]. 
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Strategy Formulation and Implementation 
Strategy implementation is not a new concept in business literature 
and practice. Stonich [97] notes however, that its role has been placed 
in a secondary position to strategy formulation. The basic premise was 
that if the formulation process was sound, successful implementation 
would follow automatically. The consequence of this philosophy is that 
many managers, who relied heavily on strategy formulation for the i r 
companies' survival, end up wondering why their sound strategies do not 
work as formulated. They are finding out, the hard way, that a more 
comprehensive and integrated way must be derived to tackle the complex 
task of implementing strategy. 
Stonich [97] asserts that clearly identifying attractive 
opportunities and setting the right strategic direction - whether at a 
corporate or division level - do not, by themselves guarantee success. 
Implementation issues have to be appropriately addressed in order to 
successfully implement strategy. He adds that as the methods used to 
formulate strategy become more sophisticated, and the resulting 
strategies themselves become more precise and fine-tuned, corporate 
managers need to devote increasing attention to the question of 
execution. In order to implement strategy effectively, the external 
focus of strategy formulation must be balanced by assessments of 
internal capabilities - as depicted in the AMT implementation model 
presented in Figure 1. The internal components in the model, referred 
to as the core organizational systems are: the organization's structure, 
management processes , cultural/political issues, and the technical 
system. 
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Eschenbach and Geistauts [22] explored some issues involved in 
interfacing engineering and strategy in an organization. They point out 
some problems of conflicting thinking patterns between engineering and 
management, and conclude that tightening the linkage between engineering 
and strategy formulation will require changes in the thinking patterns 
of both engineers and the managements that employ them. They also 
discussed the differences between technology and strategy, they point 
out that radical changes in a firm's technology portfolio (adding new 
technologies) requires top management's support, as only they can accept 
the risks and commit the resources required. They further state that 
while top management can and should set the strategic direction, input 
and support from the functional areas - including engineering - is 
required. Strategic change becomes difficult or impossible, if the 
functional capability or the willingness to support change is absent. 
Eschenbach and Geistauts [22] also covered several areas of support 
required for strategic planning. These include: technological, 
economic, demographic, competitive, political, social, legal, and 
international. In discussing the technological dimension, they ask 
several questions addressing some areas of interest. Among these are: 
whether or not strategy and technology are integrated in the plan; if 
the strategy fits the firm's technological profile; if there is a 
concrete program for implementation, if there are there linkages to 
medium and short-term plans and budgets; if any required changes in 
organizational structure have been identified and carried out; if the 
strategy matches the prevailing values and attitudes in the firm; the 
engineering and design group, as well as other groups participating in 
its implementation; if the strategy fits the corporate culture, and also 
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whether or not it enhances the firm's image as a technologically strong 
organization. Other issues raised include whether or not the strategy 
would increase organizational cohesion, if it will challenge and 
motivate engineering performance, and finally, if it will it help 
attract the best engineering talent - both for present tasks, and for 
future technological growth. 
Synder and Elliot [95] indicated that they found several items to 
be prerequisites for successful implementation of new technology through 
interviewing several experts and reviewing the current literature. 
Among the key prerequisites listed were the following. Top management 
must determine and prioritize company objectives as they relate to 
manufacturing (cost, quality, delivery, flexibility, positive work 
environment, increased employee involvement, etc.). They point out that 
management must continually emphasize these priorities through actions 
as well as words. They also indicate that in order to support a desired 
operational change, it is essential that: first, adequate changes be 
made in performance measures and second, necessary resources be made 
available. They also point out that management should set a stage for 
change. A good plan must include communicating the reasons for 
necessary changes to all employees. Such communication, they indicate, 
may include: 1) a brief history of events leading to changes, 2) a 
current state of the business and why change is required now, 3} what 
changes need to be made for the company to become competitive. The 
objective of this process, is to set a uniform tone regarding what needs 
to be done. Everyone should be informed as to the who, what, where, 
when, how, and why concerning a major change. 
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Another possible roadblock to successful implementation of 
automation projects is the fact that frequently, there is a corporate 
power struggle over the control of AMT projects. According to Herb 
Halbercht, a Stamford, CT., management consultant, " ... a corporate 
power struggle is underway over control of CIM. Automation experts in 
some companies report not to the vice president for manufacturing, but 
to the head of MIS, who is viewed as the computer czar 11 [59, p. 9], 
observed Halbercht. 11But an arrangement like that makes no sense. The 
traditional information service manager is concerned with finance and 
information and has little to do with manufacturing. Nevertheless, he 
may resist the suggestion that he surrenders responsibility for CIM. 
And nothing important is going to happen in the CIM area at a company 
unless the automation experts report to the top person in either 
manufacturing or engineering. It's as simple as that. Commitments have 
to be made now or manufacturing in this country may not survive 1990 11 
[59, p. 9]. 
In order to remedy a situation like the one described above, it is 
recommended that an environment conducive for such an enormous 
undertaking as the implementation of AMT be developed. According to 
Joseph Hurley, the di rector of manufacturing systems at Corning Glass, 
in the early stages of their CIM program, there were three notable 
problems. First, there was no focus for the efforts - no relation of 
the technologies to strategic business goals. A second shortcoming was 
that of island building. He indicated that islands of automation can be 
beneficial, but if there is no strategy to interconnect them, they will 
lead to new bottlenecks or problems elsewhere in the manufacturing 
process. The most serious problem, according to Hurley, was that there 
was no grand CIM strategy to make it all happen. To remedy this 
situation, "Four initial steps were taken to build an environment 
suitable for the undertaking: creation of an advisory board, creation 
of a systems board of directors, identification of CIM as a key 
corporate strategy, and creation of a CIM organization [49]. 
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According to Krepchin [49], the advisory board is a diverse group 
whose role is to communicate the impact and progress of CIM to all areas 
of the corporation. The systems board of directors was formed expressly 
to avoid any turf battles with information services that might arise 
between groups. The groups includes members from manufacturing, 
engineering, information services, and strategic planning functions. 
Crucial to success is an internal organization and a set of procedures 
that enable communication among participants, but also with clear lines 
of responsibility. Krepchin indicated that previously, the 
responsibilities for the various components of CIM were spread out in 
separate groups. Responsibilities for control systems and CAD were in 
the process area, while robotics and manufacturing systems were under 
the heading of machines and manufacturing systems. Each group had 
different priorities. To correct the situation, a new unit was formed 
that combined all the CIM-related areas under one individual. As an 
example, at Corning, all the subgroups reported to Hurley who held 
bi-weekly, one-on-one meetings with group leaders. This helped build 
consensus and countered some of the provinicialism that still existed. 
A system of shared objectives made sure that they worked together. If 
the automation engineer did not like the process engineer's approach, or 
feels that his territory was being invaded, Hurley reminded them of 
their common goals and saw that they resolved their differences [49]. 
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Bergstrom [8] points out that in his discussions with Larry Giesel, 
President and CEO, Carnegie Group, Inc. (Pittsburgh) a point was raised 
in the segment where they discussed what to automate in the plant, the 
point, he asserts, is that understanding the needs of the entire 
organization and the strategic goals is required, and in doing so, one 
finds that there may be areas where implementation would be - at least 
at a given point in time - ill advised. One may actually find that some 
of the objectives in a mission statement, from a CIM implementation 
perspective, simply should not be acted on [8]. 
Cultural and Political Systems 
Organizational Culture 
The word culture has many meanings and connotations. When one 
combines it with another commonly used word, "organization", there is 
almost a certainty of having conceptual and semantic confusion. The 
term culture should be reserved for the deeper level of basic 
assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization, 
that operate unconsciously, and define in a basic taken-for-granted 
fashion, an organization's view of itself and its environment. These 
assumptions and beliefs are learned responses to a group's problems of 
survival in its external environment and its internal integration. They 
come to be taken for granted because they solve those problems 
repeatedly and reliably. 
Organizations are not easy to define in time and space. They are 
open systems in constant interaction with their environment, and they 
consist of many subgroups, occupational units, hierarchical layers, and 
geographically dispersed segments (Thompson, 1963). Culture should be 
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viewed as a property of an independently defined stable social unit. 
That is, if one can demonstrate that a given group of people have shared 
a significant number of important experi ences in the process of sol ving 
external and internal problems, one can assume that such common 
experiences have led them, over time, to a shared view of the world 
around them, and their place in it. There has to have been enough 
shared experience to have led to a shared view, and this shared view has 
to have worked for long enough to have come to be taken for granted, and 
to have dropped out of conscious awareness. Culture in this sense, is a 
learned product of group experience and is, therefore, to be fou nd only 
where there is a definite group with a significant history. In summary, 
culture can be defined as a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration - that has 
worked well enough to be considered valid, and the refore, to be taught 
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in 
relation to those problems. 
Stonich [8] defines culture as a pattern of beliefs and 
expectations shared by the members of the organization. These beliefs 
and expectations, he points out, produce rules for behavior - norms -
that powerfully shape the behavior of individuals and groups in the 
organization. He further explains that different companies have 
different cultures. The culture of an organization is assimilated by 
its members, and those who cannot accept the culture often choose or are 
asked to leave. 11Strategy may be brilliantly formulated, well suited to 
the competitive situation, and supported by adequate financial and human 
resources. The other core organizational systems may very well be 
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integrated throughout the company. Despite these good mix, the level of 
fit between strategy and culture will undoubtedly affect the success of 
the strategy's implementation 11 [97, p. 5]. In some cases, a corporate 
strategy matches its culture and helps the firm achieve its strategy. 
In other cases, corporate culture is a barrier to the successful 
implementation of strategy. The issues of cultural fit/alignment with 
the strategy will be explored in this segment. 
The analysis of cultural alignment is based on the view that an 
organization is in part held together by belief in a set of norms which 
make up the organization's culture. The major concern when evaluating 
the cultural alignment of an organization is to determine the degree of 
cultural homogeneity; that is to what extent the organization is 
dominated by a single culture or multiple cultures. 
Schreiber [92] profiles the opinions of some of the visitors at 
AUTOFACT 1 86. Those visitors contacted gave some ideas on the keys to 
successful CIM implementation. "It's a cultural problem", says Philip 
M. Condit, executive vice president, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. 
(Seattle). "Like many other companies, Boeing's history is primarily of 
functional origins - the engineering department, the planning 
department, the fabrication department. CIM requires that we cross 
those boundaries. The impact of such change can be severe, but managing 
it is critical in the implementation of CIM. 11 
Tichy [100] in his discussion of the dynamic aspects of an 
organizational model, contends that organizations serve as a social 
means through which people attempt to accomplish technical, political, 
and cultural ends. He points out that they are complicated, difficult 
to design, difficult to manage, and even more difficult to change once 
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they are set in motion. Tichy discusses the different types of 
adjustments required in order for organization to function properly, 
focusing on the technical, political, and cultural alignments. Of 
particular interest to this section is the coverage of political and 
cultural alignments. Of the three systems, he points out, the cultural 
aspects are both the most pervasive and the most ambiguous. This is 
because norms and values are not always as explicit and clearly 
identifiable as a technical organizational structure or production 
technology. One of the most important and difficult tasks of top 
management, says Tichy, is to decide on the conflicts of the 
organization's culture, that is, to determine what values should be 
shared, what objectives are worth striving for, what beliefs the 
employees should be committed to, and what interpretations of past 
events and current pronouncements would be most beneficial for the firm. 
Having made these decisions, management's next task is to communicate 
these values in a memorable and believable fashion which will not be 
instantly forgotten or easily dismissed as corporate propaganda. He 
notes that these decisions are not always made explicitly, adding that 
decisions about culture are often made implicitly, intuitively, and by 
trial and error. 
Tichy further states that there are two critical issues regarding 
culture. First, the content of the culture and subculture of an 
organization. Second, the means by which cultural processes are 
managed, that is, what vehicles are used for molding and shaping culture 
and incorporating subcultures into the organizations. Katz and Kahn 
[45] proposed two conditions for cultural congruence among members of an 
organization: (1) a majority of the active organizational members 
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should accept the beliefs , endorse the values, and abide by the norms; 
and (2) individual members should be made aware that beliefs, values, 
and norms have collective support. However, cultural congruence in an 
organization varies over time. This is, perhaps, because of 
environmental value shifts, or perhaps because new members bring 
diversity into the culture. Therefore, organizations must have ways of 
either reducing cultural incongruence or developing capacities for 
managing cultural incongruence. There are a set of concepts for 
analyzing the amount of cultural uncertainty which an organization 
faces, and there are managerial responses to cultural uncertainty. 
Tichy [100] provides some guidelines for assessing the cultural 
alignment of an organization, which can be used to deal with the 
phenomena. He asserts that organizations vary in their degrees of 
cultural congruence. Congruence is defined as the degree of consistency 
among organizational members with regard to values and organizational 
norms. Congruence varies as a result of environment. Cultural value 
shifts in the wider environment are reflected within the organization 
and thus create cultural incongruence. Diversity of backgrounds in the 
organization along such dimensions as ethnic background, education, 
professional identification, sex, and age contribute to greater cultural 
value incongruence. In addition, differences in functional background, 
such as finance, marketing, R&D, and production also creates diversity; 
as organizational value/cultural incongruence increases, so does the 
need for increased amounts of cultural/value adjustment and hence the 
need for greater' organizational capacity for dealing with cultural/value 
shifts; different organizational configurations (networks, people, 
processes) have varying capabilities for facilitating cultural/value 
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adjustments; organizations will manage the cultural/value adjustment 
process and be more culturally effective to the extent that there is a 
match between the cultural/value incongruencies facing the organization 
and the adjustment capacity of that organization's components. 
According to Tichy [100], when there is a poor alignment between 
cultural/value congruence and the cultural/value adjustment capacity in 
the organization, there are two basic options for changing the 
situation. Option 1 is to change either the environment and the 
organization's relationship to the environment, or to change the 
diversity of people in the organization. Option 2 is to alter the 
alignment between the value/cultural adjustment demands and the 
organization's value/culture adjustment capacity. This entails making 
adjustments along the mechanistic to organic dimensions for the 
organizational components. 
Sashkin and Morris [87] present a cultural functions questionnaire 
(CFQ). "The CFQ is based on the work of the sociologist Talcott Parsons. 
Parsons built on the earlier work of the founder of modern sociology, 
Max Weber" [87, p. 168]. Weber observed that an understanding of social 
systems must be based on an examination of how organized activities -
means - are connected to desired end states or goals. According to 
Sashkin and Morris, Parsons took. this a step further by noting that a 
second key issue centers on how the social system maintains its identity 
separate from its environment. This, they contend, is done by creating 
a boundary, which defines an inside and an outside organization. 
Parsons identified four critical functions that he felt any organization 
would .have to carry out, just to survive for a substantial length of 
time. These four functions are: adapting, attaining goals, coordinating 
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activities of people~ and developing a set of values, beliefs, and norms 
of behavior, that is, developing a stable culture that defines and 
maintains the system. 
Specific values, beliefs, and norms - cultural patterns - can vary 
a great deal from one organization to another, and so can patterns of 
coordination. Specific goals and ways of changing to meet demands of a 
changing environment can vary almost indefinitely. These variations 
have led some management researchers to search for oversimplified 
categories of values, coordination patterns, goals, and adaptive 
strategies. Some other scholars assert that the complexity is so great 
as to mean that every organization is unique, and cannot be compared 
with others in terms of the factors discussed here. "In fact, neither 
view is correct ... " [87, p. 168]. In order to understand 
organizations, one must look for fundamental underlying patterns, and 
not just try to figure out the best way to categorize the great 
complexity of specific differences. In a sense, Parsons'[87] framework 
is elegantly simple {although its full and detailed application for the 
purpose of an in-depth analysis of an organization can become quite 
complex}. The basic idea of the four functions is attractive, and even 
if they are not the only important set of organizational functions, they 
are surely an important set. The CFQ presented by Sashkin and Morris 
[87] is a tool for assessing how an organization is performing in terms 
of Parsons' four functions. The questions used to solicit the 
information for testing hypothesis # 19 in the study was extracted from 
this instrument [87, p. 165]. 
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Organizational Political Systems 
The second type of alignment in Tichy 1 s organizational model deals 
with the political aspects of the organization. For this type of 
alignment, observed that "a business firm is a political coalition 
and ... the executive in the firm is the political broker. The 
composition of the firm is not given, it is negotiated. The goals of 
the firm are not given, they are bargained" [100, p. 129]. Political 
alignment is based on the view of organizations as coalitions, altering 
" ... their purpose and domains to accommodate new interests, sloughing 
off parts of themselves to avoid some interests, and when necessary, 
becoming involved in activities far afield from their stated central 
purpose" [67, p. 247]. 
The political test of alignment is similar to the technical test in 
that the objective is to reduce or manage uncertainty. The difference 
is that here, the focus is on the uncertainty surrounding the power to 
allocate resources & decide on the organization's goals. An 
organization faces political controversies or uncertainties which 
require political bargaining and conflicts. These requirements should 
match the organization's capacities for political bargaining and 
conflict. 
Organizations vary in their degree of political uncertainty. 
Political uncertainties result from controversies regarding the power to 
allocate resources and to set organizational goals. These controversies 
express disagreements among coalitions in relation to allocations of 
resources, power, and prestige. Organizations will manage the political 
bargaining and exchange processes and will be more politically effective 
to the extent that there is a match between the requirements of 
36 
bargaining and exchange and the bargaining capacity of the 
organization's components. According to Tichy, two options are 
available to deal with a poor match between political uncertainty and 
the organization's bargaining and exchange capacity. Option 1 is to 
alter uncertainty. This can be accomplished by attempting to change the 
environment by forming political coalitions, or using interworking 
directorates to maintain control. Another way is illustrated by 
governmentally regulated firms which have captured the governmental 
agencies that are supposed to regulate them - by supplying key 
personnel, by exerting influence through legislators, and by hoarding 
technological expertise (Kohlmeier, 1969). Option 2 can be exercised by 
developing a goal and/or means consensus. 
Technical System 
One of the three dominant traditions explored by Tichy [100] in 
guiding the thinking about organizations and the practice of change that 
should be brought together in order to provide managers of change with 
the necessary strategic tools is the technical view of the system. He 
asserted that one tradition views organizations and change from a 
technical perspective and prescribes change strategies based on 
empiricism and enlightened self interest. He called this the technical 
view. The technical view restricts itself to organizing most 
effectively and efficiently [100, p. 16]. Technical system alignment 
assumes that the components of the organization are to be interrelated 
in such a fashion as to achieve organizational effectiveness and 
efficiency in the market place. Some of the elements of the technical 
system in the organization addressed in this study include: product 
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redesign for dedicated production within the framework of the new AMT 
implementation, adequacy of particular technologies within the confines 
of the overall technological scheme of the organization, information 
integrity, and the availability of qualified systems integrators. This 
is because these elements were most frequently identified as factors 
leading to successful implementation of AMT, based on individual 
projects implementation experiences. 
Product/Process Redesign 
In the 1970's, GM developed a strategy to combat impending foreign 
competition by the Japanese. This strategy was in reaction to the gas 
price fears of buyers. The plan was unveiled in early 1979, and over 
the next seven years, GM essentially started from scratch to redesign 
every one of the cars and factories at the cost of $40 billion [33]. In 
a recent Business Week cover story [33], it was expounded that GM has 
invested $60 billion in the past eight years: (1) to completely 
redesign every product line, and (2) to install vast amounts of high 
technology manufacturing systems. The report indicated that 11 ••• many of 
its expensive new high-tech plants are hardly more efficient than the 
old ones ... 11 [33, p. 103], and the anticipated results of the 
installations have not been achieved. 
In this particular case, among the impediments identified as 
affecting GM's initiative were: management misconceptions leading to 
too much emphasis on high technology and automation rather than on more 
basic issues like addressing the functionality desired from the AMT 
installation. GM believed that if it spent enough on computers and 
robots, increased efficiency would be assured. It found out the hard 
way that new technology pays off only when coupled with changes in the 
way work is organized on the factory f1oor. 
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Perhaps the most widely reported example of a successfully AMT 
implementation is the automated assembly line at Allen-Bradley in 
Milwaukee, manufacturers of industrial controls [1]. The line produces 
electrical contactors and relays that serve as electromechanical 
starters and controllers for industrial electric motors. The line 
currently produces 600 units per hour, and as many as 125 different 
configurations of the product can be manufactured on any given day, in 
lot sizes as small as one unit. All products are manufactured to 
customer order and are shipped within 24 hours after receiving the 
order. The process is completely automated, including 3,077 built-in 
inspections. If a component fails one of the inspections, it is 
automatically rejected and a replacement unit is ordered automatically. 
Allen-Bradley executives decided to invest $15 million in a new AMT 
line that they hoped would make contactors and relays that would meet 
the standards set by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
at the lowest possible cost. Allen-Bradley says it could not employ 
traditional short-term Return-on-Investment (ROI) calculations to 
justify the strategy because the company believed it was making a 
critical long-term decision. Thanks to its automated line, 
Allen-Bradley has been able to come late to a highly competitive world 
market and establish itself as a leader. 
J. Tracy O'Rourke, Allen-Bradley's president and chief executive 
officer (CEO), claims that no competitor anywhere can beat him on price 
or quality for IEC contactors and relays. Depending on the 
competitiveness of the market, the going rate for one of the controllers 
produced on the innovative Allen-Bradley line is anywhere from $8 in 
Australia to $20 in the U.S. Allen-Brad1ey 1 s cost is $6.42. 
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Allen-Bradley's success has been closely linked to the fact that 
the system development was aimed at specific goals. One of the 
strategies employed at Allen-Bradley was to simultaneously design a new 
product along with its dedicated automated manufacturing facility [4]. 
In a speech at the Integrated Manufacturing Exposition (!MEX '86) in New 
York in December, 1986 [42], J. Tracy O'Rourke offered an extensive list 
of advice on how to implement CIM. Based on the successful results at 
his company, he said the company must have long-term objectives and 
these should be supported by long range plans. For new products, the 
product and process should be designed simultaneously, one should not be 
made a slave to the other. This is because quite often, part designs 
and new assembly techniques are not practical to automate, but many 
times a design change can eliminate this problem. The option to 
redesign must be weighed against the cost of the redesign, and its 
implementation [105]. The questions of what the impacts of redesigning 
are on other parts, and whether the redesign would be acceptable to the 
customer have to be adequately addressed and answered before embarking 
on such a project. O'Rourke also suggested that companies should seek 
flexibility to give their facilities a longer life than the products 
they are producing. He indicated the CIM's economies of scope, the 
flexibility offered by the system to adequately accorrmodate dynamic 
product mix when the general product unit of the companies, makes 
economics of scale possible [42]. 
In a study of organizations that have implemented advanced 
technology, Ettlie [23] noted that product-process dependency was 
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mentioned in 46 percent of the cases. This variable refers to the 
relationship between products and manufacturing processes, especially 
its complexity. According to Ettlie [23], one of the great paradoxes 
today is that 11 these complex system can usually be justified only when a 
new product is 1aunched11 [23]. 
Sepehri [91], in his discussion of the automation project at IBM's 
Lexington plant indicates that because the goal of the automation was a 
new manufacturing process for new products that were in the design 
stage, there were no interruptions in the manufacturing process, 
although some manufacturing floor space was reorganized and cleared 
up. Some automation elements were tested first in a laboratory 
environment, but most were designed, installed and tested on the floor. 
Information Integrity 
According to Merchant [62], the reasons for the appeal of AMT are 
precisely the same as the reasons for their risk - the extreme 
interdependence of manufacturing system elements and the number of 
variables, parameters, and changes that must be dealt with at every step 
of the process. Loss or distortion of data or information at any point 
spells disaster for the successful completion of the process. Because 
of this complexity, not all of the essential technology exists and not 
all of what exists is perfect for an individual company's applications. 
Other companies have attempted to automate existing, inefficient 
procedures without having in place, the fundamentals required to start 
such AMTS. Included in this category are: adequate data integrity, and 
organizational discipline to follow established procedures. According 
to Jim Harnedy, business, planning, and administrative manager at 
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Digital Equipment Corp. 's (DEC) Augusta, Maine manufacturing facility, 
"our MRP II program is a necessary step in our overall CIM effort ... it 
establishes the discipline DEC-Augusta needs to achieve true 
integration, and provides a good start on setting up the required data 
base for CIM" [39, p. 107]. 
Another example of a successful AMT implementation is reported at 
General Electric's Steam Turbine-Generator Business (STGB) in 
Schenectady, NY, where the general manager of STGB's engineering and 
manufacturi ng department, Randall J. Alkema says, 11 ••• with CIM we are 
getting the right information to the right people at the right time to 
make the right decision" [111, p. 72]. 
Bergstrom [8] presents some critical i ssues in CIM implementation. 
One of the issues was: what to automate, emphasizing automation of 
those areas where the real large costs are, rather than concentrating on 
trying to eliminate direct labor. The next important issue raised is 
the knowledge of the cost of implementing CIM. Unless all the costs are 
known, a successful cost analysis cannot be done. Without a thorough 
cost analysis, CIM cannot be effectively implemented. This is because 
without a cost analysis, implementation efforts could be directed 
towards chasing the wrong symptoms . The object of CIM implementation is 
to find the points with a real cost payback, and go after them, rather 
than try to do everything. Some things are simply not worth the effort, 
and investment. To do that, one must understand the entire 
manufacturing process and know where all the costs reside - including 
indirect, or white collar labor. 
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Adequacy of Technology Implemented 
Ettlie [23] also indicated that many firms simply buy the wrong 
system. What they end up learning in the process is valuable, but the 
price is high. He indicates that if the technology supplier and users 
truly have a good working relationship, the system design can be changed 
once it is ordered. "This change would save some of the systems from 
failure or greatly reduces the cost of technical success" [23, p. 78]. 
Savage [88] discusses the 11 refl ecti ons inspired by the CASA/SME 
round table on fifth generation management." He indicates that it makes 
little sense to install third, fourth, and fifth generation computer 
technology in second generation organizations. Yet, he states, this is 
precisely what many manufacturing companies are doing. Savage offers 
some reasons why this is happening. Among these were: 1) the focus has 
been on the computer technology; 2) Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
(CIM) has, for the most part, ignored the tough management issues; 3) 
few have effectively understood the new management logic which is 
required to leverage the full value of the investments that have 
advanced computer-based systems. 
CASA/SME President Wayne Snodgrass notes: very few top executives 
have begun to move towards Fifth Generation Management [88]. Savage 
describes Fifth Generation Management (FGM) as assuming a well-developed 
and fl exi bl e infrastructure of networked functions together with their 
computers and applications, capable of referencing a common data 
architecture. Each of the functions become a node, or decision point, 
on the network. These nodes become reference points or knowledge 
centers, capable of teaming with other nodes in the support of the 
enterprises business strategy. Rather than being held together by a 
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command and control structure, FGM is coordinated by its shared vision, 
values, and culture. This arrangement frees the organization from being 
locked into a management of sequential hands-offs and provides a way of 
coordinating the iterative dialogue which must go on between functions, 
such as design for assembly. In short, FGM makes it possible to 
effectively leverage the information infrastructure for competitive 
advantage. He further adds that FGM calls for a new leadership style 
and expects more of all employees in dealing with business variety so 
windows of business and technical opportunity can be more effectively 
met. Moreover, it recognizes human interaction is as important a 
quality issue, as is product quality, if competitive advantage is to be 
achieved. Finally, he indicates that FGM taps into the power, wisdom 
and insight of its managers, professionals and employees who have, as a 
team in nodal network, learned to use computer-based resources to 
enhance their decision making capabilities. 
Savage [88] further indicated that FGM, nodal networking, assumes 
the Computer Integrative Management of the Manufacturing Enterprise {CIM 
II). He stated that Fourth Generation Management, digital interfacing, 
is what should be called Computer Interfaced Manufacturing (CIM I). So 
much of what is presently called Computer Integrated Manufacturing {CIM) 
is, in reality, Computer Interfaced Manufacturing). In CIM II, 
according to Savage, the focus is not just on the manufacturing 
function, but the entire enterprise. Second, it is integrative, not 
just integrated, because we are involved in a continually evolving 
integrative process. Third, each of the departmental functions and 
sub-functions become nodes, or decision. points, on a network capable of 
bringing their accumulated knowledge to bear in an interactive mode as 
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the functions work in parallel. He emphasizes the fact that interfacing 
is not the same thing as integrating, and yet the confusion of the two 
is leading to deep frustrations, and in so many cases a rejection of the 
idea of CIM itself. CIM I will fail to solve the fundamental problems 
of the hierarchical organization, because it, like matrix management, is 
an overlay on second generation management. 
Savage defines the five generations of manufacturing enterprises as 
follows: 
o First: Small/Entrepreneurial 
o Second: Hierarchical/Functional/Divisional 
o Third: Matrix 
o Fourth: CIM I - Computer Interfaced 
Manufacturing, Smith/Taylor 
Bottleneck 
o Fifth: CIM II - Computer Integrative 
Management of the Manufacturing 
Enterprise 
Standard Communication Protocols 
Zygmont [115] mentions the fact that a major barrier to exchanging 
product description data is the lack of a common computer language that 
permits comprehensive communication among the different hardware and 
software systems in use. Part of this issue, says Zygmont, has already 
been addressed by IEEE's Initial Graphics Exchange Specification (IGES), 
a data standard for communicating geometric product information between 
computers. Major CAD/CAM vendors subscribe to the IGES standard so 
their systems can share data with others. IGES does not cover 
nongeometric data like tolerances, which are also part of a complete 
product description. The proposed solution is another standard, the 
more thorough Product Data Exchange Specification (PDES), which is being 
drawn up by the National Bureau of Standards [115]. 
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Product definition models are usually crucial to the CIM strategies 
of companies working toward beginning-to-end integration. Here, 
communication standards like IGES and POES are also important, but they 
may be worked around more easily, since a company can limit its 
equipment selection to compatible systems, or write proprietary software 
for communication between departments. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that efforts toward integration within a company have progressed the 
farthest [115]. 
Savage [88] asserts that Manufacturing Automation Protocol (MAP), 
Technical and Office Protocol (TOP), and the Initial Graphic Exchange 
Specifications (IGES), are helping second generation organizations move 
toward fourth generation management. They will make possible the 
digital interfacing of information between functional departments or 
between organizations. MAP and other networking approaches will play a 
large role on the shop floor. TOP will help tie together, engineering 
and manufacturing. IGES provides a neutral file format for passing 
information between dissimilar CAD systems. By themselves, they will 
not lead to FGM. They remain technologies and do not begin to address 
the values and cultural aspects of integration. Efforts to develop a 
Product Data Exchange Specification (PDES) will support the transition 
to CIM II, because PDES will provide a neutral reference data 
architecture for the entire organization. 
Qualified Systems Integrators 
Rummel and Holland [82] in citing some diffi culties involved in 
installation of CIM systems, identified some common probl ems. Among the 
common problems they identified are the following: "The need for well 
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trained workers familiar with the principles of automation, computer 
technologies, and manufacturing processes has driven many companies to 
institute comprehensive training programs" [82, p. 36]. Synder and 
Elliot [95], in their list of suggested implementation steps, point out 
that proper resources should be allocated to support the new technology 
once it is in place. The resources include: properly trained operators, 
and skilled knowledgeable technical resources personnel. 
Voss [106] in his discussion of factors accountable for success and 
failures in advanced manufacturing technology, pointed out that many 
adopters of new technology, both successful and unsuccessful, commented 
on the problems of obtaining suitably trained people. White [108] in his 
list of some of the more commonly expressed reasons for the scarcity of 
integrated systems pointed out that perhaps the scarcest resource is 
qualified people. Not only must technical competency exist, but 
operational, management and financial skills also must be present. 
Also, one or more individuals must be competent in developing control 
systems, for it is the control system that will separate successes from 
failures. 
Quantz [77] cited some obstacles to CIM implementation, they 
include: Critical skills deficiency. Here he indicates that critical 
skills are often lacking in both the planning and the implementation of 
broad based CIM programs. He points out that many manufacturing 
organizations are poorly equipped to deal with new technologies because 
they do not employ enough people with the requisite skills. Still other 
obstacles listed in this article are: timing errors, setting of timid 
goals, and trying to research the benefits of CIM by traditional 
methods. 
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Organizational Management Processes 
Management process is the set of tools that management has 
available to implement strategy [97]. These tools are directly related 
to the other components in the core organizational system -
cultural/political system, technical system, and organizational 
structure. Stonich covers different elements of management process 
namely: planning, programming, budgeting, and rewards. Together, these 
elements make it possible for an organization to allocate resources when 
and where they wi 11 produce the best results, and to control performance 
in a way that drives the firm toward its strategic objectives. 
11 Planning can be thought of as the communication of strategies to 
top management. It normally pulls together Strategic Business Unit 
(SBU) strategies and allows top management to develop corporate strategy 
and allocate scarce resources. Programming is a process that increases 
a strategy's chances for success by assuring that the funds are 
allocated to activities that that drive strategy forward. Budgeting 
deals with allocating all resources - both those necessary to operate 
the business on a day-to-day basis and to carry out the strategic 
programs developed through the Strategic Funds Program (SFP) process" 
[97, p. 99]. The SFP is an approach designed to enable companies to 
achieve their strategic goals by selecting and funding those programs 
with the highest potential impact on the future success of the business. 
Budgeting is therefore a critical link in the efforts to implement an 
AMT strategy. Without an appropriate budget, it is unlikely that 
strategy will be implemented effectively. Management and reward systems 
involve considerations well beyond salary and benefit packages required 
to attract and keep people of the caliber needed to implement an 
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organization's chosen strategy. Effective systems also motivate people 
to work toward the overall objectives established during strategy 
formulation, and being articulated through the planning, progranuning, 
and budgeting processes. 
Measurement and reward systems send tangible signals to the 
organization's people about their performance. Changing the reward 
system can be a powerful tool in altering the behavior of people in an 
organization. Some major points have to be considered when examining 
the effectiveness of a particular reward system. The measurement and 
reward system should fit with the strategy and the other components in 
the core organizational system, they should provide incentives to 
accomplish both the long-term and short-term objectives of the 
organization. A question should also be raised about incentives 
available to all divisional or SBU managers. Aligning measurement 
systems with other parts of a company's strategy and organization is a 
creative process that should not be overlooked. 
Alignment of the Core Organizational 
System Components 
Several discrete components comprise the core organizational 
system. Strategy formulation process feeds into the core organizational 
system. The system components considered in this study are: 
cultural/political systems, technical system, organizational management 
process and organizational structure. Success - achievement of 
strategic objectives for the AMT implementation - is brought about 
through a complex interaction of strategy and all the components that 
make up the core organizational system [97]. Stonich asserts that 
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attacking a problem in one element of a company's activities can have 
far-reaching ramifications for the other elements. He further indicates 
that it has been demonstrated repeatedly that successful performance 
occurs when appropriate strategy is implemented through effective 
rationalization of the basic elements that make up and drive an 
organization. An organization will move more effectively toward its 
declared objectives when, and only when all of its complex elements are 
synchronized. This synchronization concept is frequently referred to as 
"fit". 
Effectively implementing strategy requires a constant effort to 
match and fit the basic elements that drive the organization together. 
The AMT implementation model (Fig. 1) implies that in order to implement 
strategy effectively, the external focus of strategy formulation must be 
balanced by assessments of internal capabilities - these are: the 
or~anization's structure, management processes, cultural/political 
issues, and the technical system. 
According to George Meister, senior vice president and general 
manager, McDonnell Douglas Industry Systems Co. (St. Louis), the promise 
of CIM rests on three premises: the importance of manufacturing to the 
nation, the importance of manufacturing to the enterprise, and the fact 
that the relationship between functions within an enterprise can have 
major impacts on the effectiveness of the manufacturing process [92]. 
He further stated that CIM can have a significant strategic effect on 
quality, lead time, market responsiveness, economics of scope, and 
flexibility. 
Tichy [100] presents an organizational model with three components: 
technical system, political system, and cultural system. He indicates 
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that the goal of strategic change management is to align the components 
of an organization technically, politically, and culturally. The 
argument is made that an effective organization is one in which there is 
good strategic alignment. That is, the organizational components are 
aligned with each other and the political, technical, and cultural 
systems are in good alignment with each other. He offers four strategic 
alignment tests: (1) a technical one, (2) a political one, (3) a 
cultural one, and (4) one which tests consistency between the three 
systems. He indicates that because organizations are dynamic and exist 
in changing environments, none of these alignments will ever be 
stable. They reflect ongoing dilemmas for the organization. At 
different points in time, any one, or combination, may be in need of 
adjustment. He indicates that achievement of strategic alignment is the 
responsibility of the leaders of an organization. Tichy further 
discusses the interrelationships between the components mentioned above. 
According to Tichy [100], technical alignment is designed to manage 
uncertainty with regard to the financial, business criteria outputs. 
Technical alignment, says Tichy, assume that the components of the 
organization are to be interrelated in such a fashion as to achieve 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency in the market place. The 
following principle applies: An organization is technically effective 
to the degree that the uncertainty it faces matches its capacity to 
process information and to eliminate the uncertainty. 11 Uncertainty, he 
claims, arises because the information required to complete tasks exceed 
the information possessed. He states that as uncertainty increases -
from any combination of sources - so does the need for information 
processing capacity. Different organization configurations - of 
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networks~ people, and processes - have different capabilities of 
processing information. As information processing requirements change, 
organizational components should be adjusted. He further indicates that 
organizations will be more efficient and effective from a technical 
point of view when there is alignment between the information processing 
capacity of the organizational components. Tichy asserts that two 
options are available to deal with a poor match between uncertainty and 
information processing capacity. Option 1 is to reduce the uncertainty. 
This might be accomplished by changing the relationship with an 
uncertain environment by formation of foreign articles, lobbying for 
protective legislation, or withdrawal from certain markets. Option 2 is 
to change tasks or interdependencies, that is, alter information-
processing capacities. Automation is one way of simplifying tasks. He 
indicates that organizational diagnoses is normally triggered in an 
organization by an event or activity that creates organizational 
uncertainty. The object of the diagnoses is normally to gather 
sufficient information to determine which components in the model needs 
adjusting. 
Tichy [100] stated that the basic task for change managers is to 
ensure that there is alignment within each of the three systems and then 
between the systems. A well-designed organization should exhibit 
harmony between its cultural, political, and technical systems, and each 
of these systems should be internally aligned. The task of strategic 
management is to keep the internal organization aligned and aligned with 
its external environment. This alignment may occur quite unconsciously 
on the part of the organization and its members, and may be viewed by 
some as an evolutionary process. On the other hand, it may be a very 
proactive~ planned process. Regardless of whether or not it is 
explicitly and consciously aligned, organizations are proposed to be 
effective to the extent that there is alignment with each system, and 
across the systems. 
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Ettlie [23] proposed that the congruence, or degree of fit, between 
an organization and a specific process innovation will predict the rate 
and degree of successful implementation of that technology. Congruence 
is a scaled combination or index of any of several important attributes 
of the technology as perceived by key organization members. He asserts 
that an organizations implementation strategy and structure are matched 
or congruent in most successful cases. The implementation strategy that 
results from a very aggressive technology policy for radical innovation 
will produce flexible structural arrangements, with a special 
implementation team usually physically separate from the normal 
workflow. Less ambitious implementation strategies will use existing 
structural arrangements. 
Krepchin [49], in discussing the CIM efforts at Corning Glass, 
stated that the concept of CIM at Corning is more than just technology. 
It is built on an existing commitment to total quality and calls for the 
integration of strategy and human resources as well as technology. 
Other factors related to the alignment of the core organizational 
system include the alignment of employee attitudes with the corporate 
objectives. To get managers to support new projects, it is imperative 
that performance measures adequately reflect the positive effects of the 
change and provide incentives for managers to support change [95]. In 
his IMEX keynote address, J. Tracy O'rourke, president and CEO of 
Allen-Bradley pointed out that each employee is a critical link in the 
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system and these individuals must be properly trained, motivated, and 
rewarded [42]. Bill Kowalczyk, MRP II project manager at the DEC -
Augusta, Maine plant noted that one of the keys to success of the 
project was that the job plans and reviews of all personnel were in some 
way tied to the project [39]. 
The other aspects of organizational management processes discussed 
in literature and covered in this study include: nature of the 
relationships between the technology supplier and user firms, 
availability of AMT champion, availability of educational/traini ng 
programs, top-down planning and bottom-up implementation policy, pace of 
implementation, organization/staffing of the project, management 
commitment , and communication. These aspects will be covered in the 
following sections. 
Technology Supplier/User Relationships 
Ettlie [23] noted that in a study of some organizations, the most 
frequently mentioned factor that accounted for success or failure in the 
implementation of advanced technology systems was the nature of the 
supplier - user relationships . The respondents to his survey used terms 
like marriage or long term mutual commitment to describe these 
relationships. He indicated that after examining the comments of 
respondents on this issue, one reaches the tentative conclusions that 
team building across organizational boundaries is the key. "Based on 
the importance of this factor, it would make some sense to talk about 
the implementation strategy of the vendor- user team rather than t hat of 
the user organization" [23, p. 78] . One supplier indicated that 
successful installations are "user driven and vendor guided" [23, p. 
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77]. I n another article, Ettlie [24] explored the theoretical and 
practical answers to the general question of why some firms are more 
successful in the adoption of production technologies than others. He 
indicated that the relation between suppliers or original equipment 
manufacturers, and their customers, or users of the new technology, will 
be an important determinant of implementation success. He further 
stated that the supplier of the technology will also have an important 
influence on the outcome of the implementation process, especially 
during the early phases of installation and for the first year of trial 
operation. The OEM Service policy and other policies covering customer 
relations will be an important factor not only in implementation but in 
the initial adoption decision by the user [24]. Suppliers of new 
technology that allocate sufficient slack resources and sustain a 
support customer service policy for implementation of especially radical 
new technologies are likely to substantially promote successful 
installations of innovations. 
Availability of a New Technology Champion 
Ettlie [24] pointed out that there were always at least two key 
people: one from the technology supplier firm and one from the user, who 
worked hardest at building a team to integrate the technology in the 
user's plant. Also in the list of factors enumerated by respondents in 
this study was innovation champion. One respondent described this 
element of implementation strategy as follows: 11A person has to love it 
- (has to be) a champion, an advocate and they're not the same as a 
product champion 11 [23, p. 82]. He indicated that the champions h.ave a 
characteristic of extreme connni tment -to the project - sometimes they are 
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also the project managers. "Champion commitment is deep and apparently 
is a key to success in many applications" [23, p. 82]. He proposed that 
the more sophisticated the system, the more elevated in the hierarchy 
the champion must be in order to ensure success - an extension of the 
hypothesis of top management support [23, p. 83]. White [108] states 
that where systems integration has occurred successfu l ly, a champion has 
existed. Brauninger [11] in his list of what was used to spark interest 
in CIM at Cone Drive noted that they allowed people with ambition and 
desire to lead in the implementation of new ideas and projects. 
Nellemann [67] discussed what is involved in applying CIM to gain 
competitive advantage in the wake of increasing global markets and 
competition. He commented that frequently, U.S. managers have 
traditionally worked toward different, and often conflicting goals, and 
that the most effective strategies have to balance the differing 
objectives between the different functi onal areas. He further indicated 
that because CIM affects each area of the company, each area must 
participate in the development of the CIM strategy and understand its 
role and responsibility within it. II as James Baker, GE executive 
vice president, advises, 'in planning for automation, it is important to 
develop a close alliance between those who know the business to be 
automated and those who know the business of automation. It's a 
long-term undertaking requiring a long-term relationship between 
functions which previously had only a vague awareness of each other 111 
[67, p. 9]. 
He further suggested that if CIM is to succeed, management and 
labor, where relationships have traditionally been characterized by 
distrust at best and antagonism at worst, have to change. Management 
and labor must forge new agreements of cooperation to define the role 
that each will play in the new manufacturing environment. As many 
companies have already discovered, it is essential to develop in all 
employees, including the workers on the factory floor a "sense of 
ownership" of the new technology. He purports that this can be 
accomplished by the following: First, companies typically find that 
they require a 11 CIM champion, 11 a person who not only understands the 
technology but also has the ability to sell his ideas throughout the 
organization [67]. Nellemann asserted that CIM requires that new 
relationships be forged with suppliers. 
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Quantz [77] in his coverage of the overall planning for CIM 
suggests that that one way to develop momentum is to single out 
potential agents of change and convert them into CIM apostles - this, he 
stressed, is particularly effective if they are chief engineers, chiefs 
of manufacturing~ or other functional leaders who control real 
resources. The idea is that when middle managers are convinced of CIM's 
value, the resources they control can be directed toward implementing 
CIM and pursuing new application opportunities. 
Synder and Elliot [95], in their suggested implementation steps, 
recommend the development of a strong relationship with appropriate 
suppliers. A common understanding of the problem should be obtained, as 
well as the criteria for an acceptable solution. Voss [106] in his 
report indicated that successful implementers have tended to build close 
relationships with their suppliers. These relationships, he states, 
would seem to be characterized by a two-way fl ow of information rather 
than an off-the-shelf purchase with installation solely by the supplier 
or the user. 
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In discussing the automation of the manufacturing process at RCA's 
video component and display division in Circleville, OH., Juan Brown, 
one of the partners of Optimization Systems, Inc, the external 
consulting company employed to install the new system, indicated that it 
was important for system integrators deal with implementation issues as 
a single voice from the start of any project. This would prevent 
another engineer (who may be associated with the project) from 
instituting change or giving a command counter to the goals of the 
system integrator or project objectives. 11The whole process has to be a 
cooperative effort between the systems integrator and the customer. 
Only the customer can bring his knowledge of product and process into 
the bargain. We bring our practical experience and knowledge of what is 
required to implement the job, 11 says Brown [107, p. 122]. 
Education and Training 
Another facet in the successful implementation of CIM involves 
retraining employees, says John W. Vineyard, a consultant with A. T. 
Kearney (Atlanta) 11 1 hear over and over again: 'We have 5000 people to 
train in this process and then another 7000, and then ... Training's 
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expensive. But have you priced ignorance lately?' Ignorance is very 
expensive11 [92, p. 31]. One way to address the issue of training is to 
simplify systems. 11 I ts far more cost effective than training, 11 says 
Douglas Kahn, President, Interactive Images (Woburn, MA.). "After 
you've trained your people, they may move on to other roles, new people 
come in, and you've got to do the training all over again. But if you 
develop simple-to-use, friendly human interfaces for your shop floor 
systems, training requirements can be eliminated. This permits the shop 
f1oor systems to be easi1y operated by many different non-technical 
employees. The broader your employee's functions, the more easily the 
concepts of flexible manufacturing can be implemented, because you can 
move your people among a variety of operations" [92, p. 31]. 
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Beck [6] in his discussion of the how a new system can meet the 
growth and challenges of growth and change, attributes to the success of 
the new packaging system installation at an IBM plant in Boca Raton, FL. 
to a comprehensive training program. He indicates that among the 
reasons for the wide acceptance of the system were the diverse training 
techniques IBM developed to introduce the system to the operators and 
other employees. According to Beck, the training program, too, 
illustrates how interdepartmental cooperation paid off. They are the 
products of cooperation among distribution engineers, staff programmers, 
maintenance personnel, and others, he said. For example, maintenance 
personnel spent the last 4 months before the start-up of the system on 
the job with the installers. So their training included first-hand 
knowledge of all parts of the system before they become responsible for 
keeping it running. 
Brauninger [11] indicated that one of the things they used to spark 
interest in CIM at Cone Drive was training. In that system 
implementation, he pointed out that they trained employees in the new 
system before the actual installation. This developed confidence that 
they could do their jobs using more advanced systems and equipment . 11 We 
also promised people they would be trained in a new (and probably 
better) job if their current job was eliminated. This gave them 
security and a reason to look for time savings" [11, p. 22]. 
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In a survey of organizations that have implemented advanced 
technologies, training was frequently mentioned as a factor in a 
successful strategy [60]. According to Ettlie [23], it involves both 
education of the organization and training in specific technical skill 
area- for example, operation, progra1TITT1ing, and maintenance. Early 
commitment to training and education is important, and perhaps it is a 
factor in establishing a readiness for change and participation. He 
indicated that a respondent suggested an interesting combination of the 
training and vendor-user elements of implementation strategy; that 
vendors (technology suppliers) and users jointly conduct training 
schools after the initial group of user personnel has been trained. The 
user could then pace the training to the strengths and weaknesses of the 
personnel involved in the implementation [23, p. 79-80]. 
Among the milestones that lined the path to a class A status in the 
MRP II project at the DEC -Augusta plant was education and traini ng. 
Education was provided for top-level managers so that they would 
understand the importance of their efforts. A training program for 
operations personnel was developed in house and was accomplished just 
prior to cutover to the new system. By developing their own training 
methods, DEC was able to tailor training to the policies and procedures 
it had devised. Workers received training as close as possible to the 
time the new system was brought on line, to make sure that new 
techniques were fresh in their minds and that the training reflected the 
most current state of the system [40]. Synder and Elliot [95] recommend 
that proper training be provided to al l stockholders in the project, 
including management and supervisors as well as individual operators. 
They also recommend that proper resources be allocated to support the 
new technology once it is in place, incl.uding - properly trained 
operators, and skilled, knowledgeable technical resources personnel. 
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In the CIM efforts at Corning Glass [49], Joseph Hurley, the 
director of manufacturing systems, in the efforts to remedy the problems 
encountered at the initiation of the program, began a education 
campaign, first for himself and then for the corporation. He utilized 
consultants, vendors, societies, trade shows, literature. Once he began 
to come to speed it become apparent that it is just as important to 
involve others. A high-level sponsor in the corporation is critical, 
and early in Hurley' s efforts, the corporation's vice-chairman for 
technology, Dr. Thomas C. MacAvoy, become the CIM sponsor [49]. 
Nellemann [67] points out that one of the factors for success in 
implementing strategic directions of CIM is that education and training 
need to take place to enhance skills and to convert replaced personnel 
to the next generation of computer operators, technicians, programmers, 
and maintenance personnel. He asserts that education is one way that 
organizations can fight resistance to technology in their factories and 
offices. Management needs to be part of the training process. 
Nellemann pointed out that " we can make significant gains by 
scrapping outmoded work rules, managing and training the workforce 
better and handling parts inventories more efficiently. By having just 
the right amount of technology and by initiating new procedures to 
prepare our companies for a new system of operation, these companies can 
end up with higher productivity for less investment" [67, p. 3]. 
Kowalczyk described the experiences of the team responsible for 
implementing the MRP II software as an example of the kind of dedication 
required [39]. Twenty individuals spent 3 months full time, and 6 
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months part time, in training with the new software. 11 But we didn't 
have to hire extra people to carry the load. Many of them worked 60 and 
70-hour weeks to perform their regular tasks as well as come up to speed 
on the software 11 [39, p. 109]. 
Pearson [72] provides some techniques for reporting CIM successes 
to personnel. Included in his list are: getting employees involved in 
planning and implementation, internal news reporting, periodical 
business results meeting, encouraging and allowing technical 
publications, rewards for technical accomplishments, and employee 
training programs. He indicates that training programs provided within 
a business structure offer further opportunity to stimulate employee 
involvement and interest. A well organized training session will not 
only provide needed exposure to individual operations for employee 
participation, but can also expose the employee to current and planned 
enhancements in the business that will affect or involve the employee. 
The training process can be used to create and stimulate a climate of 
receptiveness to a changing business. There is opportunity for the 
business that is receptive to using training as an additional tool to 
motivate employees. RulTlllel and Holland [82] identified the common 
problems associated with the installation of CIM systems. One of the 
difficulties they cite is the need for well trained workers familiar 
with the principles of automation, computer technologies, and 
manufacturing processes has driven many companies to institute 
comprehensive training programs. 
Sepehri [91] in a discussion of the highly successful automation 
project of IBM's Information Products Division in Lexington, Kentucky, 
gives some attributes for successful implementation of the automation 
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project~ One of the factors listed was that prior to introducing the 
automation, every manager participated in a seminar about what was being 
done in manufacturing. It covered aspects of automation business 
strategies and product directions. The managers took information back 
to their groups and started preparing for job and responsibility 
changes. According to Sepehri, the skills required to make the old 
Selectric typewriter, with its many mechanical parts, are clearly 
different from those needed to run an automated factory. The employees 
had to learn about electronic technologies and automated assembly. They 
were candidly told that their jobs would be profoundly affected. 
Hundreds of Lexington employees were retrained as computer progranmers 
and robotic system technicians. Extensive retraining and redeployment 
enabled IBM to maintain full employment. It also helped build a skill 
base in automation technology to carry the company into the future. 
Employees morale, as measured by the annual opinion survey, actually 
went up at Lexington during the automation project. 
According to Zygmont [115], TRW 1 s investment in training 
underscores the importance of personnel in computer integration. "The 
failure of new systems is much more psychologically based than 
technologically based, 11 says George J. Hess, vice-president of Ingersoll 
Milling Machine (Rockford, IL). 11 We can change that dramatically by 
more effective training 11 [115, p. 28]. One of the causes of failure in 
AMT efforts that is addressed frequently in literature is the fact that 
companies realize late in the game that training workers to handle the 
new technologies takes longer than anticipated. 
Top ~ Down Planning and Bottom -
Up Implementation 
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According to Bill Kowalczyk, MRP II project Manager, one of the 
factors responsible for the success of the MRP II effort at Digital 
Equipment Corp. - DEC - Augusta, GA plant was the commitment, from the 
top down, of all plant personnel [39]. O'Rourke stressed the importance 
of the process of planning from the top down and from the bottom up 
[42]. 
Nellemann emphasizes that "The success of CIM requires top down 
planning and participation" [67, p. 3]. He further states that the 
issues connected to CIM - and those that determined its success - are 
strategic - and significantly impact the survival of the company. They 
require management's attention at all levels. 
Krepchin [49] explains that one of the outputs of the corporate CIM 
effort is a project plan that serves as a guideline for individual plant 
programs. Planning begins with the setting of business objectives which 
in turn 1 ead to a set of manufacturing goa 1 s. Before any further work 
is done, an audit of the existing configuration is performed. The audit 
serves several purposes. It indicates where shortcomings are, and is a 
basis for comparison once the CIM project is underway. One result of the 
audit is a firm understanding of current plant practices. This assists 
in the development of a computer simulation model which is used in the 
next step - simplification. "Why automate a process that has hundreds 
of steps when the same product can be produced with half the 
complexity? 11 "First we simplify, then we automate", says Hurley [49, p. 
94]. He indicated that simplifi cation also applies to information 
systems. After procedures are simplified, the automation and 
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information systems plans can be developed. After the plans have been 
developed, a computer simulation is again performed. Once the 
simulation has confirmed the plans, priorities for implementation can be 
set. The speed at which a project proceeds depends on the cost and the 
ability of the plant to receive the project. 
Snyder and Elliot point out that top management must form a 
corporate business plan and determine a specific plan for manufacturing 
which will serve as a road map for future change. Management must also 
determine and implement the specific changes necessary to support the 
plan [95]. "Get users involved up front to gain understanding and take 
ownership. If applicable, ground work should be laid for any union 
negotiations - Have users participate in the design, explain reasons for 
contract changes needed" [95, p. 45]. Voss [106] stresses workforce 
involvement and human factors, and continual management involvement to 
stay up to date. 
Three distinct strategies for implementing CIM are emerging, says 
Peter Marks, vice president of Automation Technology Products (Campbell, 
CA), a supplier of CAD/CAM systems. One approach is to integrate inside 
to outside, creating a computer network for data exchange between a 
manufacturer and its suppliers and/or customers. A company may also 
integrate from beginning to end of a product's development cycle, 
creating a data continuum from earliest design and planning through 
engineering and production, and even tying in support departments like 
marketing and technical publication (to aid in the preparation of 
operator manuals and repair guides}. Finally, a company may decide to 
integrate from top to bottom in order to disseminate information 
downward for better control of manufacturing operations and to feed 
information upward from the shop floor for use in business management 
and planning [115]. 
Pace of Implementation 
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One of the reasons cited for failure at advanced manufacturing 
technology (AMT) implementation efforts is the rate of implementation. 
Driven by an enthusiasm for the promise of AMT, executives often fail to 
pace the implementation of the sophisticated systems and equipment. 
GM 1 s Jan Tannehill, who oversees Hamtramck and several other GM assembly 
plants acknowledges that 11 ••• GM is rethinking its plans ... we are going 
to phase in automation slower than we had planned" [101, p. 1]. If GM 
scales back its automation plans, it will be concluding what many 
experts already believe: High technology, like strong medicine, must be 
taken in carefully measured doses. Automakers are having enormous 
problems both in coordinating sophisticated advanced manufacturing 
technologies, and in training their workers to handle it. Only by a 
carefully planned and systematic approach can these corporations be 
confident that each investment in AMT will be successful. In GM's 
Hamtramck plant, they tried to do too much too fast, and they are now 
planning to scale back their automation plans. 
One of the reasons for failures of CIM implementation efforts, says 
Nellemann , 11 ••• is that management underestimates the magnitude of 
moving toward fully automated opera ti ans. The complex myriad of 
technologies that work well is isolated pilot projects are not always 
easily coordinated in the real word of high volume manufacturing" [67, 
p. 3]. Another reason for failure, according to Nellemann, is the rate 
of implementation. Driven by an enthusiasm for the promise of CIM, 
executives often fail to pace the implementation of the sophisticated 
systems and equipment. He also pointed out that rather than have 
automation as a goal, for example, we should think in terms of 
systematically upgrading •.• incorporating only a portion of the many 
options now available. He stated that because of the rapidly changing 
technology, a step-by-step approach makes the most sense over the long 
run. He further gave a prescription for an approach that works. 
According to Nellemann, "To succeed in implementing CIM, we need to 
restructure our factories in a systematic, three-stage process: 
Simplify, Automate, and Integrate" [15, p. 3]. 
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Putnam [76] points out some traps that smaller companies should be 
aware of and must avoid when considering modernization activities one of 
the traps to avoid is trying for a home run in implementing new 
technology. "Learn to wa 1k 11 , he says, "before running, because no 
matter how much analysis is conducted prior to implementation, when the 
technology is implemented, a long learning curve may be necessary" [76, 
p. 13]. He further states that when designing a modernization project, 
it should be kept simple , and implemented in an incremental manner. 
According to Putnam, "always start with a first step that is easy to 
implement and that will show good results. This will convince doubters 
and gain support for the modernization project. It will better allow 
time for a difficult part of the project to be implemented and proven 
without pressure for immediate results" [76, p. 14]. Early successes, 
he indicates, will provide momentum for the project, and the momentum 
will be necessary. 
AUTOFACT 1 86 visitors gave some ideas on where the keys to success 
with CIM are [92]. According to Douglas Kahn, president, Interactive 
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Images (Woburn~ MA)~ a lot of companies are 11 studying 11 new technologies, 
which he says he encourages, but that they should learn by doing, 
because they are losing the opportunity to get hands-on experience, 
which is the best way to know what works and what does not. Jack H. 
Schron, Jr., vice president, Jergens, Inc. (Cleveland), agrees. "Don't 
be afraid of using current level technology today rather than waiting 
for what's over the next horizon. At some point along the way, you've 
got to make a decision and say - 'Today is when we're going to start -
we can't afford to wait for the next improvement .•. • Then take it in 
bite sized chunks with a goal of always moving toward improvement11 [92, 
p. 32]. The best way to make the transition from a conventional 
compartmentalized manufacturing operation to an integrated one, say most 
CIM analysti, is to break up the under taking into small, manageable 
pieces. For many manufacturers that are unable to commit vast sums to 
new equipment, an effective CIM strategy many require little more than 
creating an atmosphere that encourages integration [115]. 
Ettl i e recolllTlended that an incremental implementation strategy be 
used. He cautioned: "Don 1 t try too much too fast 11 [5, p. 80]. It was 
indicated that it is wise to take a strategic approach to phased 
adoption and implementation of the new technology allowing sufficient 
time (equal in importance for people and financial resources) to 
implement. He recommends that firms implementing advanced systems do so 
in stages or gradually in phases. Brauninger [11] points out that 
despite the early success indicators in their CIM project, their 11 
challenge now is to manage our future programs so that we do not attempt 
to accomplish too much at one time 11 [11, p. 22]. 
68 
A pilot project to test the systems is also recommended. A pilot 
project to test out the systems before implementation was also essential 
according to Kowalczyk of DEC - Augusta. This was not a full-scale 
test, but included real products, real parameters, and an actual data 
base [39]. Dr. Daniel L. Shunk, Director, Center for Automated 
Engineering and Robotics, Arizona State University (Tempe), urges 
companies to use prototyping techniques before committing themselves to 
a particular CIM program. 11 Prototypi ng is a way to understand the 
technology, minimize the risk, and maximize exposure to upper 
management, middle management, and shop floor personnel'', he explains. 
11 1 think it's the only way to assess the impact a technology will have 
on a company. It doesn't have to be the first place of a multiphase 
installation it may be a small-scale demo using actual data. The 
important thing is that it allows you to get feedback from the users in 
terms of whether it's going to work" [92, p. 31]. Hurley of Corning 
recommends that once implementation is accomplished, a post-project 
audit should be performed. This can be used to justify similar future 
projects, or to reassess the directions taken on the work just completed 
[49]. 
Organization/Staffing of the Project 
In his discussion of the critical issues in CIM, Bergstrom [8] 
stressed the CIM project team. He indicated that among the key members 
of a task force investigating the implementation of CIM should be a 
technologist, or a futurist. This person is key to the success of the 
task force. Further, he pointed out, a member too easily overlooked is 
the human resource specialist. According to Larry Geisel, president and 
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CEO: Carnegie Group, Inc. (Pittsburgh), 11 more than half the problems in 
CIM installations have to do with people related issues. The human 
resource thinker has to be involved in the CIM planning team. If you 
consider him or her not as important as the technologist, you make a 
serious mistake 11 [8, p. 25]. CIM planning must be done with 
participation at management levels high enough to carry the broad 
perspectives of the business. 
Brauninger [10], in defining the roles of the different levels of 
management in the organization implementing CIM, states that the 
managers must assign the most capable people to the project. 11 Ideally, 
the person will be someone respected by the rest of the group, have 
leadership skills, and be experi enced enough to understand how things 
are accomplished in this particular enterprise 11 [10, p. 17]. He further 
points out that the key ingredient in managing the CIM project is the 
project leader. He indicates that the chief executive must ensure that 
there is a team approach but must also ensure that the responsibility 
for getting things done is given to one individual. This individual 
will be one that oversees the project, ensures that each group is 
meeting its particular milestones, and advises the chief executive on 
the progress, lack of progress, or problems requiring attention. He 
also points out that people with ambition and desire should be allowed 
to lead in the implementation of new ideas and projects [4]. 
Pearson [72] state~ that when the climate is right, an effort 
should be put forth to generally define what goals and benefits are 
expected by introducing CIM. When some idea of what is desired has been 
formulated, a multi-disciplined team should be formed to further define 
the goals and generalize on how the goals can be accomplished [72, p. 
70 
30]~ In forming the team, members with a variety of training and 
experience should be included. Using a single discipline can seriously 
limit the effectiveness of the team in developing plans that will 
address all aspects of operating the business. "The actual number of 
participants will vary with business complexity and size and business 
objectives 11 [72, p. 31]. Pearson urged that generally, the team should 
include persons that have knowledge of manufacturing operations, 
production control, facilities engineering, factory planning, and 
information systems development. For complete integration of the CIM 
functions, the team should also include members from the computer-aided 
design and production engineering segments of the business. Other 
support organizations may be tapped as needed for additional 
contributions. 
Voss [106] recommends cross functional implementation teams. He 
stated that new manufacturing technologies are characterized by both 
their cross functional impact and by the involvement of a new discipline 
- computer software. Successful implementation appeared less likely to 
occur, says Voss, when relevant functions or skills are missing from the 
implementation teams. He further stated that successful teams are 
likely to have active members from: manufacturing, software 
engineering, and product engineering/development. According to Knill 
[50], the Allen-Bradley system discussed earlier, is a textbook example 
of how automation should be planned and executed. Lar~ Yost~ vice 
president of operations, Industrial Control Division at Allen-Bradley 
pointed out that" .•. the challenge in planning was to integrate the 
input of all the specialties that would be involved namely - marketing, 
quality control, management information systems, product development, 
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manufacturing, packaging, cost/finance, etc. All these functions were 
represented on a planning task force by the best people available. They 
wrote the speci fi ca ti ans for the system" [50, p. 62]. 11They need to set 
the goals, says Manor, "to provide the multidisciplinary project teams, 
to set the focus on the processes of the business rather than the 
functions of individual departments, and to ensure that there is an 
environment where change is possible, and is in fact desired" [92, p. 
32]. The need for a multidisciplinary team approach to CIM is stressed 
by many. The problem says John w. Vinyard, Principal, A.T. Kearney 
(Atlanta), is that we've 11 incentivized 11 individuals, not teams. 11 I'm 
convinced that people perform in the manner they perceive they're being 
judged, 11 he explains, "If they perceive they're being judged on how 
successful engineering is, they'll make engineering successful - even if 
it cripples manuf acturing. But if they understand they're being judged 
for the tota l benefit of the company, they 'l l make serious, dramatic 
strides. 11 [92, p. 31]. 
On a more basic level, manufacturers experienced in CIM emphasize 
t he need to utilize employees through the transition from a company's 
former operating procedures. To unite an array of independent computer 
systems with CIM, says Philip N. Condit, president of Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes , a lot of classical boundaries have to be violated. And when 
that happens, the cu l tural impact can be severe, but managing it is 
critical to the implementation of CIM. To forestall turf wars, Boeing's 
product design, engineering, production, and support are brought 
together from the outset of a program to foster communi cation and a 
unified effort [115]. 
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Geisel of the Carnegie Group, Inc. warns of a few problem areas 
associated with the organizational aspects of CIM planni ng. First, CIM 
planning must be done with participation at management levels, high 
enough to carry the broad perspective of the business. "Most people, 11 
Giesel says, "understand only part of an organization - the part they 
are in. They may understand one level up or down, but not much beyond 
that. So, the selection of the task force becomes very important" [8, 
p. 25]. A second pitfall pointed out involves skewing the task force 
one direction or another by simply over-representi ng one area's 
participation. If the task force is heavy on engineering, the resultant 
CIM plan is likely to have a strong engineering flavor. The third area 
of concern for Giesel is planning in obsolescence. According to Giesel, 
"People doing CIM planning tend to look at process and equipment 
technology as static far more often than they should. Technology is 
absolutely dynamic, and any plan that fails to take that i nto account 
will i nevitably lead to an implementation five years out that is 
obsolete" [8, p. 26]. 
Putnam [76] pointed out some of the traps smaller companies shoul d 
be aware of and try to avoid when considering modernization 
acti vi ti es. He stated that the scope of modernization wi 11 vary 
depending upon the resources the company has to apply. Some companies 
have extensive engineering staffs dedicated to modernization projects 
while other companies' entire engineering staffs remai n committed solely 
to daily operational requirements. Some companies have l imited time for 
engineering staffs to work exclusively on modernization projects, whi le 
many other companies do not have the luxury of dedicated modernization 
departments. He indicated that these companies that do not have 
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dedicated CIM project group, when confronted with the need to engineer a 
modernization project, must pull engineers of on-going projects and 
assign them to the modernization project. Great pressure will be 
exerted to complete the job quickly so the engineers can resume their 
regular duties. He suggested that to ensure that the engineer's time is 
spent productively, it is necessary to know what functions need to be 
improved in order to modernize an operation. The functional analysis, 
he claimed, will describe how the operation is being performed, and this 
information facilitates the generation of requirements. Once the 
requirements have been determined, specific solutions can be recomme nded 
and justified. By directing the engineers' efforts to specific 
functional areas for consideration, a great amount of engineering time 
will be saved. More time will be spent on solving problems, not just 
trying to define the problems. 
Ettlie [24] emphasized employee participation through 
implementation teams. He indicated that the greater the participation 
of production personnel in implementation strategy formulation, the more 
successful the installation of manufacturing process innovation . 
According to D'Angelo of IBM's Boca Raton, FL. plant, 11 We included in 
the system's design and implementation, those who will use it, maintain 
it, or be affected by it. So we are confident that they understand the 
system's purpose, its operation, and how it will serve their needs today 
and tomorrow" [6, p. 5] . Ray Reichenbach, Automation Manager, New 
Products, at IBM's Lexington plant noted that the system is the key to 
IBM's success. He points out that employees are are such an integral 
part of the company that IBM and the employees basically have to look 
after each other [41]. 
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Witt [111] in the discussion of the automation of the manufacturing 
process at RCA's Video component division located in Circleville, OH., 
indicates that an important factor to the success of the project was the 
designation of a project manager by the customer - RCA. 
Management Commitment and Support 
Despite all the upbeat talk about Automated Manufacturing 
Capabilities, the 11 factory of the future" has met considerable 
resistance from senior executives at many companies, according to Herb 
Halbercht, a Stamford, CT., Management Consultant. 11 Unions are usually 
blamed for opposing automation, 11 said Halbercht. 11 But the true culprit 
is top management itself ... senior executives reluctant to take risks 
or block projects that may not have any payoff until five or ten years 
in the future" [60, p. 9]. According to Halbercht, the big breakthrough 
are only going to come when there's an across-the-board commitment to 
CIM technology. This, he indicated, is not just CAD/CAM and 
Computer-Aided Engineering (CAE), but also vision systems, robotics, 
factory data networks (MAP), artificial intelligence ... and the entire 
process controlled by computers. 
Quantz [77] covers the overall planning for CIM. He cites some 
obstacles to CIM implementation. He indicates that although capital 
shortage and senior management complacency are often cited as the major 
obstacles to implementing CIM, inertia and middle management reluctance 
to change often prove to be the real problems. Quantz states that 
middle managers usually have limited knowledge of computers and their 
applications. These managers are often the most reluctant to support 
CIM because they are directly responsible for company resources and 
productivity. Synder and Elliot [95] recommend top management 
involvement in the formation of corporate objectives. This would aid 
them in assigning adequate resources to analyze the technology and the 
application in adequate detail to create a detailed functional 
specification. 
Rurrmel and Holland [82] state that some of the common problems in 
implementation come from a lack of commitment from management or labor 
groups. Either of which may perceive new technology as a direct 
threat. Management must recognize that new organizational structures 
may be necessary to allow more employee participation in design and 
planning, as well as in some decision making processes. Managers and 
engineers will need more finely honed human management/interaction 
skills to provide necessary motivation and enthusiasm and inspire 
employee's cooperation. 
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Ettlie [24] suggest that the most important predictor of 
utilization success is likely to be the strategy formulated and 
implemented that firms use to integrate new manufacturing equipment into 
their organizations. He indicated that he found management's coTTUTiitment 
to the philosophy of the new approach to manufacturing to be the second 
most significant correlate of utilization rate of equipment, with the 
largest correlation being the degree of workflow integration achieved 
with utilization. Gerwin [34] strongly suggests that a firm has to have 
strategic commitment to CAM systems in order for integration to be 
possible. Ettlie proposes that organizations that have an explicit, 
long term commitment to a new manufacturing process, a commitment that 
is promulgated and understood by key organization members as the . 
implementation strategy of the firm - will be more successful 
implementing the new technological process. 
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Brauninger [10] gives the roles of the different management levels 
in the organization implementing CIM. At the highest level, he 
indicates that the CEO must clearly communicate to subordinates, the CIM 
objective and ensure that continual motivation is applied in all 
areas. The next layer io the organization, he states, is the functional 
manager. He points out that this level of management is the most 
critical element to the overall success of implementation and the 
overall program. If the functional management level is not solidly 
committed to the program, their subordinates will sense this and they, 
in turn, will be against the program. 
In discussing top management's role in CIM implementation, 
Bergstrom [8] points out that the obligation for successful CIM planning 
and implementation begins at the top of an ·organization. He, however, 
indicates that this is also the seat of many hurdles and bottlenecks. 
The major difficulty, according to Giesel, as reported by Bergstrom [8, 
p. 26], is that all too often, top management not only is not directly 
involved in CIM planning, but also it does not clearly communicate 
corporate strategic goals and objectives. When that happens, the CIM 
planners' hands are bound by lack of information - or worse, a body of 
misinformation. A second area of concern with respect to top management 
is the tendency to delegate away CIM planning. "This is done", Geisel 
indicates, "because top management may not be familiar with the 
technology involved, and may be intimidated by it so it delegates this 
critical decision-making process to a lower level which is something 
that should never be done" [8, p. 25]. Geisel points out that top 
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management does not need to understand the technologies of CIM to make 
informed and successful decisions - decisions, for example, that involve 
what kind of factories one might have in the future, what their 
capacities might be, and where they might be located. These decisions, 
Geisel believes, can be made only at the uppermost level of 
organizational management. A more severe case of this delegation as 
addressed by Putnam [76], is the failure to internalize the 
modernization undertaking by hiring consultants to do all the work. He 
noted that hiring consultants is an easy way to design and implement a 
modernization project, but eventually the consultants will leave, 
placing burden of making the modernization project work on the company. 
Putnam indicated that consultants are good as technical advisors, but if 
a company fails to be a leader in selecting the technology and working 
hard to implement the technology, problems will occur when the 
consultants leave,· as it would be too expensive to retain consultants 
for helping to manage day-to-day operations. Management commitment to 
CIM is vital to its success. Says Donald I, Manor, PE Division 
Manager, Design Systems, Deere & Co., "We need dedicated management to 
get the process started and to keep everyone moving ••. " [92, p. 31]. 
A good example of a successful AMT implementation is demonstrated 
at Unimation, Inc., a subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
(Danbury, CA} in the strategy designed to maintain Unimation's position 
as a world leader in high technology robots and robotic systems [SJ. 
Unimation built its program on solid ground. It started with top 
management support and the dedicated participation of every employee. 
According to Unimation's President Paul Ockerman: "Like most 
businesses, we have to constantly change or fall behind. Each of our 
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employees has made a personal commitment to deliver the high product 
quality, technology, and service our customers deserve 11 [5, p. 4]. This 
program is working for Unimation. A sampling of the results include: An 
increase in purchased material acceptance rate from 60% to 92% over a 
two years period, a 183% increase in -incoming material turnaround time, 
a 165% improvement in on-time shipping, 50% decrease in cycle time (the 
period between receipt of an order and shipment), 56% reduction in 
operating expenses over the same two year period, and an increase in 
value added of 26% in the first year. 
Sepehri [91] explains that, in managing automation, senior 
management at IBM 1 s Lexington plant supported the project actively with 
financial and resource commitments. At a lower management level, all 
control, reporting and business management responsibilities for each 
product or process - including product design, logistics, manufacturing 
process and CIM- were located under one person. 
Voss [106] indicates that the impact of new technologies is cross 
functional, and top management support may be needed to ensure that a 
cross functional approach is taken, and that cross functional problems 
can be overcome. Implementation requires adequate resources, both 
money, and more important, people and time. Without top management 
support, these often evaporate. In addition, the choice and 
implementation of technology must be matched to a company 1 s business 
requirements, and top management 1 s input is required to accomplish this. 
Organizational Structure 
Organizational structure is the unique arrangement of reporting 
relationships and responsibilities found within a particular firm [97]. 
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In order for an organization to successfully implement its AMT strategy, 
its structure must match or "fit" the firm's strategy. I t must also be 
in tune with the other systems within the core organizational system, 
required to move the firm toward its stated objectives for implementing 
the AMT. When properly done, changes i n organizational structure, if 
needed, can be a powerful tool with wh i ch to successfully implement such 
strategies. 
"An organization's success depends on its ability to define 
strategy and respond to important forces operating in its external 
environment, and on having the appropriate structures required to manage 
the complex internal activities that will move the organization towards 
its strategic goals" [97, p. 48]. Some aspects of structure of 
particul ar interest in the efforts to implement AMT include: how the 
structure fits with the organization's strategy, how the people fit the 
organization's structure, the aspects of structure that could possibly 
frustrate or foster desired behavior such as communication, and how 
structure can be used as a strategic weapon. 
The choi ce of structure directly involves the choice of strategy. 
The first step in making a decision about structure is to understand 
what the selected strategy requires of the organization. A formal 
strategy should provide specific and detailed information on its effects 
on all aspects of the business. If the company defines its strategy as 
"continued growth in revenues and profits", for instance, the defi nition 
does not contain information about what is required of the 
organization's structure. However, if the firm defines its strategy as 
"continued growth of 10'.t, with an emphasis on developing better market 
penetration and marketing programs through quality products" [97, p. 
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163]~ the strategy begins to focus on the need for appropriate 
structures to implement the strategy. When structure does not fit with 
the organization's human resources - its people - the result may be 
significant resistance to change from managers who are critical to the 
organization's functioning. Some may even leave the organization. The 
reward structure must be designed to stimulate and encourage the 
perpetration of the organization's structure. The dilemma of whether to 
adjust structure or strategy is not easily resolved. Ideally, a firm 
chooses a structure that fits with its strategy. When strategy is being 
formulated, the firm must view its structure as both a basis for - and 
constraint on - the range of strategies possible. Conversely, when 
contemplating a change in an organization's structure, the fit with its 
strategy - as well as its people, its culture, management processes, and 
the technical system must be carefully considered. 
Ett1ie [23] makes several propositions regarding the subject of 
implementing strategy for manufacturing innovations. He proposes that 
organizations that have more complex structures are more likely to 
initiate and adopt innovation, but are more likely to encounter problems 
in implementation, regardless of innovation type. Other propositions 
related to structure are that: Organizations that are more formalized 
and more centralized are less likely to adopt incremental innovations 
but are more successful at implementing incremental process innovations 
when they do attempt change. The opposite is true for radical 
innovation, less formalized and centralized firms adopt; organizations 
that use special structural arrangements like implementation teams for 
radical process introduction and organizations that use existing 
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structural roles and relationships with expanded duties for incremental 
process introduction, will be most successful [23, p. 13]. 
Tichy [100] notes that organizations will manage the 
alignment/adjustment processes required to provide the needed balance in 
the organization to the extent that there is a match between each 
incongruency facing the organization and the adjustment capacity of the 
organization's components. Sashkin and Morris provide a sample 
questionnaire which can be used to assess an organization and place it 
along the organic - mechanistic continuum. Pertinent portions of this 
questionnaire have been incorporated into the survey instrument 
developed for this study. The questions used to solicit information for 
testing hypothesis# 4 were extracted from this source [87, p. 101]. 
Implementation Success Factors 
There are a wide variety of issues of significant importance to AMT 
implementation addressed in literature, but do not fit into any the 
sections already covered in this chapter. This section explores some of 
those issues. 
Voss [106] states that most organizations believe that they have 
successfully implemented new operating technology when two conditions 
are met. First, when all the bugs have been ironed out and it is 
working technically. Second, when the operation is working reliably and 
there is little down time, and/or the new technology has a high 
utilization rate. According to Voss, getting the technology to work may 
be only half the battle. The full success can only be considered to 
have been realized if the benefits sought are realized, and ideally 
realized in the market place through increased competitiveness. Full 
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benefits~ he says, may include increased productivity, reduced lead 
time, improved quality, increased flexibility, customer responsiveness, 
reduced cycle times, reduced labor costs, increased throughput, 
reduction in work-in-process (WIP), and common database [106, pp. 
159-172]. Voss proposes two levels of success in implementation of 
AMT: Technical success - the bugs have been ironed out and the system 
is working technically and Business success - realization of anticipated 
benefits. 
Zygmont [115] points out that CIM is not a single technology but a 
global concept, encompassing nearly all efforts to streamline a 
company 1 s manufacturing and support acti vi ti es. It may mean, for 
example, tying together product design and production engineering so 
that the same product data created on a CAD system are also used to 
program computer-controlled machine tools to cut the parts. It may also 
entail automatic corrnnunication between control computers in the factory, 
so that production is smooth and coordinated. Because no two 
manufacturers have the same needs, says John J. Clancy, president of 
McDonnel 1 Douglas Manufacturing industry Systems (St. Louis}, 11 CIM 
solutions are not generic; they have to be tailored to individual 
companies" [115, p. 29]. A manufacturer 1 s approach to CIM depends on 
such variables as its size, the age and number of its facilities, the 
volumes and varieties of its products, the kinds of arrangements it has 
with vendors, and the changeability of its market, to name a few [115]. 
Bergstrom [8], in an article which covered his discussions with 
Larry Geisel, president and CEO, Carnegie Group, Inc. (Pittsburgh) 
covering the notion of CIM, pointed out that any organization 
contemplating CIM should know itself first, what it is and where it is 
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going~ before seriously entertaining the idea of CIM. According to 
Geisel, "First of all, you have to know the nature of your business, 
like products and markets, businesses have life cycle, and it's critical 
to know what kind of life cycle your business has." He was also 
indicated that "CIM planners who start without a clear notion of 
business type will find the going difficult" [8, p. 25]. Furthermore, 
the CIM plan is going to be radically different depending upon the 
business. 
The notion of understanding one's own business and understanding 
CIM, and the progressing one step at a time, is an important one. 11 CIM 
requires tremendous support, both in terms of engineering and 
maintenance," says C. Sean Battles, senior staff engineer, strategic 
manufacturing planning, Deere & Co. (Moline, IL). "We ask whether CIM 
is going to improve the total cost of manufacturing. Careful evaluation 
before application is important to ensure that we've thought through 
both CIM's strengths and weaknesses" [92, p. 31]. According to Marcus 
A. Clarke, Jr., Engineering and Manufacturing Staff, Manufacturing 
Planning Department, Ford Motor Co. (Dearborn, MI), "The key to the 
implementation of all this new manufacturing technology is going to be 
how well you think it through and how well you utilize your people" [92, 
p. 31]. 
Nel1emann [67] indicates that CIM is more than a technical 
challenge, it is also an organizational challenge. "It requires that we 
redefine traditional roles and responsibilities, organization 
structures, work content, reward system and approach to education and 
training" [67, p. 4]. He further states that CIM changes the nature of 
manufacturing by making it a process system which affects many 
functional areas of the company, and for a system to work at its peak, 
the parts must work together. Beside having implications for the 
factory floor, it also means that the various functional areas -
finance, marketing, engineering, production, human resources and data 
processing - must work together to an unprecedented degree. Nellemann 
also gives some reasons why some companies fail in their CIM efforts. 
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He indicates that because of the complexity of combining the technology, 
organization and supplier relationships in a fashion that would make 
them work together, many companies are disappointed as their attempts to 
implement CIM systems fail to yield quick and dramatic benefits, and 
even cause more complex and serious problems than those they were 
intended to solve. He further pointed out that in many cases, 
sophisticated equipment sits idle while technicians try to debug the 
software that controls its movements, the number of products made by a 
new system is only half its capacity, costs and scrap rates are higher 
than anticipated and productivity suffers. 
Kowalczyk, in describing their experiences with the MRP II project 
at the DEC - Augusta plant noted that one of the elements respo nsible 
for their success, striving for an effective system rather than 
elegance, helped keep the project moving. The idea was to get 
procedures that worked first, and worry about improving them later [39]. 
Putnam [76] points out some of the traps that smaller companies 
should be aware of, and try to avoid when considering modernization 
activities. He states that the scope of modernization will vary 
depending upon the resources the company has to apply. Some companies 
have extensive engineering staffs dedicated to modernization projects 
while other companies' entire engineering staffs remain committed solely 
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to daily operational requirements. The first restriction affecting 
modernization efforts, according to Putnam is limited capital funds for 
such projects. He warns that modernization should not be equated with 
buying new equipment, that modernization includes the set of activities 
which will improve productivity, quality, and throughput time. With 
this limitation, he indicates that determining what set of activities 
needs to be undertaken involves identifying what is needed by the 
company. Implementing modernization which does not interface with all 
required activities will create an island of modernization with 
disappointing results. For these reasons, it is imperative to determine 
the real needs of the company to best identify the appropriate 
modernization activities. The needs analysis will then determine if a 
heavy capital investment is necessary or if just improving a process 
will be the best solution. 
Beck [6] discussed how a new system can meet the challenges of 
growth and change. In this case, the discussion is specifically 
directed at a new packaging system at an IBM plant at Boca Raton, Fl. 
He indicated that between securing management approval for the new 
system and selecting a systems integrator (Jervis B. Webb Co.) about 16 
months had elapsed. "The business was busy changing while all this was 
going on, 11 says J. Robert Brokaw, advisory engineer. 11That's why we 
decided we had to make the system generic," adds Larry A. D' Angelo, 
Manager of distribution engineering. By "generic", D'Angelo means 
"designed for a range of probable future products in addition to 
existing ones" [6, p. 5]. To IBM, making the system generic meant 
including flexibility among the general design criteria. Beck mentioned 
that planning to handle future products in unknown quantities presented 
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more difficulty. It requires ongoing cooperation between distribution 
engineers and personnel responsible for new- product development. Other 
cooperative successes included consultations between distribution 
engineering with personnel responsible for facilities engineering, 
safety, maintenance, and manufacturing at every step of the project 
planning and implementation. Concerning flexibility, O'Rourke also 
suggested that one should seek flexibility to give the facility a longer 
life than the product it is producing. He said that CIM's economics of 
scope make economics of scale possible [42]. 
Brauninger [11] discusses how Cone Drive became initially 
interested in CIM. He indicated that what started their interest was 
customer demand and competitive pressures. They realized that they had 
problems with their delivery integrity and project lead times. He 
indicated that they originally attempted to solve this problem over the 
years by hiring additional people, building more inventory, and 
extending lead times, but achieved limited or poor results. Top 
management realized that something had to be done and provided the 
personnel and financial resources to get started. Brauninger pointed 
out that the primary method to spark interest in CIM is to get everyone 
involved. He provided a list of what they used at Cone Drive to spark 
interest in CIM. Included were the fact that they developed 
expectations that things were going to get better, remained open to 
suggestions for improvement whether it related to specific tasks or the 
system as a whole, allowed people with ambition and desire to lead in 
the implementation of new ideas and projects, and showed everyone the 
results as projects were successfully completed. 
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Ettlie [24] indicates that incremental and radical innovation 
change ought to be distinguished when we study the innovation process in 
organizations, because the causal model for the two general types of 
innovation is different. He defines radical change as involving more 
risk, often because of the large magnitude of the proposed innovation, 
the lack of certainty of outcomes when using the innovation, and the 
degree to which the change is discontinuous with past experience. It 
stands out as a real difference in the normal day-to day, year-to year 
routine of patterns of behavior of an organization. He makes several 
propositions regarding implementation of process innovations. Among 
these are incremental process innovations failing for economic reasons, 
or if demand is insufficient at the selling price. Radical process 
innovations fail primarily because of insufficient human resources, 
especially during implementation; organizations that have aggressive 
technology policy are more likely to adopt and formulate a successful 
implementation strategy for sophisticated production process 
innovations; the more sophisticated the new production innovation, the 
more important technology and implementation strategy will be in 
determining successful integration of the innovation; sufficient slack 
resources consisting of people, money, facilities, support systems, and 
time will be allocated in successful innovation implementation cases. 
One of the most important causes of failure of innovation is the 
implementation stage will be lack of sufficient resources, especially 
when the technology is a radical departure from existing practice in an 
industry. 
Synder and Elliot [95] provide suggested implementation steps. 
Some of the vital points discussed include the fact that firms should 
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obtain a clear understanding of what the new technology can do and how 
it will satisfy a need that exists and develop a strong relationship 
with appropriate suppliers. They further indicated that firms should 
obtain a common understanding of the problems as well as the criteria 
for an acceptable solution and learn from the installation, perform 
analysis. The analysis should ask questions like 11What did we say we 
were going to do?, What did we actually accomplish? 11 [95, p. 48], and 
find reasons for deviations from the plan. They caution, "do not expect 
instant results" [95, p. 48]. 
White [108] provides a list of some of the more commonly expressed 
reasons for the scarcity of integrated systems. Among the reasons given 
were the following: It is not easy to design and implement integrated 
systems. Design complexity tends to grow with the number of operations 
involved. Many details are involved and nothing can be left to chance; 
they are radical departures from tradition; few apparent rewards 
exist. Few, if any, incentives exist for team performance, instead of 
individual performance, group performance should be recognized and 
rewarded. Many believe that integrated systems provide little cushion 
for error. They think that a finely tuned integrated machine will 
experience considerable downtime, and that many organizational barriers 
must be overcome. The organization chart creates boundary lines that 
are difficult to transcend; the concept of integrated systems is not 
well understood. The term means different things to different people, 
depending on their background and experience. An integrated system is 
viewed as being tightly connected, inflexible and very risky; a 
leadership void exists. Where systems integration has occurred, 
successfully, a champion had existed. A strong leader emerged and made 
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a commitment to systems integration. Few success stories and numerous 
horror stories exist. In general, the concept has been oversold and 
overpromised. Rather than having a dramatic impact on direct labor, 
integrated systems will have their greatest impact on indirect labor. 
Ma~ of the indirect jobs in manufacturing, for example, fill the "gaps" 
between workstations; integrated systems eliminate such gaps. 
While many other specific cases of successful or less than 
successful AMT related implementation endeavors could be cited, the 
author believes that those covered thus far in this literature survey 
will adequately serve the purpose of il l ustrating the possible results 
that can be achieved from these technologies, as well as to provide 
proper input as far as the factors desired in order to attain successful 
implementation, as well as those to be avoided in order to attain such 
status. This will, in turn, serve as input to the design of the survey 
instrument tailored towards achieving the goals of this study. 
Desirable Outcomes of AMT 
There are several factors identified in the literature as desirable 
outcomes of advanced manufacturing technologies. This section provides 
a synopsis of the expected/desirable outcomes provided in the literature 
based primarily upon individual AMT implementation experiences. 
In a report of the committee on CAD/CAM interface released by the 
National Research council (NRC) (Washington, D. C.), it was indicated 
that there is a requirement for a substantial shift in manufacturing 
management as a result of market pressures, which demands greater 
manufacturing flexibility, improved quality and performance, and faster 
delivery. The study further indicated that based on visits to five 
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leaders in implementing CIM, the following benefits were documented: 
reduction in engineering design costs, reduction on overall lead times, 
reduction in work-in-process (WIP), reduction in personnel costs, 
increase in productivity, and increase in productivity of capital 
equipment [30, p. 57]. In a similar study conducted by Frost and 
Sullivan, Inc . (New York), and focusing on companies using flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS}, the following benefits of FMS were 
documented: better machine tool utilizat ion, reducti on in direct labor, 
increased machine efficiency, reduced processing time, reduced f l oor 
space requirements, reduction in product cost, and reduction in the 
number of setups [70, pp . 34-35]. 
Jaikumar [44] indicated that one of the new imperatives in the 
management of FMS technology is that of making flexibility and 
responsiveness the miss ion of manufacturing. Other opportunities that 
exist in CIM are enumerated by Merchant [62]. These include: ability to 
reduce manufacturing costs, increased manufacturing productivity, 
flexibility in automation and operations, assurance of high reproducible 
quality, and increased job sati sfaction. 
11The driving force for modernization comes f rom factors such as 
customer demands and expectations which are increasing rapidly in terms 
of product performance, product quality, cost, serviceability, and 
responsiveness to schedule delivery requirements" [65, p. 34]. Mize, 
Seifert, and Berry [65] also indicated that the global marketplace is 
increasingly competitive, requiri ng manufacturers to improve their 
capabilities to satisfy customer demands for higher qual ity products at 
prices that are extremely competitive . 
Kirton and Burnham [47, p. 45] presented some case studi es 
involving the operation of integrated manufacturing. They pointed out 
some of the pressures that made the companies that they studied to 
consider integrated manufacturing. Among these were: a changing 
marketplace demanding greater responsiveness and flexibility, and also 
international competition demanding improved quality and lower costs. 
Some of the benefits that the companies experienced upon changeover to 
integrated manufacturing incl uded: reduction in manuf acturing lead 
times, reduction in product introduction times, improved machine 
utilization, reduced manufacturing costs, reduced i nventories, better 
quality, and improved workflow. 
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In a description of the implementation of MRP I I system at DEC -
Augusta, Maine manufacturing facility, the benefits of the 
implementation experienced at the plant included: fifty percent 
reduction in WIP inventory, faster identification of problems on the 
shop floor, fifty percent reduction in production time for some 
products, reduced paperwork, and reduced overhead [39]. In a discussion 
of another case study, Knill [SO] described the goals set for the CIM 
system impl emented at Allen-Bradley. Among these were the following: 
lowered production costs through a reduction in the amount of materials 
required; total elimination of direct labor costs with the exception of 
four automation attendants; elimination/reduction of indirect labor 
costs in inspection, quality control, production and inventory control, 
data processing, supervision, and material handl ing; reduction of scrap 
and rework because of automated manufacturing; higher production rates 
from manufacturing cells and computer directed material movement; 
elimination of WIP inventory; reduction in warranty expense due to 
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enhanced product quality; improved market position due to fast 
turnaround in order filling: just 24 hours from the entry of a customer 
order to shipment of that order; and the ability to automatically 
manufacture a lot size of one among the 125 variations of motor starters 
available. 
Dutton [19, p. 38], in a discussion of the modernization program 
undertaken at John Deere's Harvester Works in 1982, pointed out that the 
program's directive was to reduce the parts cost and improve quality. 
She indicated that with over 15000 part profiles recorded in Deere's 
computerized state-of-the-art Group Technology (GT) database, it seemed 
obvious that the project's goal of reducing costs had a great potential 
for savings, increased productivity, inventory reductions, and other 
efficiencies. Above all else, quality also had to be improved. 
Udoka and Nazemetz [102, p. 40], presented a list of driving forces 
for AMT implementation, based upon an earlier research. Among the 
factors enumerated were: improved product quality; increased 
flexibility; improved responsiveness to changing market demands; 
improved on-time delivery; increased productivity; improved information 
flow; shorter product life cycles; reduced manufacturing costs; improved 
system performance; reduced prices for end-products; and reduced raw 
material inventory. Other factors 1 i sted were: reduced purchase parts 
inventory; reduced WIP; reduced material cost; reduced lead time; 
reduced throughput time; reduced floor space requirements; reduced 
direct labor costs; reduced white-collar content; and reduced scrap, 
rework, and non conforming materials. 
In a discussion of the MRP II and Just-in-Time (JIT) program at E. 
I. DuPont de Numours and Co. 1 s Eagle Run, Delaware assembly plant, it 
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was indicated that prior to implementation of the systems, their 
"schedule performance was a dismal 40% and inventory accuracy was less 
than 60% 11 [40, p. 73]. The following benefits were projected for the 
MRP II program: an increase in inventory accuracy of 97%; an improved 
master production schedule performance of better than 97%; a decrease in 
raw materials lead times from a half year to less than two months; a 
doubling of annual inventory turns from 3.5 to 7; and a productivity 
increase of 35%. The benefits if the JIT effort included: an additional 
increase in productivity of 25%; cycle time and WIP reductions from 6 
weeks to 2 days; a reduction in required floor space; and an overall 
increase in quality [40, pp. 74 -75]. 
From the list of desirable/expected outcomes provided in the 
literature, those that were most frequently mentioned were compiled and 
used as the list of expected outcomes of AMT in the implementation 
success diagnosis (ISO) section of the questionnaire described fully in 
Chapter III. A summary of the selected expected outcomes of AMT used in 
the questionnaire, along with their literature support is presented in 
Table II. 
The respondents to the survey were given the opportunity to provide 
some input to this list of desirable/expected outcomes of AMT. In a 
section of the questionnaire where open-ended questions were asked, the 
respondents were asked to list the top three specific benefits of their 
AMT implementation. Their responses to this question are provided in 
Appendix F, and a relationship to this section is made in the section 
dealing with the analysis of the data in Chapter V. 
TABLE II 
LITERATURE SUPPORT FOR EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
OF AMT USED IN THE STUDY 
1. Product Quality 
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SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, '87, p.165; MHE. Feb. '87, p. 52; Merchant, 
'84, p. 8; Mize, '85, p. 175; Mize, Seifert and Berry, 1 84-85, 
p. 34; Kirton and Burnham, '87, p. 45; Knill, '85, p. 62; 
Dutton, '86, p. 38, Udoka and Nazemetz, '88, p. 40, MMH, Dec. 
I 86 > p • 74) • 
2. Flexibility to accommodate 
dynamic product mix changes 
SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, 1 87. p. 166; Jaikumar, '86, p. 76; Merchant, 
'84, p. 8; Udoka and Nazemetz, 188, p. 40). 
3. P roducti vi ty 
SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, '87, p. 165; Majchrzak, '86, p. 197; 
Merchant, '84, p. 8; Knill, '85, p. 62; Dutton, '86, p. 38; 
Udoka and Nazemetz, '88, p. 40; MMH, Dec. 1 86, p. 74}. 
4. On-time.Delivery 
SUGGESTED IN: (Vondembrese, '87, pp. 34-35; Udoka and Nazemetz, 
1 88, p. 40; MMH, Dec. '86, p. 7 3). 
5. Information flow 
SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, 1 87, p. 165; Vondembrese, '87, p. 62; Udoka 
and Nazemetz, 1 88, p.40). 
6. Manufacturing cost 
SUGGESTED IN: (Majchrzak, 1 86, p.197; Merchant, '84, p. 8; Kirton 
and Burnham, '87, p. 45, Knill, 1 85, p. 62; Udoka and 
Nazemetz, 1 88, p. 40} 
7. Inventory turnover 
SUGGESTED IN: (Kirton and Burnham, '87, p. 45; Knill, '85, p. 62; 
Dutton, '86, p. 38). 
8. Work-in-process (WIP) 
SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, '87, p. 168; Majchrzak, 1 86, p. 197; Kirton 
and Burnham, '87, p. 45; MMH, Nov. '86, p. 107; Knill, '85, p. 
62; Udoka and Nazemetz, '88, p. 40; MMH, Dec. 1 86, p. 74}. 
TABLE II (continued) 
9. Material cost 
SUGGESTED IN: (Knill, 1 85, p. 62; Dutton, 1 86, p. 38; Udoka and 
Nazemetz, 1 88, p. 40). 
10. Lead ti mes 
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SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, 1 87, p. 165; Majchrzak, 1 86, p. 197; Kirton 
and Burnham, 1 87, p. 45; Udoka and Nazemetz, 188, p. 40; MMH, 
Dec. 1 86, p. 73). 
11. Floor space requirements 
SUGGESTED IN: (Vondembrese, 1 87, p. 34; Udoka and Nazemetz, 188, 
p. 40; MMH, Dec. 1 86, p. 74) 
12. Direct labor cost 
SUGGESTED IN: (Majchrzak, 186, p. 197; Vondembrese, 1 87, pp. 
34-35; Knill, 1 85, p. 62, Udoka and Nazemetz, 1 88, p. 40). 
13. Indirect labor cost 
SUGGESTED IN: (Majchrzak, 1 86, p. 197; Knill, 1 85, p. 62; Udoka 
and Nazemetz, 1 88, p. 40). 
14. Responsiveness to shifting 
customer expectations 
SUGGESTED IN: (Voss, 1 87, p. 168; Jaikumar, 86, p. 76; Mize, 
Seifert, and Berry, 1 84-85, p. 34; Kirton and Burnham, 1 87, p. 
45; Udoka and Nazemetz, 1 88, p. 40). 
15. Long-tenn profitability 
SUGGESTED IN: (Mize, Seifert and Berry, 1 85-85, p. 35; Knill, 
185, p. 62). 
16. Stockholder benefits 
SUGGESTED IN: (Mize, 1 85, p. 175) . 
17. Overall system performance 
relative to system objectives 
SUGGESTED IN:(Udoka and Nazemetz, 1 88, p.40). 
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Similar Studies 
There have been several discrete reports of successes and failures 
in efforts to implement AMT. Actual studies in the literature are 
mainly directed towards showing the benefits of CIMS or its 
subsystems. This can be attributable to the tendency towards reporting 
only the successes in AMT implementation efforts in open literature. No 
studies have been found that has dealt with delineating the factors 
required for successful implementation of AMTS. 
In a study conducted by the Manufacturing Studies Board, National 
Research Council, Washington, D.C., the benefits of CIMS were shown to 
include: reduction in engineering design cost of 15-30%, reduction in 
overall lead time of 30-60%, increased product quality as measured by 
yield of acceptable product of 2-5 times its previous level. Another 
benefit listed was increased capabilities of engineers as measured by 
the extent and depth of analysis they could perform in the same or less 
time. Increases of 3-35 times the previous levels were recorded. Other 
benefits of AMT reported include: increased productivity of production 
operations (complete assemblies} of 40-70%, increased productivity 
(operating time) of capital equipment of 2-3 times, reduction of work-in 
process of 30-60% and reduction in personnel costs of 5-20%. The 
companies studied expect further benefits as full integration is 
approached [58]. 
In a similar study of companies using Flexible Manufacturing 
Systems (FMS), Frost & Sullivan, Inc., New York, using a sample of 20 
U.S. operating systems, found some range of improvements for the total 
sample in the different areas of FMS [70]. The benefits of FMS along 
with the range of improvements that they found is presented in Table 
I I I. 
TABLE III 
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Frost & Sullivan forecasts that the total U.S. market for FMS and 
flexible assembly systems will be about $2 billion by 1990. 
Another study related to the implementation of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) was presented by Jaikumar [44]. In the 
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study cited in this literature, the author, in 1984 conducted a focused 
study of 35 Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMSs} in the United States 
and 60 in Japan, a sample that represented more than half the installed 
systems in both countries at that time [44, p. 69]. The kinds of 
products they made were comparable in size and complexity, and required 
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similar metal~cutting times, numbers of tools, and precision of parts. 
The U. S. systems had an average of seven machines to the Japanese six. 
"Here the similarities end. The average number of parts made by an 
FMS in the United States was 10; in Japan the average was 93, almost ten 
times greater. Seven of the U. S. systems made just three parts. The 
U. S. companies used FMSs the wrong way-for high-volume production of a 
few parts rather than for high-variety production of many parts at a low 
cost per unit. Thus the annual volume per part in the U. S. was 1,727; 
in Japan, only 258 ...• For every new part introduced in the U. S. 
system, 22 parts were introduced in Japan. 11 [44, P. 69]. In this 
study, the author indicated in the comparison of the two countries' 
systems that the Japanese were better able to realize the strategic 
promise - the flexibility aspects of their FMS installations by more 
adequate management of their implementations. The study cited here 
shows the benefits of some advanced manufacturing technologies. The aim 
of this research study will be to gather information from those 
companies that have reported such benefits from AMT, about what factors 
led to their successful (or otherwise} efforts in AMT implementation, in 
order to formulate some general requirements for successful AMT 
implementation. 
Voss [106] reports on an 18 month study into the success and 
failure in Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} in England. He 
concluded that success and failure of the implementati on can be 
considered a two stage process: achievement of technical success, and 
achievement of business success. Voss further indicated that at that 
point, few firms had gotten far enough into full implementation of AMT, 
and thus there was a clear scope for further research to validate and 
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extend his findings. His study indicated that the benefits of AMT, are 
achievable but many companies have yet to achieve them. This study 
essentially showed as an output, the percentages of the compani es 
studied that achieved some productivity increases or some other benefits 
as a result of AMT implementation. 
Ettlie [23] in a related study, surveyed 41 organizations to 
determine the causes of the relative degree of implementation success of 
advanced programmable manufacturing systems in the United States. The 
general hypothesis of his study was that a successful implementation 
strategy is matched with the characteristics of the manufacturing 
innovation being introduced. He noted that one of the most important of 
these characteristics is the degree to which the new technology 
represents a radical, as opposed to an incremental, departure from 
existing practice. This study essentially tallied the responses of 
respondents to interview questions, and reported on the percentages of 
responses in each category. It also gives frequency counts of the 
different measures of success suggested by the respondents. 
Majchrzak [52] interviewed manufacturing managers in plants with 
AMT equipment varying in degree of computer-based i ntegration. The 
interviews were conducted to identify those components of management 
infrastructure which are related to plant performance. The components 
of the management infrastructure that they covered included: practices 
for managing human resources such as AMT operator responsibilities, 
training, job designs, and organizational design factors. Their results 
indicated that plant performance can be significantly enhanced by 
attention to management infrastructure variables; that as plants 
progress from stand-alone CAM equipment to integrated CIM cells, the 
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management infrastructure will ·need to change; and that management will 
need to prioritize achievement of the different dimensions of 
manufacturing performance since management infrastructure likely to 
achieve low waste is different from that likely to achieve low 
work-in-process inventory. 
In another relateq study, Majchrzak [52] examined training 
requirements for CAD/CAM. Plant representatives were surveyed 
concerning the use of various CAD/CAM technologies. The study suggested 
that at a minimum both shop floor supervisors as well as machine 
operators need to be trained. The study also suggested that in addition 
to machine operation, supervisors need to be taught information about 
manufacturing processes at the plant and an understanding of where the 
technological advances fit with the corporate strategy and manufacturing 
process. Moreover, skills taught to the operators of CAD/CAM also must 
go beyond specific machine operation. Offering training in safety 
procedures as well as general knowledge of technological advances in 
manufacturing provide the employee exposed to CAD/CAM a better 
understanding of proper expectations for the new equipment. 
Summary of the Review of Literature 
The review of related literature has attempted to examine the need 
for successful Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation 
rating. Investigative research was conducted to find information on how 
the complex elements that comprise the core organizational systems and 
the organizational strategy formulation are synchronized or aligned for 
successfully implementing AMT. From the literature, issues relating to 
each of the system elements were extracted. The review of literature 
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was also directed at the companies that have been successful in their 
efforts to implement AMTS, as well as those with dismal results in their 
implementation strategy. The aim has been to extract information on how 
the factors covered in the AMT implementation model (Fig. 1) combine to 
contribute to the relative levels of implementation success attained by 
organizations that have implemented AMT. These issues were used in 
designing the questionnaires. The questionnaires were, in turn, used to 
establish, from the survey of participating companies that have 
implemented AMT, the corrmonalty of these factors as success factors or 
detriments to AMT implementation. This information comprise the results 
of this study. This information is expected to be useful in giving an 
overview of the complex interaction of strategy with the basic elements 
that make up and drive the organization, and how the more successful 
organizations differed form the less successful ones in the levels 
interaction of the different systems within the core organizational 
system. 
The factors identified from the review of literature as factors 
predominantly accounting for successful implementation of AMT comprise 
the hypotheses formulated for this study. The nul 1 hypotheses stated 
for this study, along with their literature support, and the questions 
formulated from the literature to support and solicit information for 
testing each hypothesis are presented later in this section. The reader 
should note that all the questions used to collect the data to test 
hypothesis number 3 listed in the section below, were extracted from 
Stonich [97, pp. 6-10]; the questions used to collect the data to test 
hypothesis number 4 were extracted from Sashkin and Morris [87, pp. 
101-102], the questions used to collect the data to test hypothesis 
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number 19 were extracted from Sashkin and Morris [87, pp. 165-168]. All 
other questions in the instrument were formulated by the author from a 
combination of the references listed under each hypothesis. 
The following are the hypotheses that were tested for the study. 
Under each hypothesis, a list of literature references that were used as 
a basis for formulating both the hypothesis and the questions are 
provided. The questions listed under each hypothesis were used to 
solicit information from survey respondents for testing the hypotheses 
to which they pertain. 
Hypothesis #1 
The degree of effectiveness in aligning the core organizational 
systems with the corporate strategy wil l not be a significant factor in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful organizations in their 
efforts to implement AMT. 
Suggested in: (Ettlie, 1984, p. 31; Thompson, 1967, p. 124; Krepchin, 
1987, p. 93, Synder and Elliot, 1988, pp. 48-51, Zygmont, 1987, p. 
28; Eschenbach and Geistauts, '87, p. 62). 
Questions Used: 
1. This organization had an overall corporate statement of 
objectives for its Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) efforts, 
within which the plan for this particular AMT implementation was 
specified. 
2. This organization adequately assessed the prevailing values and 
attitudes in the firm, in selecting its methodology for achi eving the 
desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
3. This organization's scheme of events direct ed at achieving the 
desired outcomes of this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) fits 
the general technological patterns that I am familiar with. 
4. In its plans for achieving the desired goals from this Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT), this organization adequately assessed 
its organizational structure, and made the adjustments required in order 
to reach those goals. 
5. This organization made any organizational str ucture changes 
necessary for transition to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
environment prior to implementation. 
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6. This organization had a strategic focus for its Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) which increased cohesion within the AMT 
implementation organization. 
Hypothesis 12 
The degree of effective alignment of employee attitudes with the 
corporat~ strategy will not be a signi ficant factor in differentiating 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Synder and Elliot, 1988, p. 44, MHE, Feb.'87, p. 109, 
MMH, Nov. 1 86, p. 109). 
Questions Used: 
7. The reward system in this organization recognized individual 
efforts to attain the desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT). 
8. The reward system in this organization recognized group efforts 
to attain the desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT). 
9. This organization's top management provided continual 
motivation, and rewarded compliance with the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) philosophy. 
10. Top management's evaluation of middle management considered 
performances that reflect the positive effects of change resulting from 
the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation. 
11. This organization's top management provided adequate incentives 
for middle and operational management staff to support the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) program. 
12. This organization's top management provided adequate incentives 
for labor groups to support our Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} 
efforts. 
Hypothesis #3 
The strategy formulation process will not be significant in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT implementati on efforts. 
Suggested in: (Thompson, 1 67, p. 451; Bergstrom, 1 87, p. 251) 
Questions Used: 
13. This organization's strategy formulation process explicitly 
includes consideration of implementation issues such as required 
reorganizations, staffi ng changes, modifications to systems and 
policies. 
104 
14. The key middle managers in this organization usually have a 
chance to review and comment on proposed strategies before resources are 
allocated. 
15. Strategic proposals are usually critically discussed and 
consensus reached prior to acceptance in this organization. 
16. There is a corporate staff support group for strategy 
formulation within this organization. 
17. This organization usually has a formal system for internally 
reviewing strategic proposals. 
18. This organization's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
efforts were designed to support its strategic business objectives. 
Hypothesis #4 
An organization's position along the organic - mechanistic dimension 
will not make a significant difference in the degree of success attained 
in their efforts to implement Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
Suggested i n: (Ettlie, 1 86, p. 31; Sashkin and Morris, 1 87, p. 101). 
Questions Used: 
19. This organization has clear rules and regulations that 
everyone is expected to follow closely. 
20. Policies in this organization are reviewed by the people they 
affect before being implemented. 
21. Everyone in this organization knows who his/her immediate 
supervisor is . Reporting relationships are clearly defined. 
22. Jobs in thi s organization are clearly defined; everyone knows 
exactly what is expected of him/her in any specific job position. 
23. All decisions in this organization must be reviewed and 
approved by upper level management. 
24. Standard activities in this organization are always covered by 
clearly outlined procedures that everyone is expected to follow. 
Hypothesis #5 
The nature of the relationship between the technology supplier and 
the user firm will not be significant in differentiating successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Ettlie, 1 86, p. 77; Nellemann, 1 87, p. 8, Snyder and 
Elliot, 1 88, p. 50; Galbraith, 1 78, p. 116}. 
Questions Used: 
25. This organization formed an i mplementation team with the 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) supplier at the project site 
during its AMT project implementation. 
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26. This organization established a long term, mutual cormnitrnent 
with the Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) supplier to support the 
integration the new technology in our plant. 
27. There were key people from the Advanced Manufacturi ng 
Technology {AMT) supplier firm who worked very closely with our project 
team in the efforts to implement the AMT in our plant. 
Hypothesis #6 
The existence of an AMT champion will not make a signi f icant 
difference bet ween successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
effor ts. 
Suggested in: {Brauninger, 1 86, pp. 21-23; Ettlie, 1 86, p. 83; Hayes 
and Wheelright, 1 84, p. 324; Nellemann, '87, pp. 8-12, Qunatz, '84, 
pp . 38-44, White, 186, p. 23). 
Questi ons Used: 
28. This organization allowed people with ambition and desire 
(regardless of their rank in management) to lead in the implementation 
of this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} project. 
29. There was a key person from t his organization who worked 
extremely hard at building a team to integrate the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) in our plant. 
30. There was a key person from the technology supplier firm who 
worked extremely hard at building a team to integrate the Advanced 
Manufactu r ing Technology {AMT) in our plant. 
31. The project leader for the Advanced Ma nufacturing Technol ogy 
{AMT) implementation had a deep connnitment and desire to succeed in the 
AMT implementation. 
Hypothesis #7 
The position of the AMT champion in the organization will not make a 
significant difference between successf ul and unsuccessful AMT projects. 
Suggested in: (Ettlie, '86, p. 21; Quantz, '84, p. 39, Krepchin, '87. 
p. 95). 
Questi ons Used: 
32. The project manager was the key person who "championed" this 
organization's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) efforts. 
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33. The person who directed our AMT implementation efforts was in a 
key management position. 
34. The person who directed our Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT) efforts, controlled the resources necessary for implementi ng the 
project. 
Hypothesis #8 
The existence of an employee educati onal program prior to AMT 
implementation will not be a significant factor in distinguish i ng 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementati on efforts 
Suggested in: (Beck, 1 86, p.5; Krepchin, '87, p. 94; Ettlie, '86, p. 
78; MMH, Nov. 1 86, p. 109, Pearson, '86, p. 8; Rummel and Holland, 
'88, p. 36; Sepehri, 1 87, p. 73; Snyder and Elliot, ' 88, p. 47). 
Questions Used: 
35. This organization had a comprehensive educational program to 
communicate to all employees, the reasons for necessary changes related 
to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) prior to actual 
installation of the system. 
36. This organization had an educational program for top-level 
managers, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual installation of the system. 
37. This organization had an educational program for middle 
managers, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual instal lation of the system. 
38. This organization had an educational program for operations 
personnel, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual instal lation of the system. 
Hypothesis #9 
The degree of availability of hands-on training program for 
employees after the installation of the AMT system wi l l not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
i mplementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Beck, 1 86, p. 5; Brauninger, 1 86, p. 21; Ettlie, 1 86, p. 
78; MMH, Nov. 1 86, p. 109; MHE, Feb . '87, p. 32; Krepchin, 187, p. 
93; Nellemann, 1 87, p. 8; Pearson, 186, p. 80; Putnam, '87, p. 14; 
Sepehri, '87, p. 73, Snyder and Elliot, 188, p. 44; Voss, '87, p. 
159; White, 186, p. 23; Zygmont, '87 , p. 28). 
Question Used: 
39. This organization had a comprehensive hands-on training program 
to introduce the Advanced Manufacturing Tech nology (AMT) to the 
employees after the actual installation of the system. 
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Hypothesis #10 
The degree of top-down planning and bottom-up implementation in an 
organization will not be a significant factor for distinguishing between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Brauninger, 186, p. 17; MMH, Nov. 1 86, p. 109, MHE, Feb. 
1 87, p. 32; Snyder and Elliot, 1 88, p. 47; Voss, '87, p. 163, 
Zygmont, 1 87, p. 29). 
Questions Used: 
40. This organization has a broad corporate plan for its Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) scheme, which provides guidelines for 
individual projects. 
41. The process for developing thi s organization's Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementati on plan incorporated employee 
participation to feed information from the shop floor back to upper 
management. 
42. The overall plan for integrating this Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) into the organization was carried out by upper level 
management, and the information was passed downward. 
Hypothesis Ill 
The pace of implementation will not make a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementa t ion efforts. 
Suggested in : (Brauninger, 186, p. 86; Ettlie, 1 86, p. 80; Ettlie, 1 84, 
p. 37; Nellemann, 1 87, p. 10). 
Questions Used: 
43. This organization took a step-wise approach to adapt and 
implement the Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) project 
incrementally in programmed phases. 
44. This organization rushed the implementation of each phase of 
its Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) program. 
45. The pace at which our Advanced Ma nufacturing Technology {AMT) 
was implemented was so slow that the initial zeal that pushed the 
project along in its earlier stages was lost. 
Hypothesis #12 
The degree to which organizations obtained experi ence with a pilot 
project prior to implementing a full scale project will not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts . 
Suggested i n: (Putnam~ 187, p. 13, MMH , Nov. 1 86, p. 109, Schreiber, 
I 87' p • 33} • 
Questions Used: 
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46. Thi s organization started its implementation push with a pilot 
project that was easy and had high probability of success, and then 
followed it up with successively more complex ones. 
47. Thi s organization obtained experience with a manageably-sized 
(Pilot) proj ect prior to a full scale implementation. 
48. The pilot project used to obtain experience in this 
organization was of similar technology to the full scale Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT} project. 
49. Th i s organization hired individuals who were familiar with the 
type of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be implemented to aid 
in its impl ementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #13 
The organization and composition of the AMT project team will not be 
a significant factor differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Beck, '86, p. 6; Bergstrom, 1 87, p. 18; Brauninger, '86, 
p. 26; Ettlie, 1 86, p. 83; Ettlie, 1 84, p. 39; Knill, 1 85, p. 64; 
Nellemann; 1 87, p. 10; Voss, '87, p. 165). 
Questions Used: 
50. All the key functional areas were represented in the project 
team(s) for this organization's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
implementation. 
51. This organization assigned its most capable people to the 
project. 
52. This organization had an in-house project leader, who 
coordinated the efforts for the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
implementation. 
53. The individual team members of this organization 1 s project team 
were dedicated to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project on 
a full-time basis for the entire duration of the project. 
54. The staff that worked on this organization's Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT} project were involved with the project 
only on a part-time basis while still performing their regular duties. 
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Hypothesis #14 
The degree of management commitment and support in an organization 
will not be a significant factor differentiating successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Bergstrom, 1 87, p. 25; Brauninger, 186, p. 17; Ettlie, 
'84, p. 34; MS, March, 1 86, p. 9; Quantz, t84, p. 40; Rummel and 
Holland, '88, p. 38; Schreiber, '87, p. 32; Snyder and Elliot, '88, 
p. 44; BW, March, '87, p. 102, MHE, Feb. '87, p. 32). 
Questi ons Used: 
55. This organization's top management was directly involved in its 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) planning. 
56. Top management understood/supported the implementation effort, 
and commi tted adequate financial resources to the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) efforts. 
57. This organization's top management actively supported our 
Advanced Manufacturing technology (AMT) efforts with adequate human 
resource commitments. 
58. This organization's top management directed its strategic 
planning efforts towards the successful implementation of this Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
59. Top management in this organization clearly communicated the 
corporate strategic goals and objectives driving the AMT i mplementation 
to the implementation planners. 
60. Corporate planners in this organization clearly communicated 
the corporate strategic goals and objectives driving the AMT 
implementation to the implementation planners. 
Hypothesis #15 
The magnitude of product redesign or simultaneously designing a new 
product in parallel with implementing a dedicated AMT will not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (BW, 'March '87, p. 102; MHE, Feb. '87, p. 32). 
Questions Used: 
61. This organization redesigned existing products for dedicated 
production on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) facility, 
after the system was implemented. 
62. This organization simultaneously designed new products along 
with a dedicated Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) facility. 
63. Product redesign concurrent with system implementation 
contributed significantly to the attainment of the desired levels of 
performance from our AMT system. 
Hypothesis 116 
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The degree of adequacy of the particular technology to an 
application in the organization will not make a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Synder and Elliot, 1 88, p. 46). 
Questions Used: 
64. This organization attempted to apply some technologies that are 
not compatible with the rest of the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT) in the overall technological scheme. 
65. This organization purchased/installed some of the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology systems without a clear understanding of what 
the technology could do, and how it woul d sati sfy the needs that exist. 
Hypothesis #17 
The degree of i nformation integrity in an organization prior to AMT 
implementation will not be a significant factor i n differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Savage, 1 88, p. 2; Zygmont, '87, p. 28). 
Questi ons Used: 
66. The existing da t abase configuration in our organization was too 
awkward for compatibility with the Advanced Manufacturing Technol ogy 
(AMT). 
67. This organization had a standard data commu nication system for 
adequate exchange of product description data, prior to attempting to 
implement the Advanced Manufac t uring Technology (AMT). 
68 . This organization had adequate inte r facing of information 
between the necessary functional departments, prior to attempting to 
implement the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project. 
Hypothesis #18 
The degree of availability of qualified systems integrators in an 
organization will not make a significant difference between successful 
and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
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Suggested in: (Rummel and Holland, 1 88, p. 39; Snyder and Elliot, 1 88, 
p. 47, Voss, 1 87, p. 164; White, 1 86, p. 23). 
Question Used: 
69. This organization had enough people possessing the technical 
competency required to integrate the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
in our plant. 
Hypothesis 119 
The degree of alignment of an organization's AMT strategy to its 
culture will not be a significant factor in differentiating between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Suggested in: (Sashkin and Morris, 1 87, p. 165; Schreiber, '87, p. 87; 
Thompson, 1 67, p. 124). 
Questions Used: 
70. In this organization, conflicts and differences in values, 
beliefs, and norms about coordinative activities, primary goals, and 
approaches to change are quickly dealt with and effectively solved. 
71. When changes are necessary, everyone in this organization has a 
clear idea of what sort of changes are and are not acceptable. 
72. In this organization, people do the best they can; there is 
little pressure to strive for specific goals. 
73. People in this organization are very successful in dealing with 
and resolving ambiguity, and can effectively coordinate the actions of 
individuals and units. 
74. This organization has a long history of maintaining stable 
patterns of shared values, beliefs, and behavioral norms . 
. 75. In this organization, the pressure to maintain the status quo 
is so great that if a major change were required for the organization to 
survive, it might not. 
76. There is little consensus in this organization with regard to 
goals, practices, or needed changes. 
77. This organizati on handles problems of adapting to change with a 
high degree of effectiveness. 
78. Most people in this organization have their own goals that may 
or may not be compatible with one another. 
79. People in this organization have clear concepts of their own 
roles and how they relate to the roles of others. 




METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this research is to assess and generalize on the 
common factors required for successful implementation of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) projects. From the review of literature 
presented ih Chapter II, those factors that were common success factors 
across several individual AMT implementations were tallied, and they 
formed the basis for the factors investigated in the research 
hypotheses. This chapter describes the procedures used to conduct the 
study, including the research design, selection of the survey sample, 
design of the instrument that was used to collect data, the data 
collection process, and the procedures for analyzing the data. 
Research Design 
The most desirable research design to be used with a particular 
research problem depends upon a combination of sampling techniques, the 
characteristics of the population, survey costs, the allowable 
complexity of questions, and numerous other factors. The sample for 
this research represented companies throughout the United States that 
are known to have implemented Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
Given the available time to complete the study, limited funds, and 
geographical distribution of the respondents, a mail survey research 
design was considered to be the most feasible. This research was 
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designed to conduct a survey of organi z.ati ons in an effort to determine 
any possible generalizable patterns of success factors occurring across 
the population surveyed that would tend to move an organization toward 
its strategic AMT objectives. 
The survey was conducted to investigate and obtain information 
concerning the general lessons that have been learned to date, from the 
efforts directed at implementing AMT systems in the United States. 
These lessons could serve as guide posts for future attempts to 
implement Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) projects. The goal of 
the survey was to collect data from manufacturing managers and project 
team members with AMT implementation experience, concerning their views 
of the resources needed for successful implementation, and the problems 
facing the implementation process in the different areas addressed 
within the core organizational system, in alignment with its strategy, 
and with particular reference to the -experiences in their respective 
organizations. The author believes that the survey sample was 
representative of the AMT implementation experiences in the United 
States, and will provide some consensus of experts on the commonalty of 
factors accountable for successful implementation of AMT. The survey 
participants were asked to complete a questionnaire with two major 
sections tailored towards obtaining quantifiable data for subsequent 
analyses to test stated hypotheses. A detailed discussion of the 
questionnaire that was developed and used for this study is presented in 
a separate section later in this chapter. 
Wallace [107] presents a discussion of some major weaknesses of the 
mail questionnaire. Among these are the following: the problems of 
non-returns, leadi ng to a biased sample; validity of data depends on the 
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willingness of the respondent to provide accurate information; questions 
may be misinterpreted by respondents without the opportunity for the 
researcher to offer clarification. Despite those drawbacks, there are 
several advantages of mail questionnaire. Wallace presents the 
following advantages: it provides the ability to obtain a large sample 
with minimal expense; there is an opportunity for wider contact in 
dispersed geographical locations; it offers the abi l ity to reach people 
who are difficult to locate and interview; more consideration is 
permitted in answering questions; there is greater uniformity in the 
manner in which questions are posed; respondents are given a sense of 
privacy; and the interviewer effect is lessened, promoting honesty and 
frankness. 
It is commonly believed that the most effective technique for 
gathering data is through interpersonal contact between an interviewer 
and a respondent. Dillman [18] points out, however, that face-to-face 
interviews may not be as successful as they once were, and are becoming 
prohibitively expensive. He indicates that there is evidence that 
response rates to face-to-face interviews are on the decline [17], and 
that refusal rates, especially in connection with research organizations 
operating from university settings, are on the increase [81]. Due to 
the problems of locating prospective respondents for face-to-face 
interviews, costs of conducting research in this mode has skyrocketed. 
According to ASA [81], in order to raise a 65 percent response rate to . 
85 percent rate, it would cost about seven times the amount of the 
original survey. Dillman [18] also points out the difficulty of finding 
competent interviewers. 
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Suggestions abound in research literature on how to improve 
response rate in mail questionnaire design and administration. Among 
these are: Preliminary contact with members of the sample population 
[57], an attractive questionnaire design [93], keeping the questi onnaire 
brief [28], using colored stationery [35], official sponsorship of the 
research [57], personalization of cover letter and other correspondence 
[17, 28, 29, 57], anonymity and confidentiality [14, 93], incentives 
(rewards), including return postage along with other token rewards [18, 
57], 1983), and follow-up reminders [57]. 
In designing and administering the questionnaire for this study, 
the various suggestions for improving response rate were incorporated as 
much as possible. Efforts were made to minimize the length of the 
questionnaire, the questions were pretested for clarity, and a pilot 
study was conducted to further test comprehension of the questions. A 
complete discussion of the pilot study is presented in a section, later 
in this chapter. A cordial cover letter that accompanied the 
questionnaire indicated sponsorship, in this case affiliation with the 
School of Industrial Engineering and Management in Oklahoma State 
University (see Appendix C). The cover letter accompanying the 
questionnaire was printed on the depart mental letterhead. Token rewards 
of tea-bags accompanied the questionnaires, return postage was provided 
for convenience in returns. A plan was also established for sending 
follow-up reminders to respondents. As a result of these steps, many 
problems associated with inadequate sampling frames in mail-out research 
designs were avoided [18]. 
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Selecting the Survey Sample 
The survey sample for this study was selected to be representative 
of the companies within the United States that are known to have 
implemented Advanced Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs) as at the time of 
this study. 
A purposive sample was used in a deliberate effort to obtain 
representative samples [46], by including typical groups of companies 
that are known to have implemented AMTS. The author believes that a 
purposive sample represented a more knowledgeable sample for the scope 
of this study than a randomized approach would. The sample was selected 
based on the knowledge derived from published literature regarding a 
variety of AMT project implementation pursuits. Other sources of survey 
participants were experts who have some " •.. experiences in assisting 
several large manufacturing firms in developing their factory 
modernization programs ... 11 [64, p. 25]. Another source for selecting 
participants for the study was a list of individual volunteers that has 
been obtained from presentations relating to this study, made in 
professional seminars and conferences around the country. In those 
presentations, the seminar or conference attendees who have operating 
AMTs were asked to volunteer to participate in the survey for this 
study. A list of award winners from the Computer and Automated Systems 
Association (CASA) of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers' (SME) 
industry Leadership and Excellence in the Application and Development 
(LEAD) of CIM was also complied for use as a source for selecting 
companies to be included in the survey sample. The LEAD awards which 
was first awarded in 1981 is presented yearly to teams that have 
exhibited outstanding performance in the development and/or use of CIM 
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techno1 ogy. "It is the highest honor awarded by any organization in the 
CIM field" (SME News, Oct. 1987, p. 2). One more major source of survey 
participants selection was the roster of CIM Teams seminar attendees at 
SME's AUTOFACT 1 88 conference and exposition held in Chicago in October, 
1988. 
The individuals that were selected as respondents to the 
questionnaire were known to have at some time, been actually involved in 
their company's AMT efforts. It was possible to select these 
individuals through information in the sources listed above. 
Participants were selected from organizations that are in business to 
make profit. A purposive sample of twenty-eight (28) companies was 
selected for the study. For each company selected to be in the survey 
sample, efforts were directed at obtaining responses from at least two 
different individuals, preferably of different academic disciplines, and 
functions in the implementation group. The intent of this replication 
was to provide more diverse perspectives to give a more robust picture 
of each organization's implementation efforts. 
Development of the Instrument 
The purpose of this study was to conduct an investigation to 
determine if there common factors across several different AMT projects 
that tended to account for successful implementation. In order to 
accomplish the purpose and objectives of the study, a proprietary survey 
instrument was developed. This section covers the procedures that were 
carried out in order to develop the questionnaire used to conduct the 
survey for this study. The factors that were cited by a preponderance 
of the literature surveyed as success factors were sul11llarized, and 
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formed a basis for the research hypotheses that were tested in this 
study. The factors selected to be tested in the hypotheses for study 
were justified based on the strength of literature support. A surrmary 
of each hypothesis along with the reference literature support for them 
and the questions from the questionnaire that were used to collect the 
information for testing each hypothesis were presented in Chapter II. 
Once the hypotheses were selected, a set of questions, also supported by 
referenced literature were formulated tailored toward obtaining 
information for testing each hypothesis stated. The questions were also 
backed from appropriate literature sources. Instruments used in surveys 
of similar magnitude provided significant input into the structuring of 
the instrument. The questions were designed to solicit the respondents' 
views of those factors in their organizations that contributed to the 
level of success attained in their organizations' Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) implementation. The last section of the questionnaire 
seeks information required to establish the respondent's qualifications 
to evaluate their AMT implementation. The data obtained by means of the 
questionnaire are valid when the respondents' qualifications are 
established. The questions in the questionnaire were a combination of 
open and close-ended type, designed to permit the respondent to answer 
with some feeling of confidentiality. 
In designing the questionnaire, information was obtained from the 
review of literature to support the different factors addressed in the 
hypotheses. The issues delineated from literature concerning each 
hypothesis made up a general list of questions that became the master 
list for planning the instrument. The actual questions were then 
developed from this list. Items from the general list were grouped into 
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the major sections that addressed each of the hypothesis stated for this 
study. After the questions were written in the desired format, it was 
necessary to cross-check with the general list, and write in the numbers 
of the questions that would make up the set addressing each hypothesis. 
This set would solicit quantifiable information for testing the 
hypotheses that the set addresses. Comparing the draft copy of the 
questionnaire with the general list helped to identify and eliminate the 
gaps and overlaps in the initial questionnaire. This initial document 
was subjected to a series of tests and revisions to arrive at the final 
questionnaire. Two stages of questionnaire pre-test and a pilot study 
were for the revision and testing processes. These processes are 
discussed in the section on pretesting the questionnaire later in this 
chapter. 
In the final instrument, the opening section asks for general 
information about the project. This was designed to provide 
project-specific information for classification of the projects 
represented in the survey sample on receipt of completed 
questionnaires. Section II is the Implementation Success Diagnosis 
(!SD). This section provided the respondents with a list of possible 
expected outcomes of an AMT project derived from literature search and 
experience. This list was considered a comprehensive set for the 
purpose of this study. For each of the outcomes, the respondents were 
required to indicate with an answer of Yes or No (Y/N) in the space 
provided whether it was an expected outcome of the particular project 
being rated or not. The respondents were then expected to proceed to 
rate all the factors listed, by checking ['1] in the spaces provided, 
how each factor was affected by the AMT implementation. The rating 
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system was based on the a five-point Likert scale, with the low end 
indicating that the performance level of that factor actually declined 
after AMT implementation, and the high end indicating that the expected 
performance level of that factor was achieved or exceeded. The 
respondents were given the opportunity to write-in and rate any other 
factors which they considered important, but were not included in the 
instrument. The responses to this section was used primarily for 
clustering the respondents into groups that would be identified as 
either Successes or Failures depending on the relative levels of 
accomplishment of strategic objectives set for the project evaluated. A 
complete discussion of the scoring of the ISO responses for the purpose 
of clustering the respondents is presented in the following chapter on 
data analysis. The next major part of the questionnaire (Section III) 
dealt with the questions addressing the issues concerned with the 
hypotheses to be tested. The issues in this section dealt with the 
strategy formulation process, along with the components of the core 
organizational system - cultural/political system, organizational 
structure, organizational management process, and the technical ~stem -
and how they affect the level of success attained in a given project. 
As mentioned previously, each hypothesis was represented by a set of 
questions. These sets were not explicitly shown on the questionnaire. 
Rather, all the questions were grouped in a single section. The 
separation of questions into sets representing each hypothesis were done 
during analysis. Each of the questions in this section was rated on a 
seven point Likert scale, with the low end being "Disagree Strongly" 
with the statement addressing an issue relating to AMT implementation in 
the respondents' individual experiences, and the high end being ''Agree 
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Strongly 11 with that statement. Given the clustering of respondents as 
successes or failures using the scores obtained from the ISD, the data 
collected from this section was used to test if there were significant 
differences between the two groups in how they approached the issues 
identified by the questions. This thus enabled data analysis to show 
what approaches tended to be present successful AMT implementation, as 
opposed to the less successful efforts. The next section (Section IV} 
asked some open-ended questions, mainly to allow the respondent to 
back-up or expand on the issues already covered in the previous 
sections, and to solicit further input and general AMT implementation 
related opinions. The last section of the questionnaire (Section V) 
asked for demographic information on the respondents. 
Pretesting the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was pretested twice, and a pilot study was 
conducted after the second review of the document, and prior to the 
development of the final form. Participants of the pretest/review group 
included three professors and seven graduate students, all with some 
knowledge in different areas of AMT. Two other professors also served 
as outside consultants providing input regarding the general structure 
of the instrument. Each question was critiqued using a standardized 
form (Appendix A) adapted from Leedy [32] and Van Dalen [33]. The 
participants were asked to give ideas or suggestions for improving the 
questionnaire. After the necessary adjustments were made, the 
questionnaire was revised as necessa~. The same process was repeated 
for the second critique and revision. After the second revision, the 
questionnaire was printed in its final form. Some of the revisions that 
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were prompted by the testing process included rewriting some questions 
for clarity, rewriting some sectional instructions, and in some areas 
combining or completely eliminating some questions. Once t he necessary 
editing was completed, the questionnaire was then used in its revised 
form to conduct a pi l ot study designed to sample a small group that is 
somewhat similar to the population to be surveyed. The pilot study 
group consisted of graduate students who are currently working in the 
Center for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM Center) at Oklahoma 
State University, as well as others with some work experience in some 
area of AMT. The responses to the pilot was ana lyzed using the 
methodology described in the data analysis secti on. Based on the 
responses and comments from the pilot study, final revisions were made 
on t he instrument, and the final design format adopted and completed 
prior to sending the questionnaires out to the indust rial participants 
in the study. 
Collection of the Data 
The collection of data was accomplished through the use of 
questionnaires mailed to a purpos i ve sampling of manufacturing managers 
and project team members with AMT implementation experience in selected 
companies in the United States. A personal i zed cover letter (Appendix 
C) to the respondents identifying the purpose of the study as well as 
its sponsor accompanied the questionnaires. This letter also assured 
the respondents of confidentiality. Return postage was provided as an 
incentive for response. A token reward of a one cup pack of tea-bags 
were enclosed, to symbolize the appreciation of the respondents' time 
for completing the survey. 
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McGhee [57] points out that timing of the mailing of the instrument 
is important in influencing returns. He recommends that the instruments 
be timed to arrive early in the week. This principle was applied in 
this study. The questionnaires were initially mailed on a Thursday to 
ensure that they were received early in the followi ng week. As pointed 
out earlier, the questionnaires were addressed to the individuals rather 
than 11 positions 11 , for example it was addressed to "Tom Smith, The CIM 
Manager" rather than addressing it simply to "The CIM Manager" in the 
company. This was expected to show more personalized approach to make 
sure that the subjects felt more like a part of the study, and stimulate 
higher response rates [57]. The first follow-up letter (Appendix D) 
along with a second mailing of the questionnaires were mailed to 
non-respondents two weeks after the first mailing. The second follow-up 
(Appendix E), as needed were mailed three weeks following the first 
follow-up mailings. For the purpose of obtaining the required 
replications for each project evaluated, in the cases that no more than 
one respondent was located and contacted initially, the contact persons 
were asked to further support the study by providing names of other 
possible respondents from the project evaluated when returning the 
completed questionnaire. In the cases where the names were sent along 
the completed questionnaires, those people were contacted following the 
initial procedure already described, and similar time lines were kept 
from one set of mailings to the next for the purposes of any required 
follow-ups. In the instances where no names were supplied as requested, 
the respondents were contacted, mainly by phone, to obtain the other 
names, and the mailing procedure was duplicated. 
Procedures Used to Analyze the Data 
The data collected by the mail questionnaires was tabulated and 
analyzed statistically. The first section of analysis was the 
Implementation Success Diagnoses (ISO) section of the questionnaire. 
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The data collected from this section was used in classifying the 
projects represented in the survey sample as either successes or 
failures, in order to test the hypotheses for significant differences 
between the groups. These tests of hypotheses led to conclusions on the 
factors that were common to successful projects across the spectrum 
represented by the survey sample. The final output from this section 
was weighted scores based on the performance of the project, relative to 
each project's expected outcomes. A detailed coverage of the scoring 
process is presented in Chapter IV. The projects were grouped into 
clusters of two and three, and tests were conducted using two groups 
(successes or failures) in both cases to determine which clustering 
technique differentiated successes and failures better. Both methods 
produced similar results, and the two cluster grouping was chosen for 
the analysis presented in Chapter V. The analyses was performed using 
the SYSTAT statistical software. Again, a more detailed coverage of the 
procedure for analyzing the ISO data and clustering is presented in 
Chapter IV. 
Each of the hypothesis stated was then tested using the information 
obtained from the questions in Section III of the questionnaire. A 
t-test was appropriate for testing for significant differences in the 
responses to the set of questions addressing each of the hypotheses. 
This type of test was adequate because only two groups - two clusters 
(successes and failures) were dealt with in testing each of the 
126 
hypothesis. Salsow [85, p. 256] provides a decision tree for selecting 
suggested statistical tests to meet the requirements of the data to be 
analyzed. The tree indicated that a two-tailed t-test for independent 
groups would be appropriate for testing the hypotheses stated for the 
study, given the fact that the scales used for the questions were 
specified by the author as interval scales, and only two samples, 
defined by the author as successes and failures according to the mean 
scores obtained for each cluster as obtained from a cluster analysis, 
were used in the tests. Bodwitch and Buono [9, pp. 157-158] indicate 
that a t-test is appropriate for situations where there are only two 
samples. They pointed out that this test is one of the most common 
techniques used for comparison of two groups, by using group means as a 
basis for comparison. The t-test would indicate whether or not the 
difference between the two groups is statistically significant. 
-Wilkinson [109] when a sample is small enough (less than 30), at-test 
is preferred to a Z-test. A statistical significance level for this 
test was set at p < .05. This significance level was selected to 
reduce the probability of making type II error. A type II error is the 
failure to reject the null hypothesis when it is false (Jaccard, 
1983). The presentation of the findings, summary, and conclusions were 
based on the analysis of the data received from the respondents to the 
survey. 
In order to facilitate the complete data analysis, information from 
the questionnaire was extracted and put into tally sheets, using LOTUS 
1-2-3 to facilitate analysis. The questions were mostly rank-ordered, 
and open-ended. Each possible answer to the rank-ordered question was 
assigned a weighted number on a scale of one to seven, based on the 
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degree of agreement or disagreement with each question. The total score 
for each section of the questionnaire, representing a hypothesis was 
given as the normalized mean of the scores obtained from each question 
from the set. The scores were then normalized. The normalized score 
was complied for each project, and the tests conducted established 
whether or not there were significant differences between the groups for 
each null hypotheses stated. The response to open-ended questions was 
grouped by content into categories and presented in its raw state in the 
appendix (see Appendix F). 
CHAPTER IV 
EVALUATION AND VALIDATION OF PERFORMANCE 
SCORING PROCEDURE 
Introduction 
One of the major tasks that was required in order to test the 
hypotheses stated for this study was to classify the projects into 
groups based upon their performance on their projects, relative to the 
goals set for the project. The aim of this grouping was to 
differentiate the more successful projects from the less successful 
ones. This grouping was subsequently used for testing the effects of 
each of the factors addressed in the hypotheses. 
Section II of the survey instrument {Appendix B), Implementation 
Success Diagnoses (ISO), was designed specifically for collecting the 
data for use in accomplishing this task of grouping the projects 
represented in the survey sample into clusters. In this section of the 
questionnaire, survey participants were asked to respond to a set of 
questions addressing the desirable outcomes of AMT. For each of the 
expected outcome listed, the respondents were required to indicate 
whether or not it was an expected outcome for their project, and then 
proceed to rate, on a five point Likert scale, their performance on all 
the expected outcomes listed, indicating how each factor was affected by 
their AMT project. The task to be accomplished in this chapter is to 
develop a weighted score of the performance of each project, for use in 
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clustering the projects into groups of either successful or unsuccessful 
projects. 
Weighting, Scoring, and Results 
of the ISO Data 
The data obtained using the Implementation Success Diagnoses (ISO) 
section of the questionnaire was used for the purpose of classifying 
projects as either successes or failures based on their performance 
against the list of possible outcomes for the project. This grouping is 
required in order to test each of the hypotheses stated for the study. 
The interpretation of the data in this section involved developing a 
weighted score for each project in the sample. The score gives an 
indication of performance against the total scores possible, and thus 
the relative levels of successes can be assessed for the projects. The 
projects were then clustered into groups based on the scores obtained. 
Several scenarios for assigning weights and scoring the projects were 
tested, using representative test data, in order to come up with an 
acceptable scoring technique. The test data used was formulated to be 
representative of the possible combinations of situations that may be 
encountered when analyzing the real data. This took into account, 
performances in extreme conditions, as well as ratings factoring in 
achievement of successes from those factors that were expected outcomes 
along with those that were not expected outcomes for the project. The 
scoring methods that were developed/evaluated, along with the reasons 
for preference of one over the other are covered in the following 
sections. 
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Evaluation of Scoring Methodologies 
In order to consistently evaluate the scoring methodologies and 
schemes developed for assessing the performance of the projects 
represented in the survey, a set of test data was compiled to provide a 
two-stage test of performance based on scores obtained. The first test, 
known as the "ordering test", was the primary test, and was used to 
check conformance of each scheme or scenario attempted to a pre-tested, 
ordered ranking of data points. This was accomplished by compiling the 
first ten (10) data points {representing the first ten respondents or 
projects) such that they would logically rank in descending order from 
one (1) to ten (10). This data set should rank as described here 
because they were deliberately chosen to give the achievement levels in 
percentages that would rank them logically when scored correctly. The 
achievement level distribution for this data set is presented in Table 
IV. The percentages are presented in Table V. The scores obtained from 
each scoring technique was then checked for consistency with this 
ordered ranking of the first ten data points as a primary criterion for 
further consideration. 
For the purpose of obtaining this rank order for the first ten data 
points, the possible achievement levels attainable by respondents was 
restricted to either the hi ghest level of goal attainment available -
level 5 (Expected outcomes achieved/Exceeded), and the neutral level -
level 2 (No changes in levels after AMT implementation). The reader is 
referred to Section II of the questionnaire in Appendix B for the 
complete scales used. These two dimensions of the scale were used so 
that any proportion of the total expected number of expected outcomes 
that was not achieved at level 5 was assigned to level 2, and a 
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percentage of the total number of expected outcomes attained at level 5 
was obtained. 
ordering test. 
This percentage provides the required ranking for the 
The respondent numbers (R#) with higher percentages 
based on their actual expected outcomes for the project, should always 
rank higher than the one with the next l ower percentage. The rules for 
this ranking was such that respondents would score higher points based 
solely on their actual achievement level s regardless of the number of 
expected outcomes sought. The scores were normalized such that those 
who had more expected outcomes did not have an advantage in scoring over 
those with a lesser number of expected outcomes and vice-versa. A 
distribution of achievement levels for the first ten data points of the 
test data, along with their respective total number of expected outcomes 
is presented in Table IV. The complete listing of the achievement level 
distribution for the test data is presented in Table V. An illustration 
of the percentages of factors for which success was achieved at level 5 
is presented in Table VI . The first ten data points of the test data 
were used for the primary "ordering test" for each alternative 
methodology explored. This was done in order to enable the researcher 
to inspect each alternative for the right ordinal ranking of those ten 
points, based on the percentages of expected outcomes obtained at level 













DISTRIBUTION OF ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS 
FOR TEST DATA 
# of Expected Levels of Achievement 
Outcomes 5 4 3 2 
17 17 0 0 0 
8 8 0 0 9(9)* 
17 15 0 0 2 
8 7 0 0 10(9) 
17 13 0 0 4 
8 6 0 o · 11 { 9) 
17 9 0 0 8 
8 4 0 0 13 { 9) 
8 2 0 0 15(9) 












*The number in parenthesis represent the number of expected 
outcomes achieved at the level under which they appear 
that were not expected outcomes for the project. For 
example, for R# 4 , out of the eight expected outcomes, 
seven were attained at level 5, and ten were attained at 
level 2. Nine out of ten expected outcomes attained at 




































DISTRIBUTION OF ACHIEVEMENT LEVELS 
FOR THE COMPLETE TEST DATA SET 
Total # of Expected Levels of Achievement 
Outcomes 5 4 3 2 
17 17 0 0 0 
8 8 0 0 9(9)* 
17 15 0 0 2 
8 7 0 0 10(9) 
17 13 0 0 4 
8 6 0 0 11 (9) 
17 9 0 0 8 
8 4 0 0 13(9) 
8 2 0 0 15(9) 
17 4 0 0 14 
17 0 17 0 0 
17 0 0 17 0 
17 15 2 0 0 
17 14 0 0 0 
17 13 4 0 0 
17 13 0 4 0 
17 13 0 0 0 
17 13 1 1 1 
17 12 5 0 0 
17 12 0 5 0 
17 12 0 0 0 
17 11 0 0 6 
17 10 0 7 0 
17 9 8 0 0 
17 8 8 1 0 
8 17(8) 0 0 0 
10 12(2) 2(2) 2(2) 1 ( 1) 
12 9 2 2(1) 2(2) 
1 17(16) 0 0 0 
17 4 3 10 0 
R# = Respondent/Project Number 
Levels of Achievement = Level of Achievement for each 
ISO Factor as Indicated by 
Respondent (1 - 5) 
































Achieved at the Level Under Which They Appear that Were Not 














PERCENTAGES OF EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
OBTAINED AT LEVEL 5 
Total # of Expected Number Achieved 
























With the ordering test established, the scores obtained from each 
of the scoring methodologies described below was first checked for 
conformance to this expected ordering for the first ten data points (the 
"ordering test"). If any scoring scenario failed this test, it was no 
longer explored as a scoring technique, and was dropped from further 
consideration . . Any scoring technique that passed this test became a 
candid~te for acceptance, and was further tested for consistency with 
other, intuitively selected, expected ordering of scores. Beyond the 
first ten data points that were used for the primary ordering test, an 
additional twenty data points were incorporated, covering a variety of 
situations. These remaining data points thus served as the secondary 
testing parameters for checking the consistency of the scores obtained 
for certain performance ranking combinations relative to the intuitive 
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ordinal ranking of the data points compared. The intuitive ordering were 
based on the author's intrinsic feeling about how the R#'s should rank 
based on inspection of the achievement levels between the chosen 
points. For example, check of scores from Table VI between respondent/ 
project number (R#) 12, with a total expected outcome of 17 all scored 
at the third level, and R# 23, with a total expected outcome of 17, with 
10 of them scored at level five and 7 scored at level three indicates 
that intuitively, R# 23 should score better than R# 12. If on 
inspection, this order was not preserved, that particular combination in 
the scoring scenario was dropped, and others explored for possibly 
entering as a candidate for acceptance. Other points of particular 
appeal were also explored for possible inconsistencies. If a candidate 
scoring scheme passed all of the tests, it remained as a candidate, and 
eventually the one that presented the best spacings between comparison 
points was accepted. The accepted methodology became the one used for 
scoring the actual survey data for the purpose of clustering the 
projects represented in the study as either successes or failures. 
For all the scoring schemes attempted, the scores were normalized 
to a maximum normalized score of five for the purpose of equitable cross 
comparisons across all the methodologies evaluated. 
Scoring Scheme Using Every Factor Listed 
in the ISO as a Comprehensive Set 
The first scoring scheme explored involved using all of the factors 
listed in the ISO as a comprehensive set of desirable outcomes of AMT 
implementation. With this premise, every respondent would be scored 
based on all of the factors listed, directly from the ranking (1 - 5) of 
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factors from the questionnaire (Appendix B), regardless of whether or 
not they were expected outcomes for the project or not. The obvious 
flaw in this approach was that it would be inconceivable that all the 
factors would apply to every project equally. Secondly, if the 
indication of what the expected outcomes for each project were, was 
considered, the respondents who listed more expected outcomes, even with 
rather dismal performances in many of the factors listed, tended to 
always have higher scores as compared to those with fewer expected 
outcomes, attained at higher performance levels. The following is an 
example of this situation. The reader is referred again to Table V. 
From this table, by adding up the scores directly from the questionnaire 
rating on the Likert scale ranging from one to five, respondent numbers 
(R#'s) 3, 5, and 7 obtained scores of 79.000, 73.000, and 61.000 
respectively; although their percentages of goals achieved at the 
highest level (5) were 88%, 77%, and 53% respectively, all obtained 
better scores than R# 2 who had a score of 58, but at tained 100% of 
his/her goals at the highest level. This scoring scheme was dropped 
because of these flaws. 
Scoring Scheme Using Only the Indicated 
Expected Outcomes 
The second scoring methodology considered used only the items t hat 
the respondents indicated as expected outcomes for their respective 
projects. The scores obtained using this scheme was more appealing 
because it ranked the respondents on the expected outcomes, in agreement 
with the pre-set ordering of the test data used, as illustrated by the 
percentages in Table V. One limitation of this approach was that it 
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would tend to favor those projects with a limited number of expected 
outcomes. For example, a project with five expected outcomes. all 
achieved at the highest level would always score higher than one with 
more goals with the same number of expected outcomes or more obtained at 
the highest level, along with others attained at other lower levels of 
improvement. A specific case in point is illustrated in scores obtained 
by taking the mean of the ratings obtained for R#'s 2 and 5 (Table IV) 
for only those factors that were indicated as expected outcomes. R# 2, 
by attaining all eight (8) of his/her expected outcomes at level 5, 
obtained a mean score of 5; whereas, R# 5 attained 13 out of 17 expected 
outcomes at level 5 and obtained a mean score of 4.294 (((5 * 13) + (2 * 
4))/17). One other problem with this approach was that no consideration 
was given for more ambitious efforts. There would thus be a missing 
component addressing the "other factors" that may be attributable to 
successful AMT implementation efforts in this approach. 
Establishment of Weights for Different 
Performance Levels Using the 
Preference Matrix 
The third methodology for scoring the performance of respondents 
involved establishing weights to be assigned to the different 
performance level rankings (1 - 5), taking into consideration whether 
the achievement level attained by a particular fact or was based on a 
planned expected outcome or on serendipity. A preference matrix was 
established, on which the user/decision maker can indicate his/her 
preference of one performance level over the others in a given row. The 
preference of one performance over others were based on the author's 
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intrinsic placement of values for each performance achievement level, 
and may differ between users of the matrix. The preference was then 
recorded as either a one (1) for the preferred level on that row, or a 
zero (O) for others. In the cases where the author was indifferent 
between two or more performance achievement levels, as was the case for 
X13 and Xo4 (Table VII), each of the achievement levels were gi ven a 
score of 1, and all others a score of 0. After all the possibl e choices 
had been made, the points in each column representing a performance 
level were added up and the sum divided by the total points possible for 
each column (45). The number obtained from this exercise constituted 
the weight of the performance level represented by that column. The 
weights from all the columns would sum to one (1) if there were no ties 
anywhere within the matrix, or a little greater than one in the event of 
at least one tie. The weights obtained were then used to compute the 
scores, incorporating all the factors rated in the ISD section. The 
complete preference matrix used to obtain the weights that was utilized 
in scoring respondents ' performances with this technique is presented in 
Table VII. The notations used in Table VII are presented below: 
x1i =An expected outcome attained at level i, (i=l-5) 

























































.1778 .1333 .0444 0.0 .1556 .1333 
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.0889 .0667 .0222 
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From Table VII~ it can be seen that the maximum weight attainable from 
this scheme was 0.2 since this value is the sum of scores obtained for 
X15· In order to scale the weights up to the maximum level of five (5) 
used in the alternatives already discussed, al l the weights were 
multiplied by 25, bringing the maximum weight t o 5, and upscal i ng all 
others by the same factor. This was done for the purpose of parity in 
comparison between the alternatives as explained earlier. The weights 
that were derived from the preference matrix presented in Table VI I, and 
used for the analysis are summarized in Table VIII. 
TABLE VIII 
WEIGHTS GENERATED FROM PREFERENCE MATRIX 
ISO Weight Weight 
Score (if Expected Outcome) (if not Expected Outcome) 
1 0 0.5555 
2 1.1111 1.6675 
3 3.3325 2.2225 
4 4.4450 3.3325 
5 5.0000 3.8900 
The weights obtained from this weighting scheme, when used in 
scoring performances, was consistent with the expected ordering of the 
test data and was thus an acceptable choice for application in scoring 
the actual survey data. 
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Establishment of Weights Using a Linear 
Programming Formulation Based on 
Rating Equivalence 
The fourth and final methodology used for scoring each project's 
performance based upon ISO rating also involved assigning weights to the 
factors based on the performance level, and on whether or not the factor 
was an expected outcome for the project. The only difference between 
the previous approach described and this one was in the methodology used 
for assigni ng the weights. The assignment of weights for this method 
was based on the establishment of equivalence between an anchor value 
for a given performance level, and the other levels of performance. In 
this process, an anchor value for one level of performance was set, and 
from that value, different distances were establfshed to the other 
respective levels of performance in order to equate them to the anchor 
value . For the weights generated using this method, the anchor value 
was set at 1 for a factor that was an expected outcome of the project 
and rated at level five is given the notation, (X15 ). The other leve l s 
of performance were then related to this benchmark with coefficients to 
indicate their distances. Several distances from the anchor value were 
attempted, based on the intuitive evaluation of the required distances. 
' 
These were subsequently tried on the equivalence matrix (Table IX) in 
order to come up with distances that would provide a reasonable scoring 
of performances. Several trial runs using different combinations of 
coefficients representing the distances from the anchor value were 
attempted, and for each trial run, the Linear Programming (LP) 
formulation was run, and the resulting output examined for consistency 
with the logical weighting of performance levels. Each run then served 
142 
as input for further evaluation, and subsequent improvement on the 
assigned coefficients within the equivalence matrix. This matrix was 
thus continually improved based on the input of the previous run until 
coefficients were found that provided the desired distances in the 
weights assigned at each performance level. The final output from this 
procedure was the equivalence settings used for this analysis, which is 
presented in Table X. As shown on the LP formulation given, some of the 
variables in the model were assigned fractional coefficients. This was 
necessary in order to obtain a reasonable optimal solution. Several 
trial runs using strictly whole numbers failed to produce reasonable 
results, and after several trial runs, the model presented in Table XI 
was derived. Once established, these settings were used to fine-tune 
the equivalence matrix (Table IX). This matrix was, in turn, used to 
formulate an LP model which was run on the microcomputer version of 
LINDO [54]. The LP model input along with the output showing the 
different values at the different performance levels are presented in 
Table XI. The values from the LP solution were then used to score the 
performance of the test scores. After several tests, the chosen 
equivalence setting gave the most reasonable scoring of performances. 
Again for the purpose of parity in comparison between the alternatives, 
the maximum value attainable (X15 ) was set at 5, as a constraint in the 







































9 4 4 
8 4 
7 4/3 4 
TABLE IX 
EQUIVALENCE MATRIX 













7 9 2 4 









The numbers below each performance level (Xli, 
XOj) represents the combination of coefficients 
the factors that would be required in order to 
equate them to the left-hand side (LHS) of the 
equation - the overall performance at the 






The weights generated by the LP model presented in Table XI are 
































Xi; = Expected outcome attained at level i 




A LINEAR PROGRAMMING MODEL USED 
TO GENERATE SCORING WEIGHTS 
HAX XlS + X14 + X13 + Xl2 + Xll + XOS + X04 + X03 + X02 + XOl 
SUBJECT TO 
2) 2 XlS - 1.333333 X14 - 7 X12 >= 0 
3) - XlS + 4 X13 <= 0 
4) - XlS + 2 XOS <= 0 
5) - 2 XlS + 4 X13 + 2 XOS <= O 
G) - 2 XlS + 7 X12 + 9 Xll <= 0 
7) - 3 XlS + 1.333333 X14 + 4 X04 + 7 XOl <= 0 
8) - 4 XlS + 4 X14 + 4 X13 <= 0 
9) - 4 XlS + 1.333333 X14 + 2 XOS + 5 X03 + 6 X02 <= 0 
10) - 5 XlS + 4 X14 + 7 X12 + 9 Xll <= 0 
11) - X15 + 4 X13 <= 0 
12) - 2 XlS + 2 XOS + 7 XO! <= 0 
13) - 3 XlS + 4 X14 <= 0 
14) - 4 XlS + 1.333333 X14 + 7 X12 + 4 X04 + G X02 <= 0 
15) - 5 X15 + 1.333333 X14 + 8 X13 + 2 XOS + 5 X03 <= 0 
16) - 2 XlS + 9 Xll + 2 XOS <= 0 
17) - 3 XlS + 4 X13 + 4 X04 + 6 X02 <= 0 
18) - 4 XlS + 4 X14 + 5 X03 <= 0 
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19) - 5 XlS + 4 X14 + 4 X13 + 2 XOS <= 0 
20) - 6 XlS + 4 X13 + 7 X12 + 9 Xll + 2 XOS + 4 X04 + 5 X03 <= 0 
21) - 7 XlS + 1.333333 X14 + 4 X13 + 7 X12 + 2 XOS + 4 X04 + 6 X02 
+ 7 XOl <= D 
22) XlS - X14 >= 0 
23) X14 - X13 >= D 
24) X13 - X12 >= D 
25) X12 - Xll >= 0 
26) XDS - X04 >= 0 
27) X04 - X03 >= 0 
28) X03 - X02 >= 0 
29) X02 - XOl >= 0 










WEIGHTS GENERATED USING LP MODELING 
OF EQUIVALENCE 
Weight Weight 
(if Expected Outcome) (if not Expected 
0.416667 0.625000 




Formulation for Using the Weights Established 
From the Preference Matrix and LP For-
mulation for Scoring Projects 
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Outcome) 
The scores obtained using the weights from the last two alternative 
approaches incorporated two components of performance. The first 
component comprised the goal-driven attainment of the indicated 
performance level, and the second component handled the serendipitous 
attainment of the indicated performance level. The basic idea in both 
weight~ng techniques was to reward success and penalize failures. The 
rewards for goal-driven successes were set higher than that for 
serendipitous successes, and the penalties for failures in those factors 
that were objectives for the project were considerably higher. The 
objective of this weighting technique was to achieve dominance of the 
final score by the ratings from those factors that were expected 
outcomes of the project, while also adequately accounting for those 
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other factors that would tend to contribute to successful AMT 
implementation efforts. The weighting concept used is rooted in the 
fundamental theorem of utility, which has to do with preferences, and is 
tailored to guarantee the ability to assign a score to each project 
evaluated so that, for any two alternate projects, one is preferred to 
the other if and only if the score of the first is greater than the 
score of the second (Fishburn, 1970). 
In both the cases the preference matrix and the LP model anyone 
using them has the freedom of selecting their preference levels, and in 
both cases, either the matrix or the LP model can be easily updated to 
accommodate those changes, and new weights derived. 
The formula that was used to obtain the score of each project 1 s 
performance for both methodologies is as follows : 
[ 100 * [ 
17 
] Score = (1/17 .l We J , if N = 17 e=l 






We = Weights assigned to factors that were expected outcomes for 
the project at the different levels of goal attainment 
= Weights assigned to factors that were not expected outcomes 
for the project at the different levels of goal attainment 
N = Total number of factors indicated and rated by respondents 
expected outcomes for the project (1 - 17} 
M = Total number of factors rated by respondents that were not 
expected outcomes of the project (0 - 16) 
N + M = 17 
as 
148 
The weights of 95 and 5 assigned to the normalized components of 
the score representing the factors that were expected outcomes, and 
those that were not respectively, are assigned to preserve the order of 
scores, based predominantly on goal-driven attainment of different 
levels of successes in cases where N < 17. The assigned order 
preserving weights implied that 95% of the total score obtained was 
contributed by ratings of factors that were expected outcomes for the 
project, and 5% was contributed by ratings of factors that were not 
expected outcomes for the project. Prior to establishing the 95/5 weight 
combination that was finally used in scoring the test data, sensitivity 
tests were conducted using weight combinations of 80/20, 85/15, 90/10, 
95/5 and 96/4. The weight combinations of 80/20, and 85/15 failed the 
ordering test using the test data with weights obtained from the · 
preference matrix. Weight combinations of 90/10, 95/5, and 96/4 passed 
the ordering test using this scenario, and were thus candidates for 
acceptance. However, when using the weights generated from the LP 
formulation, only the weight combinations of 95/5 and 96/4 passed the 
ordering test. The weight combination of 90/10 was thus eliminated as a 
candidate for further consideration. In comparing the two surviving 
candidates, it was observed that the 95/5 weight combination gave a more 
reasonable , ranking. It would therefore more accurately reflect the 
ranking of data from the questionnaire such that for any two given 
respondents, the one with the higher score will always be ranked higher 
than the second. This combination was thus used for obtaining the 
scores in the rest of the analysis. A cluster analysis was then run to 
group respondents into clusters using the scores obtained. This was 
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accomplished using the SYSTAT statistical software [109]. Two and three 
clusters were obtained for the purpose of adequately separating the 
successful projects from the unsuccessful ones. The clusters of 
projects obtained from the analysis were subsequently designated by the 
author as successes or failures. These definitions were made, based on 
the mean scores obtained for each cluster. The cluster with the highest 
mean score was defined as the successful group of projects, and the 
cluster with the lowest mean score was defined as the unsuccessful group 
of projects. A listing showing the clusters of two and three groups, 
obtained for the test data using the weights obtained from the LP 
formulation is presented in Tables XIII and XIV respectively. 
TABLE XII I 
TWO CLUSTERS GENERATED FOR THE 
SAMPLE DATA 
SUJnlARY STATJSTJCS FOR 2 CLUSTERS 
VlilMLE BETWEEJI SS DF lllntIH SS Df F-RllTIO 
LP DATA 208337.916 I 70lt51.786 28 82.801 0.000 
CLUSTER JMmER: I 
l!EllBERS STATISTICS 
CASE DISTAJICE VARIABLE l!IHIID !!EM l!AXJWll ST .DEIJ. 





6 61 .01 
11 47.91 
13 62 .38 
l~ 3.80 
15 ~7 .67 
16 11.15 
17 30 .76. 
18 uo 
19 ~o .32 
20 33.21 
21 57 .72 
22 l't .17 







CLUSTER ll\JllBER : 2 
BERS STATISTICS 
CASE DISTaMCE VARIABLE "Illl!llll mil MAXIM ST .DEIJ. 
7 83. 7' IJllATA 125.00 m.s8 298.32 62.3~ 
8 so .so 
9 45.53 





THREE CLUSTERS GENERATED FOR THE 
SAMPLE DATA 
SOl!JWY STATISTICS FOil l CUJSTEJ!S 
BEMEJ SS IF Ml!Hll SS DF F·AATlO PROB 
LPDm 2411&2.GS~ 2 37627 .6~8 ?J 0.000 
--------------· --- .... -----------------------.. -.. .. ---.. - -- .. ----.. ....... ---.... --...... -.. --- .. 
CLUSTER R'OOER: I 
l!Ell!ERS STAl!S!ICS 
WE DIST.m tMUltE 11111111 Ell IWllD ST.DEU. 








16 27 .89 









29 35 . J~ 
CLOSTER IM!ER: 
l!EllBERS STAT!Sl!CS 
('.ASE DISTAJICE VARJMLE m1m JUI llAXll!Ull ST .DElJ. 








CLOSTER ll!JeEJ!: 3 
llEl!!EIS STATISTICS 
CASE DISTAllCE QAJ!JABl.E mum JUI KAXll!Ull ST.D£1J. 




Summary of Eval uation and Validation 
Procedures 
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In order to classify participating projects into groups as either 
successful or unsuccessful projects, for the purpose of performing the 
necessary tests for the hypotheses stated for the study, a scoring 
technique had to be developed. The scores obtained from this technique 
were then used in a cluster analysis to obtain the desired groups . Four 
(4) scoring methodologies were were developed for scoring t he 
participants' performances, based on ISO data. An evaluation process 
for each of the techniques developed i nvolved performing a primary 
ordering test of a portion of the test data, followed by secondary tests 
for cons i st ency of scores between some hypothetical data points. 
Validity of a scoring technique was determined by its performance on 
both the primary test, as well as the secondary tests. The chosen tests 
were further refined using sensitivity tests prior to final acceptance 
for application in scoring the entire test data. The scores obtained by 
using the chosen methodology serves as i nput to a cluster analysis for 
desired grouping of projects. The clusters obtained from the analysis 
were then defined as either successes or failu r es depending on the mean 
scores obtained from each cluster. Thi s definition of groups was done 
to obtained the grouping requ i red in order to conduct the required tests 
for each of the hypotheses. A two-tailed t-test for independent groups, 
wi th a between-groups design was used, with a 95% confidence interval. 
CHAPTER V 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to survey Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) project implementations in U. S. companies, to obtain 
the necessary data to analyze the possible commonalities in success 
factors across several AMT implementations. This would take into 
account, the complex relationships that is required between strategy 
formulation and the core organizational systems, in order to attain 
their effects relative levels of successes in those projects. This was 
achieved by reaching a consensus among the participants on the relative 
importance of the factors addressed by each hypothesis, based on their 
AMT implementation experiences. This was accomplished through the use 
of mail questionnaires. This chapter is devoted to the presentation and 
analysis of the data, and relating it to the null hypotheses. Topics 
covered in this chapter includes: Questionnaire return rates, results 
of the data pertaining to each of the sections in the questionnaire, and 
the summary. Additional information obtained through the open-ended 
questions are presented in Appendix F. 
Questionnaire Return Rates 
The survey sample for this study consisted of a total of 97 
knowledge workers that have been involved in the planning and/or 
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implementation of their company's AMT projects. The initial mailing of 
the questionnaire was made on February 22, 1989, to an initial group of 
80 respondents. Among this group were replications of at least two 
people from each project. In those cases where no more than one name 
could be obtained by the time for the initial mailing, the individuals 
contacted were asked to supply names of at least two more people who 
were involved in the planning and/or implementation of the project 
evaluated in the questionnaire. This was to enable contact with those 
people directly. At the time of the initial mailing of the instruments, 
three dates were designated as accounting and corresponding times. 
These were the times established for keeping records of the 
questionnaires returned, and sending letters of reminders or replacement 
questionnaires to non respondents as necessary. 
As at the first designated accounting time, two week after the 
initial mailing, 12 questionnaires, representing 15 percent of the total 
mailed were returned. At this time the first reminder with a second 
mailing of the instrument was sent to those participants that had not 
replied at that time. Out of those that had responded, six additional 
names were provided. Questionnaires were mailed to those people, and 
the date recorded for possible follow-up mailings in line with the 
established time lines. 
The second accounting and correspondence date was five weeks after 
the initial mailing, and three weeks after the first follow-up. At this 
time, an additional twenty-three questionnaires, representing 29 percent 
of the total mailed, and 34 percent of the non-respondents, as of the 
first accounting date, were received. At this time it was necessary to 
send a second reminder to the last remaining non-responding 
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participants. Eleven additional names were supplied with these returns. 
The names that were sent in for the required replications of responses 
were handled on a similar time table as the initial mailings, starting 
from the day of receipt of the names and correct mailing addresses. Six 
questionnaires were returned that were not completed. A note that 
accompanied one of the incomplete questionnaires explained that all the 
projects at that di vision were "confi denti a 1 proj ects 11 and hence they 
could not complete the questionnaire. Two other respondents indicated 
that their company does not want to participate in the study. One of 
the non completed returns indicated that they did not at that time have 
projects that the survey would apply. One more explanation for the non 
completed questionnaire was that the proposed respondent had moved from 
the location mailed to which the survey was mailed at an early stage in 
their project, and would not have enough information to complete the 
questionnaire. The total number of questionnaires finally sent out was 
97. A total of 49 (50.52%) questionnaires were returned. The total 
number of subjects finally used (usable return rate) was 43 out of 97 
(44.33%). Twenty-eight projects were represented in this sample. 
Demographic Data 
This presents the demographic data of the respondents who 
participated in this study. The data obtained from this section of the 
questionnaire was not intended to serve as a particular variable or set 
of variables in the analysis, but rather to provide a general background 
information on the respondents. This was only intended to give the 
researcher some idea about the validity of the information obtained. A 
summary of the demographic data of respondents is presented in Table XV. 
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The geographical distribution of the projects represented in the sample, 
by states, is presented in Table XVI. 
The industries represented in this study fal l into the general 
industrial classification of transportation equipment, electrical and 
electronics, and industrial metal working. These groups of industries 
were selected because the nature of the production processes make them 
the most likely users of AMT [58]. 
TABLE XV 




Number of Years 
in current position 
Less than 1 6.67 
1 to 3 36.67 
4 to 7 40.00 
8 to 12 0.00 
12 to 16 6.67 
Over 16 10.00 
Level of Formal 
Education Completed 
High School 0.00 
Some College 6.67 
Bachelors Degree 50.00 
Graduate Degree(s} "43.33 
Total Number of 
Years of Experience 
in this Technology 
Area 
Less than Two 13.33 
2 to 5 13 .33 
6 to 9 20.00 
10 to 13 10.00 
14 to 17 6.67 
Over 17 43.33 
Have you been 
Involved in Your 
AMT operation Lately? 

























GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECTS 
SURVEYED: BY STATES 




































Results of the Data Pertaining 
to Each of the Hypotheses 
The analysis presented in this section was conducted to test for 
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any possible general patterns that the factors tested in the null 
hypotheses would appear to influence the performances of groups of 
projects in the survey sample. t-Test was used to test each of the 
hypothesis with the significance level set at p < .05. The data results 
of the analyses are presented in summary tables. In each of the 
hypotheses tested, if the p value obtained in the analysis was greater 
than .05, the null hypotheses failed to be rejected. If the p value 
computed for the factor tested was less than .05, the null hypotheses 
was rejected. These, along with other pertinent statistics are 
summarized in the discussion of the results of the analysis for each 
hypotheses, presented in the next section. 
Results of the Analyses 
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An analysis of each hypothesis test is presented in this section. 
In each analysis, the hypothesis is restated; the set of questions, from 
the questionnaire, that was used to obtain the information from 
respondents for testing the hypothesis is reproduced; the statistics is 
provided; and the implications of the results of the test is given. 
In the the statistics presented for each hypothesis presented in 
this section, either a pooled or separate variance is specified. 
Separate variance statistics uses the separate variances within groups 
to compute its error, while the pooled vari~nce statistics uses the 
pooled within-groups variance, as in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
[109]. 
In order to choose the right 11 t 11 formula, it is necessary to know 
the sample sizes, variances, and if the samples are related. In 
choosing the correct formula, it is fairly easy to determine if the 
sample sizes are equal. The numbers in each sample are either the same 
or they are not. However, to determine if the variances are 
homogeneous, Hartley's test for homogeneity of population variances [69, 
pp. 415-416] was used. The formula for Hartley's test is as follows: 
F = S~ax I S~;n 
Where: S~ax and S~in are the largest and smallest 
variances of groups. 
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The calculated F value was compared to F table value at the 0.05 
significance level with N1 - 1 and N2 - 1 degrees of freedom. If the 
calculated value was greater than or equal to the table value, then s1 1 
S2; if the calculated value was strictly less than the table value, then 
S1 = S2. This test was conducted for each of the hypothesis, and the 
results determined the set of statistics used for interpretation of the 
results. The statistics used are recorded for each analysis. 
Hypothesis #1 
The degree of effectiveness in aligning the core organizational 
systems with the corporate strategy will not be a significant factor in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful organizations in their 
efforts to implement AMT. 
Questions Used: 
1. This organization had an overall corporate statement of 
objectives for its Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) efforts, 
within which the plan for this particular AMT implementation was 
specified. 
2. This organization adequately assessed the prevailing values and 
attitudes in the firm, in selecting its methodology for achieving the 
desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
3. This organization's scheme of events directed at achieving the 
desired outcomes of this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) fits 
the general technological patterns that I am familiar with. 
4. In its plans for achieving the desired goal s from this Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT}, this organization adequately assessed 
its organizational structure, and made the adjustments required in order 
to reach those goals. 
5. This organization made any organizational structure changes 
necessary for transition to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology {AMT) 
environment prior to implementation. 
6. This organization had a strategic focus for its Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology {AMT} which increased cohesion within the AMT 
implementation organization. 
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St atist ics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 3.076, df = 26, p = 0.005). 
Successes: (X = 5.230, R = 6.333 3.500, s = 0.699). 
Fai l ures: (X = 4.120, R = 4.833 2.000, s = 1.069). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The degree of alignment of the core organizational systems with the 
corporate strategy was statistically significant for differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #2 
The degree of effective alignment of employee attitudes with the 
corporate strategy will not be a significant factor in differentiating 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
7. The reward system in this organization recognized i ndividual 
efforts to attain the desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT). 
8. The reward system in this organization recognized group efforts 
to attain the desired goals from this Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT). 
9. This organization's top management provided continual 
motivation, and rewarded compliance with the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) philosophy. 
10. Top management's evaluation of middle management considered 
performances that reflect the positive effects of change resulting from 
the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation. 
11. This organization's top management provided adequate 
incentives for middle and operational management staff to support the 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) program. 
12. This organization's top management provided adequate incentives 
for labor groups to support our Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
efforts. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 0 .020, df = 26, p =0.984). 
Successes: {X = 4.637, R = 6.000 2.833, s = 0.779). 
Failures: {X = 4.630, R = 5.667 3 .611, s = 0.859). 
Result of the Hypothesi s Test: 
Failed to reject the nul 1 hypothesis 
Implications: 
The degree of alignment of employee attitudes wi th corporate 
objectives was not significantly different between successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #3 
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The strategy formulation process will not be significant in 
differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT i mplementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
13. This organization's strategy formula t ion process expl icitly 
i ncludes cons i deration of implementation issues such as required 
reorganizations, staffing changes, modifications to systems and 
policies. 
14. The key middle managers in this organization usually have a 
chance to review and comment on proposed strategies before resources are 
al located. 
15. Strategic proposals are usually critically discussed and 
consensus reached prior to acceptance in this organi zation. 
16. There is a corporate staff support group for strategy 
formulation within this organization. 
17. This organization usually has a f ormal system for internally 
reviewing strategic proposals. 
18. This organization's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
efforts were designed to support its strategic bus i ness objectives. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
{t = 2.742, df = 26, p = 0.011). 
Successes: (X = 5.013, R = 6.167 3.333, S = 0.757). 
Failures: (X = 4.019, R = 5.167 3.167, S = 0.757). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
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Implications: 
Successful projects did a better job of addressing implementation 
issues in their strategy formulation, and this was a significant factor 
for differentiating between successful and unsuccess ful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #4 
An organization's position al ong the organic - mechanistic 
dimension wi ll not make a significant difference in the degree of 
success attained in their efforts to implement Advanced Manufacturi ng 
Technology (AMT). 
Questions Used: 
19. This organization has clear rules and regulations that everyone 
is expected to follow closely . 
20. Policies in this organization are reviewed by the people t hey 
affect before being implemented. 
21. Everyone in this organization knows who hi s/her immedi ate 
supervisor is. Reporting relati onships are clearly defined. 
22. Jobs in this organization are clearly defined; everyone knows 
exactly what is expected of him/her in any specific job positi on. 
23. All decisions in this organization must be reviewed and 
approved by upper level management. 
24. Standard activities in this organi zation are always covered by 
clearly outlined procedures that everyone is expected to follow. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 0.234, df = 26, p = 0.817). 
Successes: (X = 4.657, R = 5.833 2.667, s = 0. 902}. 
Failures: (X = 4.750, R = 5.833 3.833, s = 0.689). 
Resul t of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesi s 
Implications: 
An organization's position along the organic - mechanistic 
di mension was not statistically significant fo r di fferentiating between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation effor ts. 
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Hypothesis #5 
The nature of the relationship between the technology supplier and 
the user firm will not be significant in differentiating successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
25. This organization formed an implementation team with the 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) supplier at the project site 
during its AMT project implementation. 
26. This organization established a long term, mutual co11TI11itment 
with the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) supplier to support the 
integration the new technology in our plant. 
27. There were key people from the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) supplier firm who worked very closely with our project 
team in the efforts to implement the AMT in our plant. 
St atistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; separate 
variances. (t = 0.294, df = 20.02, p = 0.772). 
Successes: 
Failures: 
(X = 4.765, R = 7.000 1.000, S = 1.526). 
(X = 4.889, R = 6.000 4.333, S = 1.655). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The nature of the relationship between the technology supplier and 
the user firm was not statistically significant for differentiating the 
more successful AMT implementations from the less successful ones. 
Hypothesis #6 
The existence of an AMT champion will not make a significant 
difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
efforts. 
Questions Used: 
28. This organization allowed people with ambition and desire 
(regardless of their rank in management) to lead in the implementation 
of this Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project. 
29. There was a key person from this organization who worked 
extremely hard at building a team to integrate the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) in our plant. 
30. There was a key person from the technology supplier firm who 
worked extremely hard at building a team to integr ate the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) in our plant . 
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31. The project leader for the Advanced Manufacturi ng Technology 
(AMT) implementation had a deep commitment and desire to succeed in the 
AMT i mplementation . 
Statisti cs: Two-tailed t -test for independent 
( t = 1. 612. df = 26, p = 0.119). 
Successes: (X = 5.405, R = 6.750 
Failures: (X = 4.861, R = 6.000 
Result of t he Hypothesi s Test: 




groups; pooled variances. 
s = 0. 723). 
s = 0.779). 
The existence of an AMT champion was not statistically signi ficant 
for distingu i shing between successful and unsuccessful AMT proj ects. 
Hypothesis #7 
The position of the AMT champion in the organization will not make 
a significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
projects. 
Questions Used: 
32. The project manager was the key person who "championed" this 
organization's Advanced Manufacturi ng Technology (AMT} efforts. 
33. The person who directed our AMT implementation effort s was in a 
key management position. 
34. The person who directed our Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT) efforts, controll ed the r esources necessary for i mp l ementing the 
project. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for i ndependent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 1.806, df = 26, p = 0. 428}. 
Successes: 
Fail ures: 
(X = 5. 353, R = 7.000 
(X = 4.962, R = 6.000 
Result of the Hypothesi s Test: 
Fail ed t o r ej ect the null hypot hes i s 
3.000, s = 1.205). 
3.889, s = 0.880). 
I11plications: 
The position of the AMT project in the organization was not 
statistically significant for distinguishing between successful and 
unsuccessful AMT projects. 
Hypothesis #8 
The existence of an employee educational program prior to AMT 
implementation will not be a significant factor in distinguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts 
Questions Used: 
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35. This organization had a comprehensive educational program to 
communicate to all employees, the reasons for necessary changes related 
to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) prior to actual 
installation of the system. 
36. This organization had an educational program for top-level 
managers, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual installation of the system. 
37. This organization had an educational program for mi ddle 
managers, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual installation of the system. 
38. This organization had an educational program for operations 
personnel, focusing on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to be 
implemented prior to the actual installation of the system. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 2.371, df = 26, p = 0.025). 
Successes: (X = 4.530, R = 6.500 2.000, s = 1.251). 
Failures: (X = 3.250, R = 4.250 2.000, s = 1. 358). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implicati ons: 
The existence of an employee educational program prior to AMT 
implementation was significant for distinguishing between successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #9 
The degree of availability of hands-on training program for 
employees after the installation of the AMT system will not make a 




.39. This organization had a comprehensive hands-on training program 
to introduce the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) to the 
employees after the actual installation of the system. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent 
(t = 0.772, df = 26, p = 0.447). 
Successes: {X = 5.492, R = 6.000 
Failures: {X = 5.111, R = 6 .000 
Resul t of the Hypothesis Test: 




groups; pooled variances. 
s = 1.117). 
s = 0.861). 
The degree of availability of hands-on training program for 
employees after the installation of the AMT system was not statistically 
significant for differentiating between successful and unsuccessful 
projects. 
Hypothesis #10 
The degree of top-down planning and bottom-up implementation in an 
organization will not be a significant factor for distinguishing between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
40. This organization has a broad corporate plan for its Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) scheme, which provides guidelines for 
individual projects. 
41. The process for developing this organization's Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation plan incorporated employee 
participation to feed information from the shop floor back to upper 
management. 
42. The overall plan for integrating this Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) into the organization was carried out by upper level 
management, and the information was passed downward. 
Stati stics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 3.905, df = 26, p = 0.000). 
Successes: (X = 4.609, R = 6.000 3.000, s = 0.726). 
Failures: (X = 3.222, R = 4.667 2.333, s = 0.935). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
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The degree of to which organizations had a corporate pla n for the 
overall AMT implementation scheme, whi ch provided guidelines for 
individual projects, with each project implementation being executed by 
individual project groups was significant in distinguishing between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts . 
Hypothesis #11 
The pace of implementation will not make a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
43. This organization took a step-wi se approach to adapt and 
implement the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT ) project 
incrementally in programmed phases. 
44. This organization rushed the implementation of each phase of 
its Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) program. 
45. The pace at which our Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
was implemented was so slow that the initial zeal that pushed the 
project along in its earlier stages was lost. 
Statistics: Two-tai l ed t-test for independent groups; pool ed variances. 
(t = 2.441, df = 26, p = 0 .022). 
Successes: (X = 4. 971, R = 7.000 3.333, s = 0.881). 
Failures: (X = 3.926, R = 5.333 2.667, s = 1.110). 
Resul t of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The degree to which organizations used a st ep-wise/phased approach 
to project implementation, without any of the phases being either too 
slow or rushed was statistically significant for differentiating between 
successful and unsuccessfu l AMT projects. 
Hypothesis #12 
The degree to which organizations obtained experience with a pilot 
project prior t o implementing a f ull scale project wil l not make a 




46. This organization started its implementation push with a pilot 
project that was easy and had high probability of success, and then 
followed it up with successively more complex ones. 
47. This organization obtained experience with a manageably-sized 
{Pilot) project prior to a full scale implementation. 
48. The pilot project used to obtain experience in this 
organization was of simi 1 ar technology to the full seal e Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology {AMT} project. 
49. This organization hired individuals who were familiar with the 
type of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} to be implemented to aid 
in its implementation efforts. 
Statist ics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; separate 
variances. (t = 0.533, df = 6.0, p = 0.613). 
Successes: 
Fail ures: 
(X = 4.441, R = 6.250 2.750, S = 1.109). 
(X = 4.056, R = 6.250 1.250, S = 1.694). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The difference in degree to which organizations obtained experience 
with a pilot project and followed it up with successively more complex 
ones in full scale implementation was not statistically significant for 
distinguishing between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation 
efforts. 
Hypothesis #13 
The organization and composition of the AMT project team will not be 
a significant factor differentiating successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
50. All the key functional areas were represented in the project 
team(s} for this organization's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) 
implementation. 
51. This organization assigned its .most capable people to the 
project. 
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52. This organization had an in-house project leader who 
coordinated the efforts for the Advanced Manufacturing Te~hnology (AMT) 
implementation. 
53. The individual team members of this organization's project team 
were dedicated to the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project on 
a full-time basis for the entire duration of the project. 
54. The staff that worked on this organization's Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project were involved with the project 
only on a part-time basis while still performing their regular duties. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent 
(t = 1.183, df = 26, p = 0.248). 
Successes: (X = 5.045, R = 7.000 
Failures: (X = 4.533, R = 5.600 
Resul t of the Hypothesis Test: 




groups; pooled variances. 
s = 0.993). 
s = 0.665). 
The degree to which organizations had staff dedicated to the AMT 
project on a full time basis, assigned the most capable people in the 
organization to the project, and had adequate representation of the key 
functional areas in the project team wa~ not statistically significant 
for differentiating successful AMT implementations from failures. 
Hypothesis #14 
The degree of management commitment and support of the AMT program 
in an organization will not be a significant factor differentiating 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
55. This organization's top management was directly involved in its 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) planning. 
56. Top management understood/supported the implementation effort, 
and committed adequate financial resources to the Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) efforts. 
57. This organization's top management actively supported our 
Advanced Manufacturing technology (AMT) efforts with adequate human 
resource commitments. 
58. This organization's top management directed its strategic 
planning efforts towards the successful implementation of this Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology (AMT). 
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59. Top management in this organization clearly communicated the 
corporate st rategic goals and objectives driving the AMT impl ementation 
to the i mplementation planners. 
60. Corporate pl anners in this organi zation clearly communicated 
the corporate strategic goals and objectives driving the AMT 
implementation to the implementation planners. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pool ed variances. 
(t = 0.041, df = 26, p = 0. 968). 
Successes: (X = 4.656, R = 6.000 2.333, s = 0.874). 
Fail ures: (X = 4.676, R = 6.167 1. 667' s 1.614). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The degree of management and support of the AMT program i n an 
organization was not statistically significant for differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementati on efforts. 
Hypothesis #15 
The magnitude of product redesign or si multaneously designing a new 
product in parallel with implementing a dedicated AMT will not make a 
significant difference between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
i mplementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
61. This organization redesigned existing products for dedi cated 
production on the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT} facility, 
after the system was implemented. 
62. This organization simultaneously designed new products along 
with a dedicated Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) facil i ty. 
63. Product redesign concurrent with system implementation 
contributed significantly to the attainment of the des i red levels of 
performance from our AMT system. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; separate 
variances. (t = 0.259, df = 5.8, p = 0.806}. 
Successes: 
Failures: 
(X = 3.532, R = 6.000 1.667, S = 0.993). 
(X = 3.741, R = 5.667 1.000, S = 1.906). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
Impl ications: 
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The degree to which organizations r edesigned their existing product 
1 i nes or simultaneously designed a new product for dedicated production 
on the AMT system was not statistically significant for distinguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #16 
The degree of adequacy of the particular technology to an 
application in the organization will not make a significant difference 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
64. This organization attempted to apply some technologies that are 
not compatible with the rest of the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT) in the overall technological scheme. 
65. This organization purchased/installed some of the Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology systems without a clear understanding of what 
the technology could do, and how it would satisfy the needs that exist. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 2.628, df = 26, p = 0.014). 
Successes: 
Failures: 
(X = 4.458, R = 6.500 1.834, S = 1.195). 
(X = 2.972, R = 5.333 1.500, S = 1.356). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
The adequacy of a particular technology implemented to an 
application, and its compatibility with existing technologies in the 
or ganization was a statistically significant factor for dist i nguishing 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #17 
The degree of information integrity in an organization prior to AMT 
implementation will not be a significant factor in differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
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Questions Used: 
66. The existing database configuration in our organization was too 
awkward for compatibility with the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT}. 
67. This organization had a standard data communication system for 
adequate exchange of product description data, prior to attempti ng to 
implement the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT ). 
68. This organization had adequate interfacing of information 
between the necessary functional departments, prior to attempting to 
implement the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) project. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 0.448, df = 26, p = 0.629). 
Successes: 
Failures: 
(X = 4.260, R = 6.333 2.333, S = 1.130). 
(X = 4.000 , R = 5.333 2.000, S = 1.265). 
Resul t of t he Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
Impli cations: 
The degree of information integrity within an organization prior to 
AMT implementatjon was not statisti cally significant for differentiating 
between successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts . 
Hypothesis 118 
The degree of availability of qualified systems integrators i n an 
organi zation wi ll not make a significant 9ifference between successful 
and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questi on Used: 
69. This organization had enough people possessing the technical 
competency required to integrate the Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
in our plant. 
Statisti cs: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 0.711, df = 26, p = 0.484). 
Successes: (X = 5.049, R = 7.000 2.000, s = 1.310). 
Failures: (X = 4.61 1, R = 6.000 2.667, s = 1.452). 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
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Implications: 
The degree to which organizations had qualified systems integrators 
during the AMT project planning and implementation process was not 
statistically significant for differentiating between successful and 
unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Hypothesis #19 
The degree of alignment of an organization's AMT s t rategy to its 
culture will not be a significant factor in differentiating between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Questions Used: 
70. In this organization, conflicts and differences in val ues, 
beliefs, and norms about coordinat ive activities, primary goals, and 
approaches to change are quickly dealt with and effectively solved. 
71. When changes are necessary, everyone in this organization has a 
clear idea of what sort of changes are and are not acceptable. 
72. In this organization, people do the best they can; there is 
little pressure to strive for specific goals. 
73. People in this organization are very successfu l in dealing wi th 
and resolving ambiguity, and can effecti vely coordi nate the actions of 
individuals and units . 
74. This organization has a long history of maintaining stable 
patterns of shared values, beliefs, and behavioral norms. 
75. In this organization, the pressure to maintain the status quo 
is so great that if a major change were required for the orga nization to 
su r vive, it might not. 
76. There is little consensus in this organization with regard to 
goals, practices, or needed changes. 
77. This organization handles probl ems of adapting to change with a 
high degree of effectiveness. 
78. Most people in this organization have their own goals t hat may 
or may not be compatible with one another. 
79. People in this organization have clear concepts of their own 
roles and how they relate to the roles of others. 
80. This organization has shown that it is able to set and reach 
important goals. 
Statistics: Two-tailed t-test for independent groups; pooled variances. 
(t = 2.229, df = 26, p = 0.035). 
Successes: 
Failures: 
(X = 4.607, R = 7.000 
(X = 3.939, R = 4.727 
Result of the Hypothesis Test: 
Rejected the null hypothesis 
Implications: 
3.545, s = 0.907). 
3.182, s = 0.720). 
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The degree of alignment of an organization's AMT strategy with its 
culture was a statistically significant differentiating factor between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts. 
Results of the Responses to the Open-Ended 
Question Dealing With the Expected 
Outcomes of AMT 
A section of the questi onnaire designed and used for the study asked 
open-ended questions to give the respondents the opportuni~ to express 
their views on some of the aspects of AMT implementation. Question # 4 
asked the respondents to state the top three specific benefits of AMT 
project implementation to their firms. The responses obtained, 
presented in its entirety in Appendix F showed that all the factors 
listed as a set in the ISO section of the questionnaire were 
represented. This was a confirmation of the fact that the factors 
included in the set, and used for scoring project implementation 
performance was a reasonable set of factors for that purpose. 
Summary of the Analysis of Data 
The purpose of this stu~ was to assess the success factors behind 
different organizations' efforts to implement Advanced Manufacturing 
Technologies (AMTs). It is anticipated that assessing and documenting 
these factors will provide valuable information to various functions in 
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the organization planning implementation strategies for the future. A 
detailed discussion and summary of the interpretation of the data 
analysis presented in this chapter is presented in Chapter VI. 
This project is expected to shed some light on the reasons why some 
AMT implementations succeeded and why others failed. It should also 
give some indication as to what factors are more critical to successful 
system implementation. This information is expected to be useful to the 
following functions within an organization: 1. The CEO - It would 
serve a valuable role in strategic planning, by providing information 
that would be helpful for matching the strategic objectives with the 
thrust areas identified as driving forces by a consensus of experts. 
2. The Resource Allocator - The outcome of this research project will 
aid the resource allocator in determining the priorities on the set of 
activities that needs to be undertaken in order to accomplish the 
company's business objectives. 3. Implementation Specialists, Project 
Managers/Groups - The ratings will provide some information on the 
factors that are considered critical for successful implementation, as 
well as pointing out what the possible pitfalls to be avoided are. 
Generally, these different functions will be served by providing 
guidelines on the factors that a consensus of experts have determined 
the levels of criticality for AMT implementation. The approach to 
achieving these goals have already been outlined. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to survey knowledge workers (people 
that were involved at some time in the planning and/or implementation of 
their companies 1 AMT) in companies that have implemented Advanced 
Manufacturing Technologies (AMTs) in the United States, in order to 
analyze the combination of factors within an organization that in 
general, contributed to implementation success achievement levels 
attained by typical groups of successful projects. In order to get this 
accomplished, a thorough review of related literature was conducted in 
order to ascertain factors that have been identified in a majority of 
the projects described in literature as contributors to the various 
levels of success in the individual projects. From the information 
obtained from literature, nineteen factors were selected due to their 
predominance as individual projects success factors. These factors thus 
formed the basis for the nineteen null hypotheses that were stated for 
this study. Information obtained from the literature search was also 
used to develop a questionnaire which was used to conduct the survey. 
The questionnaire was designed to enable collection of quantifiable data 
from survey participants to test each of the hypotheses. A section of 
the questionnaire, the implementation success diagnoses (ISO) was 
designed to obtain information to enable the researcher to distinguish 
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th~ more successful projects from the less successful ones. In order to 
make this distinction, scoring techniques were developed, one of which 
was chosen for use in scoring the projects represented in the sample 
based on their performance relative to goals set for the project. The 
scores obtained for each project were, in turn, used to perform a 
cluster analysis which separated the projects into clusters designated 
as either successes or failures for the purpose of the analysis. The 
nineteen null hypotheses stated for this study were tested, and the 
typical combination of factors for success in AMT implementation as 
indicated by the successful group efforts were delineated. 
The respondents to this study consisted of 97 knowl edge workers 
sampled across the United States. The questionnaire used for this study 
was developed by the researcher. It consisted of five sections which, 
when responded to, provided answers pertaining to the nineteen null 
hypotheses stated for the study. There were 49 returned questionnaires, 
of which six were unusable, yielding 43 usable returns or 44.3 percent. 
A total of twenty-eight projects were represented in the study. For 
each project represented, effort was made to obtain replications of at 
least two respondents for the analysis . The analysis was based on 
clusters of projects as either successful or unsuccessful projects. The 
clusters were obtained using weighted scores of project performance 
obtained for each project evaluated as a basis. These clusters were 
then used as the groupings for testing the individual hypotheses for 
significant differences between the groups. Clusters of two and three 
groups were tested in the effort to obtain the best grouping of 
projects. Both clustering techniques produced similar results when used 
to test the hypotheses. The 2-cluster grouping was used for the 
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analysis in this study. A summary of all the hypotheses tested, along 













SUMMARY OF THE NULL HYPOTHESES 
WITH TEST RESULTS 
Factor Addressed 
Alignment of the core 
organizational system 
with the corporate 
strategy 
Alignment of employee 




Position along the 
organic - mechanistic 
dimension 
Relationship between 
the technology supplier 
and the user firm 
Exi ste nee of an AMT 
champion 
Position of the AMT 
champion 
Existence of an 
educational program 
Availability of hands-
on training program 
Top-down planning and 
bottom-up implementation 
Status of Test 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Failed to reject 
the null hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
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TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Hypothesis # Factor Addressed Status of Test 
11 Pace of implementation Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
12 Obtaining experience Failed to reject 
with a pilot project the nul 1 hypothesis 
13 Organization and Failed to reject 
composition of the the null hypothesis 
project team 
14 Management commitment Failed to reject 
and support the nul 1 hypothesis 
15 Existing Product Failed to reject 
redesign or new the nul 1 hypothesis 
product design 
16 Adequacy of the Rejected the null 
particular technology hypothesis 
to an application 
17 Information integrity Failed to reject the null hypothesis 
18 Availability of Failed to reject 
qualified systems the nul 1 hypothesis 
integrators 
19 Alignment of strategy Rejected the 
null 
with the organizational hypothesis 
culture 
Conclusions 
The objective of this study was to investigate AMT implementation 
efforts across a group of projects to determine any possible commonality 
of factors accountable for AMT implementation successes across that 
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variety of AMT projects. The finding would then indi cate if there is 
any discernible pattern of success factors across the whole spectrum. 
Any such pattern would thus provide a general set of factors which 
influence success or failure of AMT implementation transferable from one 
project to the next. 
The conclusions reported in this chapter were based upon the 
population studied, and should be applied with caution in any attempts 
to generalize to other populations. 
Based on the data analyzed for the respective nul l' hypotheses 
tested, the following conclusions were reached: 
* 
* 
Overall, although al l of the factors addressed in the nineteen 
null hypotheses were success factors in individual projects 
reported in literature, they were not all significant across a 
spectrum of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) projects. 
Seven out of the nineteen factors that were investigated i n the 
hypotheses stated for this study were significant in 
differentiating between successful and unsuccessful AMT 
implementation. They thus formed the generalized pattern of 
commonality that was sought across projects, producing a 
consensus-based set of success factors for implementing advanced 
manufacturing technologies, or factors that would lead to 
failures in AMT implementation efforts if not adequately 
addressed. 
* The first null hypothesis addressing the alignment of the core 
organization system was rejected, indicating that the core 
organization systems illustrated in Figure 1 - strategy 
formulation, cultural/political system, organizational structure, 
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technical system, and organizational management processes - as 
much as possible, need to be made to work in unison in order to 
implement AMT strategy successfully. 
* The factors addressed in the other hypotheses that were rejected, 
indicate the areas of emphasis to deal with in order to get the 
AMT mission accomplished. 
The seven factors which were significant in distinguishing 
successes from failures were: An organization's:-
1. Ability to effectively align the core organizational systems 
with the corporate strategy. 
2. Strategy formulation process. 
3. Educational program for employees prior to AMT implementation . 
4. Top-down planning and bottom-up implementation. 
5. Pace of implementation. 
6. Adequacy of a particular technology to an application in the 
organization. 
7. Degree of alignment of AMT strategy with organizational culture. 
A summary of the null hypotheses that were rejected, signifying 
their statistical significance as differentiating factors between 
successful and unsuccessful AMT implementation efforts is presented in 
Table XVIII ~' A summary of the null hypotheses that failed to be 










SUMMARY OF THE NULL HYPOTHESES 
REJECTED IN THE STUDY 
Factor Addressed 
Alignment of the core 
organizational system 




Existence of an 
educational program 
Top-down planning and 
bottom-up implementation 
Pace of implementation 
Adequacy of the 
particular technology 
to an application 
Alignment of strategy 
with the organizational 
culture 
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Status of Test 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 
Rejected the null 
hypothesis 

















SUMMARY OF THE NULL HYPOTHESES THAT 
FAILED TO BE REJECTED IN THE STUDY 
Factor Addressed Status of Test 
Alignment of employee Failed to reject 
attitudes with the the nul 1 hypothesis 
corporate objectives 
Position along the Failed to reject 
organic - mechanistic the nul 1 hypothesis 
dimension 
Relationship between Failed to reject 
the technology supplier the nul 1 hypothesis 
and the user firm 
Existence of an AMT Failed to reject 
champion the nu l l hypothesis 
Posit ion of the AMT Failed to reject 
champion the null hypothesis 
Availability of hands- Failed to reject 
on training program the null hypothesis 
Obtaining experience Failed to reject 
with a pilot project the null hypothesis 
Organization and Failed to reject 
composition of the the null hypothesis 
project team 
Management commitment Failed to reject 
and support the null hypothesis 
Existing Product Failed to reject 
redesign or new the nul 1 hypothesis 
product design 
Information integrity Failed to reject 
the nul 1 hypothesis 
Availability of Failed to reject 
qualified systems the null hypothesis 
integrators 
One hypothesis measured the placement of organizations along the 
organic/mechanistic continuum. For this factor a higher score showed 
that the organization was tending toward the highly mechanistic and 
bureaucratic type of setting, while a lower score showed the tendency 
towards an organic and adaptive organization. The results from this 
test showed that the more successful organizations leaned more toward 
the organic side than the less successful ones. Successful 
implementations would thus tend to be associated with an organic and 
adaptive organization. 
Recommendations for AMT Implementation 
Practices 
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The recommendations proposed are based on the findings and 
conclusions of this study. It is recommended that companies planning to 
implement new AMT systems adequately incorporate the factors listed 
above as those distinguishing the more successful projects from the less 
successful ones. The author does not suggest that the importance of the 
other factors investigated be discounted, but merely recommends, based 
on the findings of this study, that attention be given to factors that 
were identified as being critical to successful implementation across 
several projects than others. It is expected that these findings will 
serve as input to advanced manufacturing technology strategy 
implementation process, as well as pointing out some direction in terms 
of AMT resource allocation. It should also provide project managers and 
implementation specialists with at least a starting point for 
implementation planning, as well as contribute to the general theory of 
AMT implementation. 
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The set of expected outcomes used in the study was a good set since 
they were a 11 addressed by. the respondents to the survey on the 
open-ended questions presented in Appendix F. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
There is immense opportunity for further expansion of this 
research. The following is a set of recommendations that would further 
expand the knowledge in the area of AMT implementation. The 
recommendations proposed are based on the findings and conclusions of 
this study. 
It is recommended that a comparative study be conducted between 
different industries to determine if there are significant differences 
between industries. Once that is accomplished, an international scope 
can be embraced based on the experience obtained, with a comparative 
study of implementation practices between industrialized nations, 
notably between the United States and Japan. 
It is further recommended that a similar research be conducted 
using a wider scope of companies and more industry representations to 
determine if there are differences in the combination of factors leading 
to successful project implementations in each industry. This would 
further strengthen the claim on the generalized set of success factors. 
It is also recommended that a similar study be conducted with an 
extension as a longitudinal study to compare the changes in study 
information with a passage of time, as people change their group 
membership and the projects change focus/emphasis over time. 
It is recommended that with appropriate funding, a similar study be 
designed to incorporate on-site interviews as a back-up for more robust 
187 
data collection procedure for analysis. This would give the researcher 
an opportunity to get some reactions from diverse groups of people who 
might impact implementation success. 
A similar study should be conducted to explore more details on the 
level interaction required of each specific factor identified as a 
success factor, to determine possibilities for enhancements in each 
factor. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE PRE-TEST FORM 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO CRITIQUING 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
198 
The critiquing of this ouestionnaire is divided into 
three parts. The first part deals with the individual 
ques~ions/statements. the second part deals with the overall 
questionnaire, and the third part asks for some specific 
opinions, ideas, and suggestions from each oarticioant. 
PART I. Please read each question/statement i n the 
attached questionnaire. then answer the 
critiauing auestions below. If the ans wer to 
critiauing question is yes, do nothing. If 
the answer is no, write the section number and 
question number (for example II.3 for 
section II. auestion number 3) in the space to 
the ri~ht of the critiquing question. 
CRITIQUING QUESTIONS 
1. Is it clear? 
2. Is i t complete ? 
3. Does it deal with a single idea? 
4 . Is it brief? 
5. Do you unders t and orecisely what 
the question sta tement is soli c iting ? 
6. Is it ob.iective, without suggesting 
a response? 
7. Is it courteous. without adverse 
connotations ? 
Any other comments? Please include 
number to which they pertain. 
the section and auestion 
PART II. Please review the overall questionnaire and 
answer the questions below. Ci rcle only one 
response to each question. 
1 . The design of the overall questionnaire is logicallY 
arranged? (yes l (no l 
2. Directions for completing the questionnaire are clear 
3. 
and cornolete? (yes) (no) 
The overall length of the questionnaire is 
(Too long) ( Okav) (Too short> 
? 
4. Questions are oresented in ~ood osycholo~ical order. 
oroceedin2 from 2eneral to specific responses? 
(yes) (no) 
5. Any additional comments and su~2estions? 
PART III. Please answer the followin2 questions 
briefly, in your own words. 
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1. What is the len2th of time it would take to comolete the 
questionnaire if you were not evaluatin~ each question? 
2. Which areas could be re2arded as bein2 overly sensitive? 
3. Which questions or areas were confusin2? 




REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY CAMT). 
The following questions are designed to identify the relative 
contributions of various factors to successful implementation of 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) projects. 
It is anticipated that some of these factors may be more 
important in your company's Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
(AMT) implementation efforts than in other companies. Please 
indicate your perception of the effect of each of the factors 
covered in this instrument on your Advanced Manufacturing 
Technology (AMT) implementation. Your response to all items will 
assist in the development of a set of requirements for 
successful A.MT implementation. This will enable managers who are 
designing implementation strategies for the future to follow some 
logical sequence, based on the results of the survey, for 
successful system implementation. 
PLEASE .ANswER ALL THE QuESTIONS IN THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES TO 
COMPLETE 
IN APPRECIATION OF YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE, 
A SUMMARY OF THIS STUDY ~ILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU l.1HEN THE 
STUDY IS COMPLETED. IF YOU DESIRE TO RECEIVE THE SUMMARY, 
PLEASE CHECK THE SPACE PROVIDED AT THE END OF THE INSTRUMENT 
NOTE: YOUR RESPONSES TO THE ENTIRE INSTRUMENT ~ILL BE KEPT 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL, AND WILL NOT BE LINKED TO YOU OR YOUR 
COMPANY \lHEN THE DATA IS ANALYZED 
201 
I. SPECIFIC· AMT PROJECT TO BE EVALUATED 
INSTRUCTIONS: Your company may have implemented several 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology (.AMT) projects to date. In the 
spaces provided below, please £ill in the in.f'ormation on one 
speci:fic project in your company, and answer the :following 
questions related to the project. Your responses to all the 
questions in this instrument should be based on this project. 
TITLE OF PROJECT LEADER? 
HOME DEPARTMENI' OF PROJECT LEADER? 
\lHAT IS YOUR OFFICIAL JOB TinE? 
1. How are (were) you involved (if at all) in the AMT 
implementation process? (e.g . If you are (were) a project 
manager, describe the duties performed in that capacity ) . 
2 . Please characterize the relative size of the project (e.g. 
machine cell, ... , entire plant, square footage invo lved, amount 
($) spent on project, etc). 
202 
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3. Please characterize the re l ative scope of t he p r o ject, i n t erms 
of functions covered during the various implementat ion 
phases: (check all that apply) . 
a. Marketing and Sal es 
b. Engineering Design 
c . Process Planning 




h. Quality Assurance 
i. Shipping and Receiving 
j. Other(s) (Please Specify) 
4. Please give a brief description of the pro j ect in terms of 
what the goals were , and how you went about achi eving them. 
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II. IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS DIAGNOSIS CISO) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Your company had some specific expected outcomes 
for this project. For each of the items listed below, please 
indicate the response that best fits the current status of your 
firm's Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) i mplementation 
results tor this project as follows: 
1. In the space provided before each of the items listed, please 
indicate [Yes/No) if the factor was an expected outcome of your 
AHT system, and hence used to justify the system's implementation. 
2. For every factor listed below, please rate by checking C"'4 
the appropriate box to the right, as it was affected by your 
Advanced Manufacturing Technology {A.MT) project implementation. 
RATING 
l.EvEL De:CLlNED AFTER 
.AMT IMPLEMENT A rJON 
No CHANGES IN LEVEL AFTER 
AMT IMPLEMENT A Tl ON 
SOME IMPROVEMENT REALlZED 
Sussr ANTI.AL IMPROVEMENT REALIZED 
Bur TARGET LEVELS Nor MET 












Flexibility to accommodate 






D D D 
D D D D o ! 
D D D D D 
D D D D D 
D D D D D 
D D D D D 
D D D D D 
RATING 
l£vEL DECLINED AFTER 
AMT IMPLEMENTATION 
No CHANGES IN LEVEL AFTER 
AJ1T IMPLEMENTATION 
SOME IMPROVEMENT REALIZED 
SuBST ANTI AL IMPROVEMENT REALIZED 
Bur TARGET LEV ELS Nor MET 


















Floor space requirements 
Direct labor cost 
Indirect labor cost 




17. overall system performance 
relative to system objectives 

















































D D D D D 












[!I . AMT IMPLEMENTATION SURVEY 
INSTRUCTIONS: THIS PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS CONCERNED WITH 
YOUR FIR~(S ADVANCED MANUfACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IMPLEMENTATION >- >-
PROCESS. PLEASE CAREFU.L Y READ EACH STATEMENT BELOW, THEN CHECK >- >- ....J ....J _J ....J l- (!) 
(v'] ONE BOX TO THE RIGHT THAT MOST ACCURATELY REPRESENTS YOUR (!) I- :r z 
FIRM'S SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THIS PARTICULAR PROJECT. :z :r: ~ 0 0 0 ....J w C:: a:: w < ....J w I-w ::i (/) I- a:: a:: C:: en 
(J) (!) UJ I- w (!) 
<I: 
'.:) w < w w w w c:: (/) w w w :z (!) c:: c:: a:: < a (!) <.'.) <.'.) (/) < <: <: (/) 
a a 
1. THIS ORGANIZATION HAO AN OVERALL CORPORA TE STATEMENT OF 
OBJECTIVES FOR ITS ADVANCED MANUF'ACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) D D D D D D D EffORTS, WITHIN WHICH THE PLAN F'OR THIS PARTICULAR AMT 
IMPLEMENTATION WAS SPECIFIED. 
2. THIS ORGANIZATION ADEOUA TEL Y ASSESSED THE PREY AILING VALUES 
AND A ITITUOES IN THE FIRM, IN SELECTING ITS M£n!ODOLOGY F'OR 
D D D D D D D ACHIEVING THE DESIRED GOALS FROM THIS Aov ANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY (AMT). 
3. T HIS ORGANIZATION'S SCHEME. OF' EVENTS DIRECTED AT 
ACHIEVING THE DESIRED OUTCOMES OF THIS ADVANCffi MANUFACTURING 
D D D D D D D T ECHNOLOGY (AMT) F'ITS THE GENERAL TECHNOLOGICAL PATIERNS THA T 
I AMF AMILIAR WITH. 
4. IN ITS PLANS F'OR ACHIEVING THE DESIRED GOALS F'ROM THIS 
ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) , THIS ORGANIZATION 
D D D D D D D AOEOUA TEL Y ASSESSED ITS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, ANO MADE TliE 
ADJUSTMENTS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO REACH THOSE: GOALS. 
5. T HIS ORGANIZATION MADE ANY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHANGES 
D D 0 0 D D NECESSARY FOR TRANSITION TO THE Aov ANCED MANUF ACTIJRING 0 
TECHNOLOGY (AMT) ENVIRONMENT PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION. 
6. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD A STRATEGIC F'OCUS FOR ITS ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING T ECHNOLOGY (AMT) WHICH INCREASED COHESION WITHIN THE D D 
AMT IMPLEMENTATION ORGANIZATION. 
D D D D 0 
7. THE REWARD SYSTEM IN THIS ORGANIZATION RECOGNIZED INDIVIDUAL 
D D D EFFORTS TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED GOALS FROM THIS ADVANCED D D D D 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) . 
8. THE REW ARO SYSTEM JN THIS ORGANIZATION RECOGNIZED GROUP D D D D D D D EFFORTS TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED GOALS FROM THIS Aov ANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT). 
9. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT PROVIDED CONTINUAL 
MOTIVATION, ANO REWARDED COMPLIANCE WITH THE ADVANCED D D D D D D D MANUF ACTUR!NG TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PHILOSOPHY. 
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>- >-
>- >- ....J _J ....J ....J I- 0 
(.!) I- :::i:: z z ::c -I 
<.!) w 0 
0 (.!) w c::: w <( ....J I-0:: w :i 0:: (/) c:: (/) I- 0:: I- (!) (/) <.!) (/) :::> w <( w 
w <( w w w (/) w 




(/) C/l a 0 
10. T OP MANAGEMENT'S EVALUATION OF MIOOLE MANAGEMENT CONSIDERED 
PERFORMANCES THAT REFLECT THE POSITIVE EFFECTS OF CHANGE RESULTING 
FROM THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IMPLEMENTATION. D D D D D D D 
11. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT PROVIDED ADEQUATE 
INCENTIVES FOR MIDDLE ANO OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT STAFF TO SUPPORT D D D D D D D THE ADVANCED MANUf ACTURINC TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PROGRAM. 
12. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT PROVIDED AOEOUA TE 
INCENTIVES FOR LABOR GROUPS TO SUPPORT OUR Aov ANCED MANUFACTURING D D D D D D D TECHNOLOGY (AMT) EFFORTS. 
13. THIS ORGANIZATION'S STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS EXPUCITL Y 
INCLUDES CONSIOERA TION Of IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES SUCH AS REQUIRED 
REORGANIZATIONS, STAFFING CHANGES, MOOIFICA TIONS TO SYSTEMS ANO 
D D D 0 D D D POLICIES. 
14. THE KEY MIDDLE MANAGERS IN THIS ORGANIZATION USUALLY HAVE A 
CHANCE TO REVIEW ANO COMMENT ON PROPOSED STRATEGIES BEFORE 
0 D D D D D D RESOURCES ARE ALLOCATED. 
15. STRATEGIC PROPOSALS ARE USUALLY CRITICALLY DISCUSSED ANO 
D 0 D D D 0 D CONSENSUS REACHED PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE IN THIS ORGAN!ZA TION. 
16. THERE IS A CORPORA TE STAFF SUPPORT GROUP FOR STRATEGY 
0 D D D D 0 D FORMULATION WITHIN THIS ORGANIZATION. 
17. THIS ORGANIZATION USUALLY HAS A FORMAL SYSTEM FOR INTERNALLY 
D D D D D D D REVIEWING STRATEGIC PROPOSALS. 
18. THIS ORGANIZATION'S ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) 
EFFORTS WERE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT ITS STRATEGIC BUSINESS 
D D D 0 0 D D OB..JECTIVES. 
19. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS Cl.£AR RULES ANO REGULATIONS THAT 
D CJ D D D D D EVERYONE IS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW CLOSELY. 
20. POLICIES IN THIS ORGANIZATION ARE REVIEWED BY THE PEOPLE THEY 
D D 0 D 0 D AFFECT BEFORE BEING IMPLEMENTED. D 
21 . EVERYONE IN THIS ORGANIZATION KNOWS WHO HIS/ HER IMMEDIATE 
SUPERVISOR IS. REPORTING RELATIONSHIPS ARE CL£ARL Y DEFINED. D D D 0 0 D D 
22. Joas IN THIS ORGANIZATION ARE CLEARL y DEFINED; EVERYONE KNOWS D D D D D D D EXACTLY WHAT IS EXPECTED OF HIM/HER IN ANY SPECIFIC JOB POSITION. 
23. .AJ..L DECISIONS IN THIS ORGANIZATION MUST BE REVIEWED AND 
APPROVED BY UPPER LEVEL MANAGEMENT. 
24. STANDARD ACTIVITIES IN THIS ORGANIZATION ARE ALWAYS COVERED 
BY CLEARLY OUTLINED PROCEDURES THAT EVERYONE IS EXPECTED TO 
FOLLOW. 
25. THIS ORGANIZATION FORMED AN IMPLEMENTATION TEAM WITH THE 
ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) SUPPLIER AT THE PROJECT 
SITE DURING ITS AMT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. 
26. THIS ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED A LONG TrnM, MUTUAL COMMITMENT 
WITH THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) SUPPLIER TO 
SUPPORT THE INTEGRATION THE NEW TECHNOLOGY IN OUR PLANT: 
27. THERE W'ERE KEY PEOPLE FROM THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY (AMT) SUPPLIER FIRM WHO WORKED VERY CLOSELY WITH OUR 
PROJECT TEAM IN THE EFF"ORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE AMT IN OUR PL.ANT. 
28. THIS ORGANIZATION ALLO\llED PEOPLE \111TH AMBITION AND 
(REGARDLESS OF THEIR RANK IN MANAGEMENT) TO LEAD IN 





29. THERE WAS A KEY PERSON FROM THIS ORGANIZATION \I/HO WORKED 
EXTREMELY HARD AT BUILDING A TEAM TO INTEGRATE THE ADVANCED 
HANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IN OUR PLANT. 
30. THERE WAS A KEY PERSON FROM THE TECHNOLOGY SUPPLIER FIRM 
WHO WORKED EXTREMELY HARO AT BUILDING A TEAM TO INTEGRATE THE 
ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IN OUR PLANT. 
31. THE PROJECT LEADER FOR THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY CAMD IMPLEMENTATION HAO A DEEP COMMITMENT ANO DESIRE 
TO SUCCEED IN THE AMT IMPLEMENTATION. 
32. TH£ PROJECT MANAGER WAS THE KEY PERSON WHO °CHAMPIONED 0 THIS 
ORGANIZATION'S ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) EFFORTS. 
33. THE PERSON WHO DIRECTED OUR AMT IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS WAS 
IN A KEY MANAGEMENT POSITION. 
34. THE PERSON WHO DIRECTED OUR ADv ANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
(AMT) EFFORTS. CONTROLLED THE: RESOURCES NECESSARY FOR 
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35. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD A COMPREHENSIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM TO 
D COMMUNICATE TO ALL EMPLOYEES, THE REASONS F"OR NECESSARY CHANGES D D D D D D 
RELATED TO THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PRIOR TO 
ACTUAL INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM. 
36. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM FOR TOP-LEVEL D D D D D D D 
MANAGERS, FOCUSING ON THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) 
TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION Of THE SYSTEM. 
37. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM FOR MIDDLE D D D D D D D 
MANAGERS, FOCUSING ON THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) 
TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION Of THE SYSTEM. 
38. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM FOR OPERATIONS 
PERSONNEL. FOCUSING ON THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) D D D D D D D TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION Of THE SYSTEM. 
39. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD A COMPREHENSIVE HANDS-ON TRAINING 
PROGRAM TO INTRODUCE THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMTl 0 D D D D D D TO THE EMPLOYEES Afll:R THE ACTUAL INSTALLATION OF TiiE SYSTEM. 
40. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS A BROAD CORPORA TE PLAN FOR ITS D D D D D D D ADVANCED MANUF" ACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) SCHEME, WHICH PROVIDES 
GUIDELINES FOR INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS. 
41. THE PROCESS FOR DEVELOPING THIS ORGANIZATION'S ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN INCORPORATED 0 0 D D D 0 D EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION TO FEED INFORMATION FROM TiiE SHOP FLOOR 
BACK TO UPPER MANAGEMENT. 
42. THE OVERALL PLAN FOR INITGRA TING THIS ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY (AMT) INTO THE ORGAN!ZA TION WAS CARRIED OUT BY UPPER D D D D D D D LEVEL MANAGEMENT, ANO THE INFORMATION WAS PASSED DOWNWARD. 
43. THIS ORGANIZATION TOOK A STEP-WISE APPROACH TO ADAPT AND D D 0 D D D D IMPLEMENT THE Aov ANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) 
PROJECT INCREMENTALLY IN PROGRAMMED PHASES. 
44. THIS ORGANIZATION RUSHED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EACH PHASE OF 
D D D D D D 0 ITS ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PROGRAM. 
45. THE PACE AT WHICH OUR ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) 
WAS IMPLEMENTED WAS SO SLOW TiiAT THE INITIAL ZEAL THAT PUSHED THE 
D D D 0 D D 0 PROJECT ALONG IN ITS EARLIER STAGES WAS LOST. 
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46. THIS ORGANIZATION STARTED ITS IMPLEMENTATION PUSH WITH A 
PILOT PRO.JECT THAT WAS EASY ANO HAO HIGH PROBABILITY OF 
D D D D D D D SUCCESS, ANO THEN FOLLOWED IT UP WITH SUCCESSIVELY MORE COMPLEX 
ONES. 
47. THIS ORGANIZATION OBTAINED EXPERIENCE WITH A MANAGEABL y-SIZED 
(PILOT) PRO.JECT PRIOR TO A FULL SCALE IMPLEMENTATION. D D D D D D-D 
48. THE PILOT PROJECT USED TO OST AIN EXPERIENCE IN THIS 
ORGANIZATION WAS OF SIMILAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE FULL SCALE ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PRO.JECT. D D D D D D D 
49. THIS ORGANIZATION HIRED INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE FAMILIAR WITH 
THE TYPE OF ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) TO BE 
D D D D D D D IMPLEMENTED TO AID IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS. 
SQ. ALL THE KEY FUNCTIONAL AREAS WERE REPRESENTED IN THE 
PROJECT TEAM(S) FOR THIS ORGANIZATION'S ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY (AMT) IMPLEMENTATION. D D D D D D D 
51. THIS ORGANIZATION ASSIGNED ITS MOST CAPABLE PEOPLE TO THE 
D D D D D D D PRO.JECT. 
52. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD AN JN-HOUSE PRO.JECT LEADER. WHO 
D D D D D D D COOROINA TED THE EFFORTS FOR THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
(AMT) IMPLEMENTATION. 
53. THE INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION' S PRO.JECT 
TEAM WERE DEDIC A TED TO THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
(AMT) PROJ ECT ON A FULL - TIME BASIS FOR THE ENTIRE DURATION OF THE 0 0 0 D D D D PRO.JECT. 
54. THE STAFF THAT WORKED ON THIS ORGANIZATION'S ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PRO.JECT WERE INVOLVED WITH THE 
D D D D D D D PRO.JECT ONLY ON A PART-TIME BASIS WHILE STILL PERFORMING THEIR 
REGULAR DUTIES. 
55. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN 
D D . D D D D D ITS ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) PLANNING. 
56. TOP MANAGEMENT UNDERSTOOD/SUPPORTED THE IMPLEMENTATION 
EFFORT, AND COMMITTED ADEQUATE F"INANCIAL RESOURCES TO THE ADVANCED 
D D D D D D D MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT} EFFORTS. 
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57. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT ACTIVELY SUPPORTED OUR 
D 0 0 ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMTl EFFORTS WITH 
AOEQUA TE HUMAN RESOURCE COMMITMENTS. 
0 D D D 
58. THIS ORGANIZATION'S TOP MANAGEMENT DIRECTED ITS STRATEGIC 
0 D PLANNING EFFORTS TOWARDS THE SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS 
ADVANCED MANUf"ACTVRING TECHNOLOGY (AMT). 
D 0 D D D 
59. TOP MANAGEMENT IN THIS ORGANIZATION CLEARLY COMMUNICATED 
D D D THE CORPORATE STRATEGIC GOALS ANO OBJECTIVES DRIVING THE AMT D D D D IMPLEMENTATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PLANNERS. 
60. CORPORA TE PLANNERS IN THIS ORGANIZATION CLEARLY COMMUNICATED 
THE CORPORA TE STRATEGIC GOALS ANO OBJECTIVES DRIVING THE AMT 
IMPLEMENTATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PLANNERS. D D D D D D D 
61. THIS ORGANIZATION REDESIGNED EXISTING PRODUCTS FOR 
OEOICA TED PRODUCTION ON THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 
(AMT) FACILITY, AFTER THE SYSTEM WAS l~LEM£NTEO. D D D D D D D 
62. THIS ORGANIZATION SIMA.. T ANEOUSL Y DESIGNED NEW PRODUCTS ALONG 
WITH A DEOICA TED ADVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY (AMT) FACILI TY. D D D D D D D 
63. PRODUCT REDESIGN CONCURRENT WITH SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE A TT AINM£NT OF THE DESIRED LEY ELS D D D D D D D OF PERFORMANCE FROM OUR AMT SYSTEM. 
64. THIS ORGANIZATION ATTEMPTED TO APPLY SOME TECHNOLOGIES THAT 
D D D D D D D ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE REST OF THE ADVANCED MANUFACTURING 
TECHNOLOGY (AMTl IN THE OVERALL TECHNOLOGICAL SCHEME. 
65. THIS ORGANIZA TlON PURCHASED/INSTALLED SOME OF THE ADVANCED 
MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS WITHOUT A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF 
WHAT THE TECHNOLOGY COULD 00, ANO HOW IT WOULD SATISFY THE NEEDS D D D D D D D 
THAT EXIST. 
66. THE EXISTING DATABASE CONFIGURATION IN OUR ORGANIZATION WAS 
D D D D TOO AWKWARD FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH TH£ ADVANCED MANUFACTURING D D D 
TECHNOLOGY CAMT). 
67. THIS ORGANIZATION HAO A STANDARD DA TA COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
FOR ADEOUA TE EXCHANGE OF PRODUCT DESCRIPTION DA TA, PRIOR TO 
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68. THIS ORGANIZATION HAO ADEQUATE INTERFACING OF INFORMATION 
BETWEEN THE NECESSARY FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS, PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING D D D D D D D TO lfo.IPLEMENT THE AOVANCED MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY ( AMT) PROJECT. 
69. THIS ORGANIZATION HAD ENOUGH PEOPLE POSSESSING THE TECHNICAL 
COMPETENCY REQUIRED TO INTEGRATE THE Aov ANCED MANUFACTURING D D D D D D D TECHNOLOGY IN OUR PLANT. 
70. IN THIS ORGANIZATION, CONFLICTS ANO DIFFERENCES IN VALUES. 
BELIEFS, AND NORMS ABOUT COOROINA TIVE ACTIVITIES, PRIMARY GOALS, 
AND APPROACHES TO CHANG£ ARE OUICKL Y DEALT WITH ANO EFFECTIVELY 
D D D D D D D SOLVED. 
71. WHEN CHANGES ARE NECESSARY, EVERYONE IN THIS ORGANIZATION HAS 
D D D D D D D A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT SORT OF CHANGES ARE ANO ARE NOT ACCEPT ABLE. 
72. IN THIS ORGANIZATION, PEOPLE DO THE BEST THEY CAN; THERE IS 
D D D D D D D LITTLE PRESSURE TO STRIVE FOR SPECIFIC GOALS. 
73. PEOPLE IN THIS ORGANIZATION ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL IN DEALING 
D D D D D D D WITH ANO RESOLVING AMBIGUITY, ANO CAN EFFECTIVELY COORDINATE THE 
ACTIONS OF' INDIVIDUALS ANO UNITS. 
74. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS A LONG HISTORY OF MAINTAINING STABLE 
0 D D PATTERNS OF SHARED VALUES, BE:UEFS, ANO BEHAVIORAL NORMS. .o D D D 
75. IN THIS ORGANIZATION, THE PRESSURE TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO 
D D D D D IS SO CREA T THAT IF A MAJOR CHANGE WERE REQUIRED FOR THE D D 
ORGANIZATION TO SURV IVE, IT MIGHT NOT. 
76. THERE IS LITTLE CONSENSUS IN THIS ORGANIZATION WITH REGARD TO 
GOALS, PRACTICES. OR NEEDED CHANGES. D D D D D D D 
77. THIS ORGANIZATION HANDLES PROBLEMS OF ADAPTING TO CHANGE WITH 
A HIGH DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS. D D D D D D D 
78. MOST PEOPLE IN THIS ORGANIZATION HAVE THEIR OWN GOALS THAT 
MAY OR MAY NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH ONE ANOTHER. D D D D D D D 
79 . PEOPLE IN THIS ORGANIZATION HAVE CLEAR CONCEPTS OF THEIR OWN 
ROLES AND HOW THEY RELATE TO THE ROLES OF OTHERS. D D D D D D D 
80. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS ABLE TO SET AND REACH 
IMPORT ANT GOALS. D D D D D D D 
IV. OVERALL OPINIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS:This part of the questionnaire is designed to 
obtain your opinions of the factors that you cons i der essential to 
the Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) implementation process 
in order to realize the system's full potential. Please answer 
all the questions in your own words as completely as possible. 
l. If you had to implement your AMT system all over again, what 
~ould you do differently? 
2. In your opinion, what are the top three factors inhibiting a 





J. In your opinion, what are the top three 
contributed to the successful implementation of this 







4. In your op1n1on what are the top three specific benefits of 




5. ~h i ch department(s) were represented in your project team for 
the AMT implementation? (Please list department and number of 
people represented from each department. ) 
DEPARTMENT # OF PEOPLE REPRESENTED 
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V. DEMOGRAPHICS 
INSTRUCTIONS: This part of the questionnaire is concerned with 
information about the individual respondent's background that 
will help to place proper perspective on the study. Simply 
omit any question you do not wish to answer in this section. 
1 . Please indicate the time you have spent in your present 
position.(.;]. 
___ a. Less than 1 year ___ d. 8 to 12 years 
___ b. 1 to 3 years ___ e. 12 to 16 years 
___ c. 4 to 7 years ___ f. Over 16 years 
2. Please check the level of formal education you have comp leted 
( v' ) 
___ a. High School ___ c. Bachelors Degree 
___ b. Some College d. Graduate Degree(s) ---
3. Please indicate your total number of years of exper i ence in 
this technology area (.; J 
___ a. Less than 2 years d. 10 to 13 years ---
___ b. 2 to 5 years e. 14 to 17 years ---
___ c. 6 to 9 years f. Over 17 years ---
216 
4. Have you been invo l ved in your AMT system o peration r ecently? 
___ a. Yes ___ b. No 
5. If you r response to ~4 above is Yes, ~hat are (were ) your 
duties wi th the AMT system operat i on? 
6. Please list the top three activities related t o your 
system that you spend most of your time performing 








THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME ANO EFFORT. YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE I 
HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. 




Oklaho,ma State University 
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 
January 19, 1989 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74078-0540 ENGINEERING NORTH, ROOM 322 (405) 744-6055 FAX: (405) 744-7673 




We are c0nducting a doctoral level research to study "The Requirements for Successful 
Implementation of Advanced Mnr.ufacturing Techno[ogy (AMT)", in the United States. 
This study is being conducted by the school of lndustrial Engineering and Management at 
Oklahoma State Universitv, an1 your project(s) has been chosen to be included in the 
sample for this study. Your name was supplied to us by who 
worked with you during the project. 
She indicate<l that you are extremely knowledgeable about the project that was 
implemented at your company, and that you "'ould be aole/willing to comp lete the 
attached surve1 for us. Your experie~ces would be very valua~le to us in our efforts to 
complete this resP.arch and since we are making tl:is req.'est af only a small select group, 
your individual reply is most important to make our informati8n useful an~ reliable in 
guiding future implementation efforts. 
The attached questionnaire should take about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minutes of 
your time to complete. Please answer all the questio;is in the questhnnaire completely. 
If at all possible, please return the compl'=ted instrument to reach us 1!.'ithin tl-ie next 
week. · 
When the instrument is completed, pleas~ fold it lengthwise so that the return address is 
visible, and staple it closed, and drop it in ti1e mail. Return postage is provided for your 
convenience. 
We want to assure you that your responses to the entire instrument will be kept strictly 
confidential, and will not be linked to you or your company when the data is analyzed. 
You will notice a number on your questionnaire. This number will only be used for our 
internal co'!trol and verific:::ition purposes. At no time will questionnaires be identified by 
name. ' ... 
.!!.. • CENTE)!Nl.U.L 1890. 1990 
Celebrating !he Past . Preparing ':;r :re =~1i... r e 
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Page 2 
As a token of our appreciation for your time and effort, a pac!<et of Superior Brand 
Pekoe tea bag is included. We thought you might enjoy a nice cup of tea while completing 
the questionnaire. A summary of this study will also be made available to you when the 
study is completed. If you would like to receive the summary, please check the box 
provided at the end of the instrument, and one will be mailed to you. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please call us at (405) 744 - 6055. 
Sincerely, 
>hL W· 
dhn W. Naze~~ 
Research Director Princi 
APPENDIX D 
FIRST FOLLOW-UP LETTER 
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Oklahoma State University 
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND .'11\ANAGEMENT 
February IO, l 989 
Dear 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 1~078-0540 ENGINEERING NORTH. ROOM JZ2 (405) 744-6055 
221 
About two weeks ago, a questionnaire seeking your op1n1ons on the Req..iiremerits for 
Successful Implementation of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) was mailed to 
you. You were selected as a part of the survey sample, .due to your extensive knowledge 
in the implementation process of some projects in your company. 
If you have already campleted and returned the questionnaire to us, please accept our 
sincere thanks. If not, plen.-;e do so today. Your response is very important to t~e 
successful completion of this study. · 
If, by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, a 
replacement is enclosed, and return postage is provided. As a token of our apprecirJtion 
for your time and effort in completing the questionnaire, a pack of Flavored Lipton 
Caffeine Free Tea is iricluded. We thought you might enjoy a cup of tea this time around, 
just in case you pref er caffeine-free tea to regular caffeine tea which wns the token 
enclosed in our first mailing. 
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
John W. Nazemetz, Ph.D. 
Research Director 
, \ 
J,'v.~~ ~ ~'-:~ 
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[[]§OD 
Okla.ho nza State [Jn z'l'ersitu 
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND M AN AGEMENT 
February 17, 1989 
I STILLWATER, OKLAHOMA 74078-0540 ENGINEERING NORTH, ROOM 322 (405) 744-6055 FAX: (405) 744-7673 
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF ADVANCED 
MANUF ACTURlNG TECHNOLOGY 
Dear 
223 
About three weeks ago, a questionnaire seeking your opinions on t'.ie Req•Jirements for 
Successful Implementation of Advanced Manufacturing Technology (AMT) was mailed to 
you. You were selected to be included in the survey sample due to your extensive knowle 
dge in the the process of implementing some projects in your companv. We wou ld 
therefore greatly appreciate it if you would take some time to complete and return the 
q•Jestionnaire to us tod'Jy. Your respon"e is very important to the successful completion o 
f this study. lf, however, you have already completed and returned t he questionnaire to 
us, please accept our sincere thanks. 
If by some chance you did not receive the questionnaire, or it got misplaced, a 
replacement copy is e:-iclosed, and return postage is provided for your conv':'nience. When 
the instrument is completed, please fold it lengthwise so that the return address is v 
isible, and staple it closed, and drop it in the mail. 
As a token of our appreciati::in of your time and effort in completing the questionnaire, a 
one-cup pack of Flavored Lipton Caffeine-Free Tr=a-Bag is included. We thought you 
might enjoy a cup of tea while completing the questionnaire. You will notice t'lat w e 
included a caffeine-free tea this time around, just in case you prefer caffeine-free tea to 
the regular tea-bag which was the token enclosed in our first mailing. 
If you have any questions about this survey, please call us at (405) 744 - 6055. 
Sincerely, 
DJ-. w.~ J; Iv c~ \ ~v&1w:_ I .... J.!.. 
* 
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DATA FROM OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS 
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RESPONSES TO THE OPEN ENDED QUESTIONS 
Open-ended questions were included in the survey 
questionnaire to give the respondents an opportunity to 
express t heir views on AMT implementation issues beyond t h e 
s et.of items provided in the closed-ended questions. The 
questions asked were expected to to provide some support, 
and to further strengthen the responses to closed-ended 
items. The responses to open-ended questions are presented 
below, grouped by individual questions. The responses as 
presented here were quoted as close as possible to the form 
presented by t h e respondents. with the only changes 
occurring in s t atements t hat had information that would 
reveal the iden tity of t he respondents or their firms. The 
reader will not ice repeti tions of some items in the 
responses. these were left in the sets to indicate the 
frequency of occurrence of e a ch item under each question 
posed. 
QUESTION f: l: 
If you had to implement your AMT system all over again. 
what would you do differently? 
The responses as given b y the respondents for this 
question. are listed below : 
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1. Start the software deve l opment off with a more clear l y 
defined set of requirements. 
2. Involve more personnel from the affected departments in 
the plann ing stages. 
3. Locate designers and developers together sooner. 
4. Obtain agreement fr om al l departments represented in 
the .AMT team that technical direction as wel l as budget 
and schedule cont rol is p rovided by AMT program off ice 
and not line organizational departments. 
5. Combine .. visual-aids" project with the "actual .. project 
to insure timely implementation. 
6. Develop a more thorough requirements defin ition prior 
to starting computer software design. 
7. Provide a break between operations to simplify the line 
design, as opposed to one complex line. 
8. P lant staff came on board over 12 months. a fter plant 
d esign was set . Should be part of planning. Average 
age of staff, excluding plant manager, was 29. No one 
had a good knowledge of managing processor much 
experience managing people. 
9. Better up-front planning about the plant operating 
organization and what 's ahead. 
10. More specific simulation concerning the f'lexibility of 
the manufacturing process. 
11. Insist that more technical competence and experience be 
involved. 
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12. Concentrate all efforts to evolve human systems towards 
t he p roper development of the technical systems. 
13. Insi s t upon appropriate start-up staffing to deal with 
the myriad of problems at that time. 
14. Set h igher standards for completeness and accuracy of 
speci £ications and documentation. 
15. Use more commercial sof tware instead o f .. h omegrown " 
variety. 
16. Use distributed computers and UNIX. instead of IBM 
mainframe. 
17. We deve l oped this system wi th this par t icular project 
in mind. I would like to have included other plant 
locations in this project and developed it on a 
corporate wide basis. We were the plant in our firm to 
develop this type of system. If it was on the 
corporat e level. we would have been able to realize a 
greater benefit for the company. 
18. Secure participation and support of middle management. 
19. Push for more rapid implementation. 
20. Involve shop earlier; too much engineering. 
21. Better definition of project management to factory 
management. 
22. Obtain unquestioned support and commitment of resources 
(proper personnel. commitment of all a£fecte d 
organizations) by top management. 
23. Be more intentional in providing training and 
application of "management of changeM principles. 
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24. Work more closely wi th user's in t he beginning. 
25. Would draw from the middl e managers and hourly 
employees. More of their ideas and attempts to obtain 
greater buy-in to the concept. 
26. Detailed analysis of possib le threats to plants 
execution . 
27. Set-up small prototype implementat ion. 
28. Better education of support groups. 
29. Since we are implementing in phases we are able to 
adjust to the variances encountered. However. I would 
train the implementation Team more extensively pr ior t o 
starting and establish real i stic goals to scheduling. 
30. Define and develop a more through AS-IS/TO-BE scen ario 
with the defined c ost and saving estimates. 
31. Obtaining higher management input and suppor t and 
additional resources. 
32. Try to secure enough f unding for the .AMT implementation 
process. Insufficient funding is a major constraint to 
a successful .AMT program. 
33. Select more flexible. smaller, lower cost equipment. 
34 . Ensure involvement at all levels. 
35. Prepare manufacturing throu gh quality improvements 
prior to implementation. 
36. Fu l l time project team. 
37. Commitment from upper and middle management via pay 
i ncentives. 
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38. Take a better look a the information flow existing and 
desired after implementation. 
39. Provide education t o management early and a more 
det ailed training l ater. 
40. Take a longer range look at downstream data 
requ i rements in such areas as technical publications. 
shop floor data access. etc. 
41. More cell team leader training. 
42. Would change some machine t ools and control hardware. 
43. Try to make it more user-friendly. 
4 4. Spend more time educating people as t o the process and 
focus more participation by the people in-house. 
1-tS. The in-house participants need to take complete 
o wn ership o f the problem and the solution. 
46 . The system went in on time and met all of the signed~ 
off users requirements and system functional s pecs. 
The only thing I would change has to deal with 
corporate culture and the way in wh ich its various 
departments int eract with the corporation and each 
other. 
47. Have more face to face meetings with vendors on 
inter facing of equipment. 
48. Spend more time - selling- the system. 
49. Ascertain more definitive customer requirements and 
forecast of need. 
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50. Charter the user organization with authori ty and 
responsibility for ent ire project. Top management 
should communicate that charter through all 




In your opinion, what are the top three factors 
inhibiting a more rapid implementat ion of this AMT project 
in your firm? 
The list of the top three factors as presented by 
respondents for this question , are as follows: 
1 . Lack of user acceptance. 
2. Inadequate functional design (revisions required). 
3. Priority conflict with ongoing production demand. 
4. Changing requirements. 
5. Non-standard hardware. 
6. Lengthy software development. 
7 . Machine vendor missed delivery dates. 
8 Agreement to control hardware for production 
implement ation. 
9. Aggressive support of all departments involved in the 
project implementation. 
10. Line design was too complex. 
11. Plant s t aff did not 11Buy In .. to the project teams 
design . 
12. Simulation n ot detailed enough - did not examine the 
complexity in the inspection/packaging process. 
13. Late designation of key staff. 
14 . No one had real in depth experience with processors. 
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15. Lead eng ineer on site was of .. old school" ""I know how 
to do it•. 
16. Too much new technology being tackled at one time . 
17. Inadequate engineering support for designed syst ems. 
18. I nadequate staff support for start-up circumstances. 
19. Need to continue manufacturing during cutover to new 
system. 
20. Too few software developers. 
21. Users' resistance to change. 
22. Employees who are against change. 
23. "Old Timers'" who do not trust automation and comput ers. 
24. Employees, especially middle management, who were too 
busy to learn about the system. 
25. Lack of active support of middle management. 
26. Some key managers who declined to participate. 
27. Inadequate push from the top. 
28. Lack of commitment. 
29. Poor choice of personnel resources. 
30. Lack of adequate funds. 
31. Government procurement process . 
32. Tradition (we have not done it that way). 
33. Communication up and down between management. 
34. Vast size of plant. 
35. Age of plant. 
36. Organizational boundaries. 
37. Lack of support and acceptance by mid a anagers and 
hourly employees. 
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38. Lack of in-house ability to develop new business 
systems required for CIM system. We have 100 
programmers working on this issue but this will be the 
primary factor inhibiting more rapid implementation. 
39. Adjusting to change. 
40. Lack of training. 
41. Scheduling - not to inhibit production requirements. 
42. Space requirements. 
43. Lack of top management awareness/support. 
44. Middle management turf battles/inertia. 
45. Huge size of organization (45,000 people). 
46. Savings justificat ion. 
47. Development/imp lementation functions better defined. 














Long-term orientation of the AMT process. 
Management in-fighting. 
Poor process control and product quality. 
Poor education of employees (all levels) (traditional 
educat ion. not proj ect specif ic). 
57. Poor product design. 
58. Culture change. 
59. Commitment. 
60. Resources. 
61. No disposition toward long term suppl i ers in th i s 
technology area. 
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62. Each factory is it's own profit center. hence they h a ve 
the ability to make their own choices 0£ systems and 
level of integration. 
63. Education/training. 
64. Leadership. 
65 . Reward system. 
66. Leadership training. 
67. Team member training. 
68. Identifying location of cell teams in the manufacturing 
flow. 
69. Copying the concept many plants lack the qualified 
personnel. 
70. Level of staff and financial requirements. 
71. Lack of direction from top management. 
72. Staff i n-fighting in terms of priorities. 
73. No full-time employees on .AMT projects. 
74 . Managements reluctance to spend the money. 
75. Resistance to change. 
76. Intangible cost and value of the study to develop an 
i mplementation plan. 
77. The tendency to rely on the consultant team too much -
and then not value the results they present. 
78. Lack of corporate and facility buy-in and 
participation. 
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79. Poor communication and co-ordination within the var ious 
d epar tments involved. 
80. Mor e par t icipation by the .. customers" ... they often do 
not really know what they want. change direction 
frequently and cause schedule delays and cost build 
ups. 
81. Interfacing with Government. 
82. Interfacing with vendors. 
83. Time required to justify the project. 
84. Time required to build consensus. 
85. Time required to resolve divisional differences. 
86. Lack of top level strategic direction. 
87. Lack of long term resource commi t ment. 
88. Resistance to change. 
89. Budget allocations (almost always short of operation 
needs). 
90. Management in-fighting. 
91. Long-range orientation of R&D and associated costs. 
92. Cust omer requirements. 
93. Geographical d ispersion. 
94. Lack of competent management. 
95. Econ omic factors - program cancellations. 
96. Lack of cooperation from product engineering in design 
modifications for robotic manufacturing. 
QUESTION t 3: 
In your opinion, what are the top three factors that 
contributed to the successful implementation o f this AMT 
project in your firm? 
the list of t he top three factors as presented by 
respondents for this question are listed below: 
1. Building a project team and isolating them from 
political demands of home departments. 
2. Top management interest, support, and commitment to 
successful implementation. 
3. User participation in design. 
Lt. Contractually imposed demonstration dates. 
5. Good people assigned to the project. 
6. Location of designers and developers together. 
7. Middle management Support. 
8. Pragmatic approach to implementation. 
9. Decision to implement was strategic and not based 
on short term Return on Investment (ROI). 
10. All disciplines were involved in the project. 
11. Project management focus. 
12. Technical support at start - up by people who know t he 
process to be automated. 
13. Top management support of doing things differently. 
14. Adequate funding. 
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15. Top management agreement to ""do it right .. even if' 
sch edule slipped. 
16. Project management and planning. 
17. Selection of individuals on plant staff. 
18. Top management support to correct system d esign errors. 
19. Highly competent software developers. 
20. Management support. 
21. Star t ing the system up in a new plant. 
22. Dedication of the team members. 
23. This AMT project was implemented in a new plant - no 
old habits or retraining required. 
24. Desire of team members to accept a challenge. 
25. Support for concept from top of the plant (although it 
could have been more demanding). 
26. Outstanding project leader. 
27. Very successful introduction of MRP just proceeding .JIT 
on shop floor. 
28. Hard work by contractor and project team. 
29. Management support/corporation. 
30. Cross-functional team. 
31. Good upfront planning. 
32. New technology organization with creative/assertive 
leader. 
33. Assignment of " can do .. people to project. 
34. Management commitment. 
35. Customer support. 
36. User buy-in. 
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37. Dollars available t o support project. 
38. Strong commitment on part of u p per management. 
39. Having time to implement system without being forced to 
addr ess other issues immediately. 
40. Championship was effective. 
41. Simple beginn ing. 
42. Adver tise success/education. 
43. Top management support. 
44. The ability and desire to challenge. 
45. Dedication of i mplementation Team. 
46. Small core of dedicated enthusiastic people. 
47. Consultant expertise. 
48. Customer pressure on comp any. 
49. Perseverance. 
50. Str ong coordination and affiliation. 
51. Thorough planning. 
52. Technical k now how. 
53. Customer support. 
54. Available equ ipment. 
55. Dedicated staff. 
56. Market demand. 
57. Competition. 
58. Better understandin g of management. 
59. Good project team. 
60. Hultidisciplined implementation team . 
61. A Nlocal champion". 
62. Good education/training. 
239 
63. Top management commitment. 
64. Employee involve ment. 
65. Incentive system . 
66. Total team effort. 
67. Large volume production product. 
68. Peop le wanting to improve and be part of improveme nt. 
69. Planning. 
70. Teamwork. 
71. Phased implementation. 
72. Middle management's desire to see it happen. 
73. The engineer's ability to figure out and make it 
happen. 
74. Commitment and determination by a dedicated few. 
75 . Timeliness of the program relative to the upward or 
dot.mside market .conditions present. 
76. Vision of where the company needs to be t echnically in 
the next 5 years. 
77. Dedicated. knowledgeable. trained core team in a multi-
disciplined environment. 
78. Re-use of existing hardware and software .. modules .. from 
previous efforts. 
79. Clear and concise requirements and specifications in 
line with user expectations. 
80. Head of project team. 
81. Team leaders. 
82. Plant maintenance. 
83. The understanding and longevity of middle managers. 
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84. The commitment of the design team. 
85. The clear need for the system. 
86. Strong problem manager (over both engineering and 
manufacturing. 
87. Dedicat ed full time t eam. 
88. Market demand and pressure. 
89. Dedicat ion and perseverance of project personnel. 
90. Need t o outwit competition. 
91. Management. 
92. Technical expertise. 
93. Hard work. 
94 . Cooperation amongst cognizant organizations. 
95. Good vendor/supplier support. 
96. Clear understanding of specifications and requirements. 
QUESTION :f:4: 
In y our opinion. what are the top three specific 
benefits of t his AMT project implement ation to your firm? 
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the list of the top three factors as presented by 
respondents for t h is question are provided below= 
1. Flexibility to respond to changing production demand. 
2. Uisibility of tomorrow's requirements today. 
3. Reduced work in process (WIP) inventories. 
11. Reduced lead times. 
5. Reduced scrap and rework. 
6. Learn how to become partners. 
7. Consolidated data base. 
8. User education about factory o f the future. 
9 . Competitive position for the future. 
10. Reduced production cost. 
11. Reduced inventories. 
12. Capacity - meet sales forecast. 
13. Flex ibility - quick changeovers, small runs, better 
service. 
1~. Regional support of the business as opposed to having 
"al 1 the eggs'" in one basket with one plant. 
15. Proved AMT can work. 
16. Reduced management costs and tighter process control. 
17. Reduced inventories. 
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18. New manufacturing facility in western half of country -
customer service. 
19. Provides second U.S. manufacturing site which could 
potentially be favorable during corporate negotiations 
20. Manufacturing capacity. 
21. Decreased lead-times. 
22. Smaller inventories; work-in-process and raw material. 
23. Lower costs through decreased labor requirements. 
24. Improved customer service. 
25. Improved quality. 
26. Less labor required to perform tasks. 
27. Greatly shortened manufacturing interval - greater 
flexibility. 
28. Potential for lower cost. 
29. Sparked improvements in other parts of this facility 
and in other facilities. 
30. More efficient process planning. 
31. More efficient design process. 
32. Reduction in process planning time. 
33. Routing standardization. 
34. Tooling standardization. 
35. Exposure as a company with innovative manufacturing 
technology. 
36. Set the tone for follow-on projects to modernize. 
37. Future survival. 
38. Financial. 
39. Communica tions. 
243 
40. Reduced cost. 
41. Better turnaround time for production. 
42. Reduced inventory or parts in process. 
43. Productivity improvements . 
• 44. Inventory savings. 
45. Plant form for integration. 
46. Improved quality. 
47. Improved productivity. 
48. Reduction of cost. 
49. Will reduce costs. 
50. Manufacturing will be more flexible. 
51. Quality improvement. 
52. Costs savings. 
53. Quality. 
54. Cost savings. 
55. Reduces span time. 
56. Introduction of new technology. 
57. Streamlining of the production process. 
58. Cost reduction. 
59. Product quality improvement. 
60. Learned not to do it again. 
61. Learned where to focus attention. 
62. Single plan used by all organizations. 
63. Reduced inventory and WIP cost. 
64. Proactive instead of reactive management. 
65. Reduced product cost. 
66. Improved product quality. 
67. Reduced product change/introduction times. 
68. Customer satisfaction. 
69. Company reputation. 
70. Reduce the overall product costs. 
71. Cost reduction. 
72. WIP reduction. 
73. Cycle time reduction. 
74. Quality improvement. 
75. Lead time reduction. 
76. Cost savings. 
77. Reduce paperwork. 
78. Increased product ion. 
79. Easier access to information. 
80. I t forced us to examine and question the way we do 
t hings. 
81. Spin off projects that come from the study time. We 
were not aware needed doing. 
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82. Uisible "success story" to prove that our methods. 
tools and people can p r ovide higher quality systems at 
lower overall cost. 
83. Increased user acceptance and understanding which leads 
to better process capabilities. 
84. Provided a test bed or platform for higher level 
integration activities. 
85. Quality product. 
86. Worker safety improvements. 
87. Productivity improvements. 
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88. Accuracy of information. 
89. Timeliness of information. 
90. Manufacturing performance. 
91. Enhanced competitive position on this product line. 
92. Will serve as pilot for other plant application. 
93. Cost reduct ion. 
9~. Quality improvement. 
95. Streamlining of product ion process. 
96. Knowledge. 
97. Experience. 
98. Potential future improvements. 
99. Increased flexibility in implementing design changes. 
100. Reduced tooling costs. 
101. Reduced schedule impact during design changes. 
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